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opinio	 juris.	 However,	 there	 is	 a	 current	 trend	 in	 legal	 argument	 by	 Third	 World	
Approaches	 to	 International	 Law	 (TWAIL)	 that	 challenges	 these	 state	 practices	
arguably	dominated	by	Western	ideologies.	Based	on	these	challenges,	the	purpose	
of	this	research	is	not	to	discard	these	trends;	rather	it	interrogates	the	basic	principle	









































































































Customary	 international	 law	 is	 one	 of	 the	 main	 sources	 of	 international	 law.	
Traditionally,	 it	 is	 constituted	 from	 state	 practice	 and	 opinio	 juris.1	 This	 definition	
places	the	creation	of	custom	solely	on	states.	State	practice	is	commonly	understood	
as	the	objective	element	of	custom,	centred	on	generality	and	uniformity	of	practice,	
although	 it	 does	 not	 require	 every	 state	 to	 adopt	 a	 given	 practice.2	 Besides	 state	
practice,	opinio	 juris	 is	 understood	 as	 the	 subjective	 (or	 psychological)	 element	 of	
custom	based	on	the	motive	behind	the	behaviour	of	a	state.3	This	subjective	element	
rests	 on	 the	 expectation	 that	 a	 practice	 must	 be	 followed	 by	 a	 sense	 of	 legal	




interests	 –	 and	 continues	 to	 do	 so.	 Far	 from	 being	 defeatist	 about	 this	 bias	 and	










3	 Ian	 Brownlie,	 Principles	 of	 Public	 International	 Law	 (7th	 edn.)	 (2008)	 see	 note	 2;	 David	 P.	 Fidler,	
‘Challenging	 the	Classical	Concept	of	Custom:	Perspective	on	 the	Future	of	Customary	 International	
Law’	(1996)	GYIL	39,	p.	198.	









through	 non-state	 actors	 that	 encourages	 a	 wider	 participation	 of	 diverse	 legal	
traditions.	








not	 the	 case,	 as	 non-European	 states	 were	 compelled	 to	 adopt	 the	 customary	
international	law	based	on	European	ideologies,	which	were	mostly	formulated	during	
the	 colonial	 era.	 This	 situation	 has	 continued	 to	 raise	 concerns	 over	 a	 lack	 of	
representation,	 non-participation	 and	 domination	 in	 custom-making	 in	 the	 Third	
World.	However,	non-European	states	have	sought	to	change	this	imbalance	but	have	




non-European	 entities	 were	 not	 regarded	 as	 sovereign	 states.	 This	 situation	 excluded	 them	 from	
participating	in	international	law	making.	Independence	conferred	on	them	sovereign	statehood	which	
ultimately	is	expected	to	put	them	on	an	equal	level	to	their	European	counter-parts	with	full	rights	
and	privileges	under	 international	 law.	However,	 this	 has	not	been	 the	 case	 in	 terms	of	 customary	














International	 Law	 (referred	 to	 as	 TWAIL	 throughout	 this	 thesis);	 resisting	 these	










8	 Karol	 Wolfke,	 ‘Some	 Persistent	 Controversies	 Regarding	 Customary	 International	 Law’	 (1993)	 24	
NETHERLANDS	 YEARBOOK	 OF	 INTERNATIONAL	 LAW,	 p.	 1;	 Stephen	 Schwebel,	 ‘United	 Nations	
Resolutions,	Recent	Arbitral	Awards	and	Customary	International	Law’,	in		Adriaan	Bos	and	Hugo	Siblesz	
(eds.),	Realism	in	Law-Making:	Essays	on	International	Law	in	Honour	of	Willem	Riphagen	(Dordrecht:	
Martinus	 Nijhoff,	 1986)	 203;	 Michael	 Byers,	 Custom,	 Power	 and	 the	 Power	 of	 Rules:	 International	
Relations	and	Customary	International	Law	(1999)	see	note	1,	at	pp.	40-43.	
9	Makau	Mutua,	‘What	is	TWAIL?’	(2000)	2	ASIL	Proceedings,	p.	31.	







Both	 the	 hegemonic	 nature	 of	 international	 law	 as	well	 as	 the	 practice	 of	 seeking	
alternative	 solutions	 to	 daily	 problems	 with	 legal	 purchase	 outside	 of	 the	 state	
questions	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 state	 as	 the	 sole	 actor	 in	 control	 of	 both	 national	 and	
international	affairs	in	law-making	from	the	Third	World	perspective.	




Third	World	 through	scholarship,	policy	and	politics	 for	 the	benefit	of	 those	 in	 the	
Third	World.13	These	TWAIL	objectives	address	concerns	mostly	 in	the	areas	of	the	
history	 of	 international	 law,	 human	 rights	 and	 globalisation.	 However,	 research	 is	
limited	in	the	area	of	the	practices	and	opinions	of	Third	World	non-state	actors	that	
influence	international	custom-making.	Such	research	would	have	revealed	whether	









International	 Law:	 A	 Manifesto’,	 (2006)	 INTERNATIONAL	 COMMUNITY	 LAW	 REVIEW,	 8:	 3-27;	 J	













role	 of	 non-state	 actors	 in	 regards	 to	 custom-making	 in	 international	 law,	
notwithstanding	the	traditional	position	that	customary	international	law	depends	on	
state	 practice	 and	opinio	 juris.14	 This	 thesis	 questions	 the	 basic	 principle	 of	 public	
international	law’s	dependence	on	the	state	by	attempting	to	bring	into	perspective	
some	 compelling	 activities	 of	 groups	 of	 non-state	 actors	 in	 the	 Third	 World	 that	
challenge	this	traditional	notion.	This	provides	evidence	of	resistant	practices	of	non-
state	actors,	leading	to	the	development	of	customary	rules	in	the	political	and	socio-
economic	 lives	 of	 people	 in	 the	 Third	World,	 particularly	 in	 African	 societies.	 This	




central	 figure	 in	 raising	 awareness	 of	 the	 colonial	 legacies	 of	 international	 law)	
described	 this	 phenomenon	 as	 ‘a	 unity	 in	 diversity’.15	 He	 argued	 that	 common	
practices	 prevailed	 over	 many	 areas	 of	 pre-colonial	 Africa	 and	 these	 practices	
																																								 																				
14	See	note	1.	














the	 legal	 capacity	 of	 the	 diverse	 pre-colonial	 African	 ‘entities’	 in	 the	 international	
system.	 However,	 the	 resilience	 of	 Africans	 (and	 other	 Third	 World	 peoples)	 in	
recapturing	their	place	in	the	international	legal	system	introduced	another	platform	
of	 participation	 through	 resistance	 to	 hegemonic	 rule.	 For	 instance,	 resistance	




authority	 that	 attempted	 to	 impose	 a	 tax	 on	 women,	 fierce	 resistance	 ensued.	 A	
landmark	act	of	resistance	was	the	ogu	umuwanyi,	commonly	referred	to	as	the	Aba	
women’s	 riot	 of	 1929.17	 The	 resistance	 by	 those	women	 shook	 the	 foundation	 of	
colonial	rule	in	Nigeria,	and	is	regarded	as	the	bedrock	of	anti-colonialism	in	Nigeria	
and	other	parts	of	Africa.	During	negotiations	between	the	women	and	the	colonial	
authority,	 the	women	asserted	 their	 rights	 to	 representation	 in	decisions	 affecting	
their	socio-economic	lives.	Ultimately,	they	were	able	to	compel	the	colonial	authority	
																																								 																				










making	 in	 international	 law.18	Arguably,	as	will	be	discussed	 in-depth	 in	 this	 thesis,	




this,	 as	 actors	 in	 a	 counter-hegemonic	 practice.	 The	 type	 of	 practices	 already	
introduced	are	arguably	common,	consistent	and	widespread	among	African	societies.	
Following	the	above	illustrations,	it	is	arguable	that	Third	World	non-state	actors	are	
contributing	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 custom	within	 the	African	 region	 that	 could	 (and	
should)	manifest	 in	 public	 international	 law.	 This	 challenges	 the	 insistence	 on	 the	
traditional	concept	of	state	practice	and	opinio	 juris	 in	 the	 formation	of	customary	
international	 law.	 The	 focus	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 in	 African	 states,	 and	 particularly	 in	
Nigeria.	However,	this	focus	should	be	regarded	as	illustrative	of	a	larger	phenomenon	
among	 non-state	 actors	 from	 the	 Third	World.	 The	 case	 study	 of	Nigeria	 arguably	























research	 aligns	 with	 those	 that	 believe	 in	 finding	 means	 of	 reform	 which	 can	
incorporate	interests	of	the	Third	World.	In	this	regard,	customary	international	law	is	
recognised	as	a	means	of	international	rule-making.	It	recognises	the	contribution	of	
states	 in	 custom-making.	 However,	 the	 state	 is	 seen	 as	 just	 one	 actor	 in	 the	
international	 sphere,	 in	which	 there	 are	other	 actors	playing	 various	 roles.19	More	
specifically,	this	thesis	brings	into	perspective	the	argument	that	post-colonial	states	
																																								 																				













‘hegemony’	 and	 ‘counter-hegemony’	 will	 be	 explored	 by	 making	 use	 of	 Antonio	
Gramsci’s	 the	 Prison	 Notebooks	 and	 other	 authors	 who	 have	 examined	 Gramsci’s	
notion	 of	 these	 concepts.	 It	 will	 also	 rely	 on	 TWAIL	 literature	 to	 establish	 the	




of	 the	Nigerian	 state	 from	 pre-colonial	 to	 post-colonial	 era.	 This	 exposes	 Nigerian	
domestic	 and	 international	 relations	 within	 this	 period.	 	 The	 chapter	 sets	 off	 the	




South.	 Contemporary	 challenges	 are	 necessitating	 the	 inclusion	 of	 diverse	 actors,	






The	 examination	of	 legal	 personality	 is	 the	 object	 of	 study	 in	 Chapter	 Four,	which	
acknowledges	 the	 works	 of	 scholars	 such	 as	 Hersch	 Lauterpacht,	 Robert	
McCorquodale,	 and	 Roland	 Portmann.20	 The	 conceptualisation	 of	 non-state	 actors	
from	the	Third	World	perspective	 in	 the	 later	part	of	Chapter	Four	will	answer	 the	
question	on	the	scope	of	non-state	actors	who	can	participate	in	law-making	in	this	
region.	
Finally,	 Chapter	 Five	 considers	 concrete	 examples	 of	 resistance	 through	 non-state	
actors.	 Education,	 scholarship,	 the	 media,	 judicial	 decisions	 and	 diverse	 social	
movements	will	be	used	as	frames	to	establish	the	counter-hegemonic	potential	of	
non-state	 actors	 in	 the	 making	 of	 international	 custom.	 It	 also	 assesses	 custom-
making	from	a	Third	World	perspective.	It	is	argued	that	customary	practices	arising	
from	 resistance	 in	 this	 region	 contribute	 to	 the	 development	 of	 customary	
international	law.	At	the	very	least,	these	practices	could	guide	law-making	activities	
within	the	region.	Furthermore,	it	is	posited	that	law-making	originating	from	African	
regions	 can	 and	 should	 contribute	 to	 the	 participation	 of	 non-state	 actors	 in	 the	
international	legal	system.	As	will	be	shown	in	this	thesis,	non-state	actors	contribute	
















Africans	 are	 familiar	 with	 the	 making	 and	 application	 of	 custom,	 as	 it	 governs	 a	
significant	part	of	their	interactions	and	predates	the	advent	of	colonialism.	Although	
there	are	similar	attributes	in	the	formation	of	custom	from	diverse	legal	traditions,	
such	as	 its	unwritten	nature,	 care	must	be	 taken	 in	order	not	 to	 trap	African	 legal	
thoughts	within	that	of	the	West.22	Here,	non-state	actors	play	significant	roles	in	its	
development,	irrespective	of	post-colonial	states.	
The	 choice	 of	 custom	 by	 Third	 World	 non-state	 actors	 over	 other	 sources	 of	
international	law	as	counter-hegemonic	may	be	challenged,	given	the	controversies	
surrounding	the	formation	of	custom.23	In	addition,	the	capacity	of	Third	World	non-




21Anthony	 D’Amato,	 The	 Concept	 of	 Custom	 in	 International	 Law	 (1971)	 note	 1	 at	 p.	 12;	 Patrick	














caused	 by	 the	 alien	 state	 system	 within	 the	 African	 region.	 It	 will	 also	 provide	 a	
platform	 for	 the	 resolution	 of	 countless	 conflicts	 between	 African	 indigenous	
communities	 and	 persons	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 post-colonial	 states’	 international	
‘collaborators’	 (such	 as	multinational	 corporations,	 institutions	 and	 other	 forms	 of	
state	power)	on	the	other	hand.		
v. BRIEF	LITERATURE	REVIEW	
The	 role	 of	 non-state	 actors	 in	 international	 law	 has	 become	 a	 topic	 of	 growing	
interest	 in	 international	 legal	 research.	Several	 scholars	have	dedicated	much	 time	
and	thought	to	discussions	on	the	legal	personality	of	non-states	actors	and	their	role	
in	international	law.	One	of	the	leading	authors	in	this	area,	Robert	McCorquodale,	
explores	 various	 areas	 of	 international	 law,	 such	 as	 international	 criminal	 law,	
international	 human	 rights	 law	 and	 international	 economic	 law	 to	 buttress	 the	
creation,	 development	 and	 enforcement	 of	 international	 law	 by	 individuals	 upon	
other	 subjects	 of	 international	 law.24	 Ultimately,	 McCorquodale	 foresees	 the	
feasibility	 of	 non-state	 actors’	 contributions	 to	 the	 development	 of	 customary	
international	law,	as	their	participations	affects	the	practice	of	international	law.		
Till	 Müller	 points	 to	 the	 interaction	 between	 national	 governments	 and	 non-
governmental	organisations	as	forming	part	of	modern	customary	international	law.25	









law’	 that	 is	 not	 exclusively	 dependent	 on	 states,	 but	 the	 entire	 international	
community.26	 Christiana	 Ochoa	 also	 makes	 some	 theoretical	 justifications	 for	 the	
inclusion	 of	 non-state	 actors,	 with	 a	 specific	 focus	 on	 individuals	 in	 customary	
international	law	formation.27	She	also	proposes	methods	by	which	these	particular	
non-state	 actors	 might	 participate	 in	 customary	 international	 law	 formation.	 Her	
methods	 include	 ‘belief	 and	 expectations’	 in	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 contents	 of	
customary	 international	 law.	 She	 used	 the	 term	 ‘expectation’	 to	 capture	 what	
individuals	expect	from	interactions	with	other	subjects.	This	is	in	regards	to	the	ways	
in	which	the	state	or	other	entities	ought	to	behave.	Ochoa	compares	‘belief’	to	opinio	
juris	 although	 ultimately	 dispensing	 with	 the	 term	 ‘opinio	 juris’	 so	 as	 to	 avoid	
confusion	with	traditional	state-based	opinio	juris.28			
A	further	pertinent	source	is	the	International	Law	Commission’s	third	report	(headed	
by	 	 Special	 Rapporteur	 Sir	 Michael	 Wood)	 on	 the	 role	 of	 inaction,	 treaties	 and	
resolutions,	 judicial	 decisions	 and	 writings,	 the	 relevance	 of	 international	
organisations,	 as	 well	 as	 particular	 custom	 and	 the	 persistent	 objector	 in	 the	
identification	of	custom.29	Although	there	is	heavy	a	reliance	on	traditional	means	of	
formation	 of	 custom	 based	 on	 state	 practice	 and	 opinio	 juris,	 there	 could	 be	 a	















works	 on	 custom-making	 by	 non-state	 actors	 have	 raised	 divergent	 opinions,	 as	
demonstrated	 above,	 this	 research	builds	on	 the	need	and	possibility	 of	 non-state	
actors	in	custom-making	from	the	Third	World	approach.	It	adds	a	novel	perspective	
to	 the	on-going	debate	by	 investigating	 the	 role	of	practices	and	opinions	of	Third	
World	 non-state	 actors	 as	 a	 counter-hegemonic	 tool	 for	 their	 participation,	 self-




elements	 of	 custom	 to	 ascertain	 whether	 there	 are	 (re)emerging	 and	 continuing	
contributions	to	custom-making.	
vi. STRUCTURE	OF	THESIS	





30	Michael	Wood,	Special	Rapporteur,	 ‘Third	report	on	 identification	of	customary	 international	 law’	





















systems.	The	 chapter	also	explores	Nigerian	 independence	and	 its	 admittance	 into	
international	organisations,	which	appears	 to	demonstrate	Nigerian	consent	 to	 the	
reproduction	of	hegemony	in	the	making	of	customary	international	law.	The	chapter	















despite	 the	 current	 rules	of	 customary	 international	 law	having	been	modelled	on	
Western	 traditions	 and	 norms.	 Underlying	 factors	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 custom	 are	
examined	 to	 uncover	 flexibilities	 and	 evolutionary	 processes	 that	 could	 provide	
opportunities	 for	 the	 inclusion	 of	 non-state	 actors.	 Chapter	 three	 concludes	 by	





personality	 and	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 historical	 presence	 of	 non-state	 actors	 in	
international	law.	A	critical	enquiry	into	accepted	historical	narratives	is	necessary,	as	
it	has	been	observed	that	authors	appear	to	choose	divergent	pathways	in	beginning	








non-state	 actors	 and	 their	 contemporary	 roles	 in	 the	 international	 sphere.	
Furthermore,	this	chapter	will	examine	self-determination	and	the	conceptualisation	
of	non-state	actors	in	the	Third	World.	
The	 fifth	and	 final	chapter	demonstrates	 that	 the	resistance	and	practices	of	some	
Third	World	non-state	actors	are	effecting	changes	in	their	daily	lives,	as	well	as	their	
transnational	 relationships,	 and	 this	 could	 influence	 the	 formation	 of	 customary	
international	 law	 beyond	 a	 state	 monopoly.	 It	 will	 first	 identify	 some	 tools	 of	
resistance	used	by	 the	Third	World,	 such	as	solidarity,	education,	a	composition	of	















emphasises	 the	African	perspective.	Naturally,	Africa	 is	not	a	homogenous	 society.	
While	presenting	the	poly-ethnic	nature	of	Africa,	care	must	be	taken	in	order	not	to	
exaggerate	 the	 situation	 so	 that	 the	 effects	 of	 past	 and	 present	 socio-economic	
contacts	among	its	people	are	not	suppressed.31	In	this	thesis,	Nigeria	is	used	as	a	lens	
to	 explore	 the	 terms,	 hegemony	 and	 counter-hegemony	 in	 relation	 to	 customary	
international	law.	In	many	respects,	the	Nigerian	situation	is	similar	to	the	experience	
of	other	African	states	and	peoples.	Before	British	colonisation,	there	was	no	single	
entity	 called	 Nigeria.32	 Pre-colonial	 Nigeria	 was	 made	 up	 of	 several	 autonomous	
societies.	 The	 northern	 and	 western	 parts	 of	 the	 country	 were	 characterised	 by	
centralised	systems	of	government.33	In	these	parts	of	Nigeria,	there	was	evidence	of	
trade	 and	 diplomatic	 interaction	 with	 other	 neighbouring	 societies	 and	 European	
trading	nations.34	Prominent	among	these	societies	are	 the	Hausas/Fulanis,	Yoruba	
and	 the	 Benin	 people.	 Southern	 and	 Eastern	 parts	 of	 Nigeria	 practised	 (and	 still	
practice)	a	decentralised	system	of	government	that	may	be	regarded	today	as	a	form	
of	direct	democracy.35	Prominent	among	these	groups	are	the	Igbos.		
Like	 most	 African	 states,	 Nigeria	 experienced	 colonial	 rule	 between	 the	 late	
nineteenth	and	mid-twentieth	century	and	was	created	out	of	colonial	domination.	It	
attained	 independence	 in	1960.	As	has	been	 frequently	noted,	particularly	 in	post-
























customary	 rules	emanating	 from	Third	World	non-state	actors.	To	 fill	 this	gap,	 this	
thesis	 aims	 to	 promote	 an	 alternative	 legal	 vision	 for	 the	 Third	World	 rather	 than	
defending	the	(hegemonic)	status	quo	 in	 international	 law	making.39	 In	this	regard,	
																																								 																				
36Makau	W	Mutua,	‘Why	Redraw	the	Map	of	Africa:	A	Moral	and	Legal	Inquiry’	(1995),	note	10;	Richard	
Drayton,	 The	 wealth	 of	 the	 west	 was	 built	 on	 Africa's	 exploitation	 ‘	 available	 at	
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/aug/20/past.hearafrica05	 [accessed	 on	 25	 September	
2016];	Frantz	Fanon,	The	Wretched	of	the	Earth,	Translated	by	Richard	Philcox	(New	York:	Grove	Press,	
1963);	Edward	W.	Said,	Orientalism	(London:	Penguin	books,	2005-	Reprint);	Gayati	Chkravorty	Spivak,	

































In	 order	 to	 set	 out	 the	 parameters	 of	 the	 study	 of	 the	 hegemonic	 and	 counter-
hegemonic	properties	of	customary	international	law,	this	chapter	examines	some	key	
terminologies	 used	 in	 this	 thesis.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 term	 ‘hegemony’.	 This	 research	
adopts	 Antonio	 Gramsci’s	 idea	 of	 hegemony.	 According	 to	 Gramsci,	 power	 is	









times	 in	 respect	of	his	 alleged	 roles	 in	British	 colonialism,	 racism	and	oppression.	 There	have	been	
protests	 against	 the	 retention	 of	 his	 statue	 in	University	 environments	 and	 this	 has	 resulted	 in	 his	
sculpture	being	removed	from	the	University	of	Cape	Town	and	request	for	same	to	be	removed	from	
the	University	of	Oxford,	United	Kingdom.	See	Martin	Hall,	‘The	symbolic	statue	dividing	a	South	African	
university’	 BBC	 news	 available	 at	 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-31945680	 [accessed	 on	 21	


















I	 ask	 the	 following	 questions:	 Does	 the	 insistence	 on	 the	 formation	 of	 customary	
international	 law	 through	 state	 practice	 and	opinio	 juris	 represent	 hegemony	 of	 a	
particular	Western	ideology?	If	so,	what	form	does	such	hegemonic	rule	take	and	how	
has	 it	 been	 reproduced	 in	 the	 making	 of	 customary	 international	 law?	 The	
examination	of	these	issues	will	attempt	to	reveal	how	the	dominant	Western	position	
on	custom	is	presented	and	reproduced	as	a	universal	ideology.		
The	 other	 side	 of	 the	 story	 is	 one	 of	 customary	 international	 law	 as	 counter-
hegemonic.	The	acceptance	of	custom	as	an	important	source	of	law,	no	matter	which	
society,	and	the	flexible	nature	of	its	principle,	also	provide	a	space	for	Third	World	
resistance.3	 In	spite	of	 the	strength	of	hegemonic	practices	 in	post-colonial	African	
states,	 several	 non-state	 actors	 have	 been	 resisting	 such	 domination.4	 	 The	











efforts	 of	 the	 Third	 World	 to	 assert	 themselves	 in	 the	 making	 of	 customary	
international	law.	The	continuous	presence	of	non-state	actors	and	their	participation	
from	pre-colonial	to	postcolonial	Africa	presents	a	‘decisive	factor’	of	the	African	voice	
in	 international	 relations.	Consequently,	 the	 role	of	non-state	actors	as	a	potential	
alternative	 to	 strict	 insistence	 on	 post-colonial	 African	 states	 as	 sole	 actors	 in	 the	
formation	of	customary	 international	 law	 is	made	 imperative	 in	 the	African	reality.	
Such	an	alternative	is	imperative	if	Africans	and	the	rest	of	the	Third	World	are	not	to	
remain	what	this	thesis	terms	‘perpetual-recipient-heirs’	of	hegemonic	international	









This	 thesis	 is	 framed	 on	 TWAIL	 perspectives	 in	 that	 it	 highlights	 practices	 of	
exploitation	 in	 the	 colonial	 encounter	 between	 the	 former	 colonial	 powers	 (in	 the	
Global	North)	and	the	colonised	peoples	(in	the	Global	South).		
																																								 																				






perspective.	 The	 Nigerian	 perspective	 is	 interesting	 because	 it	 is	 in	 a	 sense	 a	






The	 question	 of	 development	 and	 law	 is	 first	 and	 foremost	 a	 question	 of	 political	
economy.	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 adopt	 a	 critical	 perspective	 on	 universality	 and	 how	 it	




principles	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 ruling	 class.7	 This	 brings	 into	 perspective	 Marx’s	
criticism	of	the	mode	of	production	based	on	capitalism	that	enables	the	bourgeois	
(owner	of	 capital)	 to	exploit	 the	proletariat.8	Adopted	 to	 the	 relationship	between	
																																								 																				




international	 law,	 proliferation	 of	 international	 courts	 and	 tribunals,	 and	 the	 emerging	 multi-level	
international	governance.	On	the	other	hand,	it	has	been	argued	that	heterogeneity	does	not	exclude	
the	 universality	 of	 international	 law,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 law	 retains	 and	 develops	 its	 capacity	 to	
accommodate	 an	 ever-larger	 measure	 of	 such	 heterogeneity.	 See	 Bruno	 Simma,	 ‘Universality	 of	














There	are	divergent	opinions	and	 interpretations	of	 the	 concept	of	hegemony	and	
such	views	render	 it	 ‘elastic	and	contestable’.10	Antonio	Gramsci,	an	Italian	Marxist	
theorist,	largely	conceptualised	hegemony	in	his	Prison	Notebooks	(1929-1935),	which	
he	wrote	 during	 his	 incarceration	 under	Mussolini’s	 regime.11	Gramsci’s	works	 are	
dominated	 by	 his	 experience	 of	 Italian	 culture:	 political,	 historical	 and	 ‘super-
structural’.	 His	 works	 were	 also	 influenced	 by	Machiavelli’s	 philosophy	 on	 human	
action,	 the	 importance	of	 leadership	and	political	craft;	a	praxis-based	approach	 in	








University	 Press,	 2013)	pp.	 65-76.	 See	 also	Christian	 Fuchs	 and	Vincent	Mosco	 (Eds.)	Marx	and	 the	
Political	Economy	of	the	Media	(Leiden-Boston:	Brill,	2015)	p.	1.	
10	Jonathan	Joseph,	Hegemony:	A	Realist	analysis	(London-New	York:	Routledge,	2002).	
11	 Antonio	 Gramsci,	 Selections	 from	 Prison	Notebooks	 of	 Antonio	 Gramsci	 (edited	 and	 selected	 by	
Quintin	Hoare	and	Geoffrey	Nowell	Smith)	(London:	Lawrence	and	Wishart,	1971).		
12	 Antonio	 Gramsci,	 Selections	 from	 Prison	 Notebooks	 (1971),	 see	 note	 11	 at	 pp.	 248-9;	 Niccolò,	
Machiavelli,	 ‘The	Art	of	War’	 in	The	Chiefs	and	Others,	Vol.	 2,	 (Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	





This	 usually	 occurs	 through	 the	 ruling	 class,	 which	 establishes	 a	 particular	 set	 of	
cultural	norms,	upholds	these	norms	and	declares	them	to	be	natural	and	ineluctable.	




Nevertheless,	Gramsci’s	 idea	of	hegemony	emphasises	 the	maintenance	of	 control	
that	is	achieved	through	consent,	rather	than	via	violence	or	coercion.	Such	consent	




help	 to	maintain	 the	 status	quo	 instead	of	 revolting.	 Consequently,	 a	 social	 order,	
which	 produces	 and	 reproduces	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	 dominant	 class,	 is	maintained	
through	 a	 nexus	 of	 institutions,	 social	 relations	 and	 ideas	 built	 on	 a	 political	 and	
																																								 																				
13	 T.	 J.	 Jackson	 Lears,	 ‘The	 Concept	 of	 Cultural	 Hegemony:	 Problems	 and	 Possibilities’	 (185)	 THE	
AMERICAN	HISTORICAL	REVIEW,	Vol.	90,	No	3,	pp.567-	593.		








sustain	 relations	of	domination.’	Here,	 ‘some	 individuals	and	groups	benefit	more	 than	others,	 and	
which	some	individuals	and	groups	have	an	interest	in	preserving	while	others	may	see	to	contest.’	See	
John	 B.	 Thomspson,	 Ideology	 and	 Modern	 Culture:	 Critical	 Social	 Theory	 in	 the	 Era	 of	 Mass	
Communication	 (California:	 Stanford	 University	 Press,	 1990);	 Susan	 Marks,	 The	 Riddles	 of	 All	






ideological	 superstructure.15	 Through	 this,	 political	 practices,	 norms,	 values	 and	
relations	are	shaped	on	the	terms	of	the	ruling	class.16	
The	idea	of	the	state	and	civil	society	are	crucial	to	understanding	Gramsci’s	political	
thought.	 Gramsci	 expanded	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 state	 beyond	 the	 elements	 of	






the	 police,	 army,	 and	 legal	 systems,	 amongst	 others	 form	 the	 space	 for	 political	








































21	Uprendra	D	Acharya,	 ‘Globalization	 and	Hegemony	 Shift:	 Are	 States	Merely	 Agents	 of	 Corporate	
Capitalism?’	(2013)	BOSTON	COLLEGE	LAW	REVIEW,	Vol.	54,	Issue	3,	p.	937.	





























158;	and	RP	Anand,	Development	of	Modern	 International	 Law	and	 India	 (Germany:	Nomos,	2005).	
However,	 the	attribution	of	 the	history	of	 international	 to	European	origin	has	 faced	criticisms	and	
viewed	as	a	distortion.	Non-European	scholars	who	give	account	on	how	their	home	legal	traditions,	
practices	and	activities	have	contributed	to	 the	development	of	 international	 law	usually	 raise	such	
criticisms.	They	argue	that	the	development	of	 international	 law	is	not	to	be	regarded	as	a	Western	
privilege.	See	Taslim	O	Elias,	Africa	and	the	Development	of	International	Law,	second	revised	edition	
by	 Richard	 Akinjide	 (Dordrecht:	 Martinus	 Nijhoff	 Publishers,	 1988)	 and	 JJG	 Syatauw,	 Some	 Newly	
Established	Asian	States	and	the	Development	of	International	law	(The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff,	1961)	
at	29-30.	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	 the	History	of	 International	 Law	 (Oxford:	OUP,	2012)	 is	 a	 recent	


















centred	 law.32	 Since	 then,	 this	European	 form	of	politics	and	 law	has	 continued	 to	
define	international	law	as	it	has	moved	from	the	European	to	the	international.		













Lyons	 and	 Michael	 Mastanduno	 (eds.)	 Beyond	 Westphalia?	 State	 Sovereignty	 and	 International	
Intervention	(Maryland:	The	John	Hopkins	University	Press,	1995).	
32	Malcolm	N	Shaw,	International	Law	(6th	edn.)	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2008).	





economically	 over	 the	 colonised	 non-Europeans.34	 Historically,	 the	 early	 trade	
relations	were	usually	conducted	by	trading	companies	such	as	the	British	East	India	












power	 to	effectively	 control	 the	 trade	 relations	or	 the	practices	 that	 could	 lead	 to	
















of	 colonisation,	 as	 explored	 in	 this	 chapter,	 has	 not	 significantly	 improved	 the	
participatory	position	of	many	non-European	states	in	international	law-making.		
The	encounter	between	Europeans	and	Africans	during	colonialism	was	characterised	
by	 the	 use	 of	 force,	 intimidation,	 deceit	 and	 conquest	 in	 order	 to	 institute	 and	
maintain	‘particular	binding	principles’	derived	from	Europe.38	Some	of	such	binding	
principles	 arose	 from	 the	 Congress	 of	 Vienna	 of	 1814-1815,	 where	 Europe	





system	 involving	 the	 gradual	 erosion	 of	 traditional	 mores	 among	 predominantly	
segmentary	peoples.	In	this	example,	the	Igbo	political	institution	was	rooted	in	village	
republicanism	and	the	principle	of	Igbo-Enwe-Eze	(the	Igbo	have	no	kings).	Following	










(2001)	 AFRO	 ASIAN	 JOURNAL	 OF	 SOCIAL	 SCIENCES,	 Vol.	 2,	 No.	 2	 Quarter	 II,	 available	 at	

















incentives	 and	 penalties	 in	 the	 post-colonial	 state.	 Arguably	 these	 limit	 the	
representation	of	the	interests	of	the	Third	World	in	the	international	system.	
As	Anthoy	Anghie	has	argued,	factors	such	as	Christianity	and	sovereignty	were	used	




41	 Makau	 Mutua,	 ‘Why	 Redraw	 the	 map	 of	 Africa:	 A	 Moral	 and	 Legal	 Inquiry’	 (1995)	 MICHIGAN	
JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW,	VOL.	16,	p.	1113.	
42	Ngongura	J	Udombana,	‘The	Ghost	of	Berlin	still	haunts	Africa!	The	ICJ	Judgement	on	the	Land	and	












authenticity	giving	rise	 to	 the	 legal	capacity	 to	determine	 international	 law.	Such	a	
European	 type	 of	 sovereignty	 was	 used	 as	 a	 mechanism	 for	 suppression,	
management,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 adoption	 of	 European	 civilisation.	 The	 European	
sovereignty	 attained	 a	 universal	 status,	which	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world	 had	 to	 adopt,	
whereas,	for	the	non-Europeans	who	were	not	regarded	as	sovereigns,	the	attainment	
of	 sovereignty	 for	 them	 consisted	 of	 alienation	 and	 subordination	 rather	 than	
empowerment.46	 It	 deprived	 non-Europeans	 the	 legal	 capacity	 to	 participate	 in	
international	law	making.	
Furthermore,	 Anghie	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 exclusion	 of	 non-Europeans	 was	 as	 a	
result	of	their	non-Christian	status.47	Through	the	exploration	of	Francisco	de	Vitoria’s	
work,	 the	 idea	 of	 difference	 through	 Christian	 standards	 is	 highlighted	 between	















to	 the	 position	 of	 being	 sovereign	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 inclusion	 into	 the	 family	 of	
nations.	
Besides	the	above	historical	account,	Christianity	was	not	the	only	exclusionary	factor	
then.	 The	 so-called	 ‘civilising	mission’	was	 part	 and	parcel	 of	 exclusion	 and	 forced	
submission.48	 During	 the	 period	 of	 colonialism,	 non-Europeans	 were	 described	 as	






Crown.52	 	 In	 this	 treaty,	 the	 sovereignty	 and	 management	 of	 Lagos,	 Nigeria	 was	
transferred	 to	 the	 Queen	 of	 England.	 According	 to	 the	 British	 view,	 such	 transfer	
enabled	the	Queen	to	‘assist,	defend	and	protect’	the	inhabitants	of	Lagos.	It	was	also	
declared	as	a	means	to	put	an	end	to	slave	trade	and	prevent	destructive	wars	arising	











52	 F.	 Abiola	 Irele	 and	 Biodun	 Jeyifo	 (Eds.)	 The	 Oxford	 Encyclopedia	 of	 African	 Thought,	 Volume	 1:	












civilization.	 Subsequently,	 the	 European	 standard	became	 the	universally	 accepted	
norm	as	it	defined	the	rules	of	international	law.54	Such	criteria	were	intended	to	grant	
legal	 personality	 in	 order	 to	qualify	 for	 participation	 in	 international	 law-making.55	






of	 the	 European	 form	 (and	 is	 therefore	 also	 counter-hegemonic).	 Customary	
international	 law	has	a	central	role	to	play	in	the	development	of	 international	 law	
such	that	most	often	international	lawyers	do	not	bother	to	explain	its	importance,	as	














international	 law	 is	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 state	 immunity	 and	 state	 responsibility	 where	
multilateral	treaties	of	a	general	scope	are	yet	to	be	negotiated.57	It	also	serves	as	an	
instrument	for	filling	lacunae	within	treaties,	and	for	finding	the	meaning	of	unclear	
or	undefined	terms	in	a	text.58	Furthermore,	 its	relevance	is	purported	to	 lie	 in	the	
protection	of	human	 rights,	where	 states	 are	neither	party	 to	existing	 treaties	nor	
party	to	the	relevant	treaty	enforcement	mechanisms.59		
Traditionally,	 customary	 international	 law	 binds	 all	 states	 except	 persistent	
objectors.60	Such	universal	application	implies,	among	other	things,	the	expansion	of	
international	 law	 beyond	 its	 European	 origins.	 The	 universally	 binding	 nature	 of	
customary	international	law	is	explained	through	theory	of	state	consent.61	This	has	
raised	 problems	 of	 legitimacy	 following	 the	 imposition	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 a	 small	
number	of	states	on	all	states.62	Some	scholars	have	abandoned	the	idea	of	‘express	
consent’	 contending	 that	 the	 theory	 does	 not	 explain	 what	 really	 happens	 in	 the	
formation	of	customary	international	law.63	However,	some	scholars	have	relied	on	
																																								 																				
16,	 pp.	 313-344;	 David	 P.	 Fidler,	 ‘Challenging	 the	 Classical	 Concept	 of	 Custom’	 (1996)	 GERMAN	
YEARBOOK	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW,	Vol.	39,	p.198.	
57	 Michael	 Byers,	 Custom,	 Power	 and	 the	 power	 of	 Rules:	 International	 Relations	 and	 Customary	
International	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1999).	
58	Patrick	Dumberry,	‘The	Last	Citadel!	Can	a	State	Claim	the	Status	of	Persistent	Objector	to	prevent	
the	Application	 of	 Customary	 International	 Law	 in	 Investor-State	 Arbitration?’	 LEIDEN	 JOURNAL	OF	
INTERNATIONAL	LAW,	vol.	23,	no.	2	June	2010,	p.	381.	
59	 Michael	 Byers,	 Custom,	 Power	 and	 the	 power	 of	 Rules:	 International	 Relations	 and	 Customary	
International	Law	(1999),	see	note	57	at	p.	2.	











Chapter	 3	 includes	 an	 in-depth	 analysis	 of	 customary	 international	 law;	





states,	 and	 the	 belief	 that	 such	 practices	 raise	 legal	 obligations	 that	 require	
compliance.	 The	 identification	 of	 these	 elements	 has	 continued	 to	 raise	 scholarly	
debates.67	 However,	 the	 material	 sources	 of	 custom	 include	 diplomatic	
correspondence,	policy	statements,	press	releases,	and	opinions	of	government	legal	
advisers	 amongst	 others.68	 The	 value	 attached	 to	 these	 varies	 and	 depend	 on	
circumstances.	 The	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (ICJ)	 considers	 duration	 and	
consistence	of	practice,	generality	of	practice	and	opinio	juris	(evidence	of	a	belief	that	
																																								 																				




66North	 Sea	 Continental	 Shelf	 ICJ	 Reports	 (1969)	 p.	 3,	Military	 and	 Parliamentary	 Activities	 in	 and	
Against	Nicaragua,	Merits,	ICJ	Reports	(1986),	pp.	14,	97(para.	183,110	(para.	211);	Asylum	case,	ICJ	
Reports	 (1950)	pp.	226,	276-277;	Right	of	Passage	over	 India	Territory,	 ICJ	Reports	 (1960)	pp.6,	40;	




Anthony	 Aust,	Hand	 Book	 of	 International	 Law	 (2nd	 edn.)	 (Cambridge:	 Cambrdge	 University	 Press	
2010).	







such	practice	 is	 rendered	obligatory	by	 the	existence	of	a	 rule	 requiring	 it)	 for	 the	
determination	of	custom.69	Customary	international	law	is	premised	on	the	traditional	
notion	 of	 sovereignty	 that	 views	 states	 as	 the	 sole	 subject	 which	 enjoys	 full	 legal	
personality	 under	 international	 law.70	 This	 position	 concentrates	 the	 making	 of	
customary	international	law	within	the	state	system.		
As	 mentioned	 above,	 historically,	 the	 state,	 in	 particular	 the	 European	 state,	 was	
regarded	as	the	element	around	which	all	of	international	law	revolved.	In	spite	of	the	
participation	of	non-European	 societies,	 for	example	Africa,	 in	 the	development	of	
customary	 international	 law,71	 only	 Eurocentric	 origin	 has	 been	 adopted	 to	 the	
exclusion	of	others.	In	view	of	such	European	bias,	the	first	definition	of	customary	
























as	 comprised	 of	 a	 particular	 territory,	 population	 and	 centralised	 form	 of	
governance,76	is	a	form	of	organisation	with	European	origins	which	was	historically	
also	exclusively	available	to	European	states,	it	is	also	a	system	which	privileges	those	
states	 which	 adhere	 to	 the	 European	 model.77	 Of	 course,	 1920	 was	 prior	 to	
decolonisation,	meaning	 that	 the	Euro-centric	 visions	 in	 the	drafting	process	 came	
from	a	largely	European	drafting	committee.78	Certainly	the	exclusive	and	Euro-centric	
nature	 of	 the	 provisions	 in	 Article	 38	 are	 still	 evident	 in	 the	mention	 of	 ‘civilized	
nations’,	implying	of	course,	that	there	are	‘uncivilized	nations’.	There	is,	therefore,	




76	 James	Crawford,	The	Creation	of	States	 in	 International	Law	 (2nd	edn.)	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press,	2007).	
77	I.	A.	Shearer,	Starke’s	International	Law	(11th	edn.)	(Sydney:	Butterworths,	1994)	see	particularly	the	
definition	 of	 international	 law	 in	 p.	 3;	 Anthea	 Roberts	 and	 Sandesh	 Sivakumaran,	 ‘Lawmaking	 by	
Nonstate	Actors:	Engaging	armed	Groups	 in	 the	Creation	of	 International	Humanitarian	Law’	 (2012)	
THE	YALE	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW,	vol.	31:1,	p.108.	
78	 Members	 of	 the	 committee	 included	 MINEICHIRO	 ADATCI,	 Envoy	 Extraordinary	 and	 Minister	
Plenipotentiary	 of	 His	 Majesty	 the	 Emperor	 of	 Japan,	 at	 Brussels;	 M.	 RAFAEL	 ALTAMIRA,	 Senator,	
Professor	of	the	Faculty	of	Law	of	the	University	of	Madrid;	CLOVIS	BKVILAQUA,	Legal	Adviser	to	the	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	Brazil;	BARON	DESCAMPS,	Senator,	Belgian	Minister	of	State;	FRANCIS	
HAGERUP,	 Envoy	 Extraordinary	 and	Minister	 Plenipotentiary	 of	His	Majesty	 the	 King	 of	Norway,	 at	
Stockholm;	 ALBERT	 DE	 LAPRADELLE,	 Professor	 of	 the	 Faculty	 of	 Law	 of	 the	 University	 of	 Paris;	 Dr.	
LODER,	Member	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	Netherlands;	LORD	PHILLIMORE,	Member	of	the	Privy	
Council	 of	His	Majesty	 the	King	of	 England;	ARTURO	RICCI-BUSATTI,	Minister	Plenipotentiary	of	His	
Majesty	 the	King	of	 Italy,	 Legal	Adviser	 to	 the	Ministry	of	 Foreign	Affairs	of	 Italy;	Mr.	 ELIHU	ROOT,	
Former	 Secretary	 of	 State	 of	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America.	 RAOUL	 FERNANDES,	 former	 Brazilian	
delegate	 to	 the	 Paris	 Conference,	 was	 present	 at	 the	 meetings	 of	 the	 Committee,	 at	 first	 in	 a	
consultative	 capacity,	 as	 adviser	 to	M.	 BEVILAQUA,	who	was	 prevented	 from	 attending;	 but	 in	 the	
course	of	the	Committee's	work	he	was	appointed	a	member	of	the	Committee	to	replace	the	latter.	








also	 in	 its	 substance	 (in	 that	 it	 is	more	 likely	 for	 the	great	powers	 to	 influence	 the	
making	of	customary	norms).79	The	bias	for	the	customs	of	European	states	and	the	
exclusion	of	non-European	states	 in	custom-making	goes	back	 to	 the	 imposition	of	
European	governance	principles.	The	logic	of	 international	 law	is	that	the	power	to	
make	 international	 law	 lies	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 the	 state.	 However,	many	 colonised	
countries	were	said	 lacked	 this	distinct	 ‘state-like’	 structure	 resembling	 that	of	 the	
Europeans.80		Therefore,	any	practice	arising	from,	for	example,	decentralised	African	
societies	did	not	amount	or	contribute	to	customary	 international	 law.	The	custom	













81Antony	 Anghie,	 ‘Finding	 the	 Peripheries:	 Sovereignty	 and	 Colonialism	 in	 Nineteenth-Century	
International	Law’,	(1999)	see	note	34.	
82	Henry	Wheaton,	 1866	Elements	of	 International	 Law,	George	Grafton	Wilson	 (ed.),	 The	Carnegie	
Institute	of	Washington	photo,	reprint	1964,	at	p.	15.	







the	 practice	 of	 European	 States	 could	 create	 (customary)	 international	 law.85	
Participation	 in	 law-making	was	 the	 exclusive	 preserve	 of	 European	 states.86	 They	
insist	 that	 the	making	 of	 custom	 is	 solely	 dependent	 on	 state	 practice	 and	opinio	
juris.87	 Therefore,	whatever	 practices	 existed	 in	 the	 so-called	 ‘uncivilised	 tribes’	 of	
former	colonies	did	not	matter	in	the	creation	of	customary	international	law.	The	lack	
of	sovereignty	was	used	as	a	smokescreen	to	exclude	non-Europeans.	As	a	result,	the	
tribal	 societies	 (non-Europeans)	 could	 not	 be	 admitted	 into	 international	 law.88		





law	 	 	 	 	 	 	 binding	 upon	 states	 therefore	 emanates	 from	 their	 own	 will	 as	
expressed	 in	 conventions	 [treaties]	 or	 by	 usages	 generally	 accepted	 as	
expressing	 principles	 of	 law	 established	 in	 order	 to	 regulate	 the	 relations	

















the	 status	 of	 sovereignty.	 They	 were	 independent	 from	 any	 interference.	






States	 have	 agreed	 shall	 be	 binding	 upon	 them	 in	 their	 dealing	 with	 one	
another.	 It	 is	quite	 true	that	whatever	has	 received	the	common	consent	of	
civilised	 nations	must	 have	 received	 the	 assent	 of	 our	 country,	 and	 that	 to	



















colonialism	 has	 faced	 severe	 scrutiny	 following	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 they	 were	
obtained	by	colonial	powers.95	For	instance,	there	was	a	state	practice	for	the	transfer	
of	ownership	of	 land	 from	African	chiefs	 to	colonial	powers	 through	 the	signing	of	
treaties	between	both	parties.96	There	is	evidence	to	show	that	the	consent	of	African	
chiefs,	 as	 exemplified	 in	 the	 above	 case	 involving	 King	 Dosunmu,	 was	 sometimes	
obtained	through	the	employment	of	violence.97			
The	 end	 of	 colonisation	 brought	 a	 different	 dimension	 in	 the	 assessment	 of	 Third	
World	 consent	 in	 international	 relations.	 For	 instance,	 the	 attainment	 of	
independence	 by	 these	 states	 led	 to	 their	 membership	 of	 the	 family	 of	 nations.	
Following	 such	 status,	 many	 of	 these	 states	 became	 signatories	 to	 international	
treaties	like	the	United	Nations	Charter.	Based	on	this	premise,	it	would	be	expected	
that	the	hegemon	has	the	ability	to	command	compliance	of	the	Third	World	to	what	
constitutes	 (customary)	 international	 law	 without	 coercion.	 However,	 there	 are	
situations	in	which	powerful	states	still	use	force	to	insist	on	the	monopoly	of	certain	
practices.98	They	also	use	 force	 to	combat	 resistance.99	Such	use	of	 force	could	be	
																																								 																				
94	Antonio	Gramsci,	Selections	from	Prison	Notebooks	(1971)	see	note	11;	Ted	Hopf,	‘Common-sense	
Constructivism	 and	 Hegemony	 in	World	 Politics’	 (2013)	 INTERNATIONAL	 ORGANISATIONS,	 Vol.	 67,	
Issue	02,	pp.	317-354.	
95	Antony	Anghie,	Imperialism,	Sovereignty	and	the	Making	of	International	Law	(2005)	see	note	33.	
96	 Antony	 Anghie,	 ‘Finding	 the	 Peripheries:	 Sovereignty	 and	 Colonialism	 in	 Nineteenth-Century	
International	Law,’	see	note	34.	
97	 F.	 Abiola	 Irele	 and	 Biodun	 Jeyifo	 (Eds.)	 The	 Oxford	 Encyclopedia	 of	 African	 Thought,	 Volume	 1:	
Absolutism-Imperialism	(2010)	see	note	52.	
98	 Antony	 Anghie,	 ‘Finding	 the	 Peripheries:	 Sovereignty	 and	 Colonialism	 in	 Nineteenth-Century	
International	Law,’	see	note	34.	
99	 Balakrishnan	 Rajagopal,	 ‘The	 Role	 of	 Law	 in	 Counter-hegemonic	 Globalization	 and	 Global	 Legal	





carried	 out	 through	 their	 overwhelming	 military	 power	 to	 suppress	 possible	
challenges	to	what	they	regard	as	the	customary	rules	or	their	perception	of	the	world	
order.100	 In	 such	 situations,	 international	 norms	 appear	 not	 to	 be	 a	 constraint	 for	
dominant	 states,	 be	 it	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 use	 of	 force	 or	 minimum	 respect	 for	
international	humanitarian	law.	The	United	States	intervention	in	Nicaragua,	the	Gulf	
war,	the	NATO	intervention	in	Kosovo,	and	the	Iraq	war	are	a	few	examples.	Arguably,	
the	 practice	 surrounding	 the	 institution	 of	 peace	 in	 the	 contemporary	 world	 by	
powerful	states	becomes	a	function	of	dominance,	which	could	be	enhanced,	with	the	
use	of	force.101	




















regime	 of	 international	 law.	 In	 the	 above	 text,	 Anghie	 examined	 the	 relationship	
between	positivism	and	colonialism.	He	sought	 to	understand	 the	 legal	 framework	
employed	 by	 the	 positivist	 to	 subordinate	 and	 exclude	 non-Europeans	 from	
membership	of	 the	 family	of	nations,	as	well	as	 the	significance	of	 the	nineteenth-







Court	 of	 America,	made	 an	 inquiry	 into	whether	 slavery	was	 an	 accepted	practice	
according	 to	 the	 law	 of	 nation.104	 In	 that	 case,	 the	 Chief	 Justice	 made	 a	 gesture	
towards	 including	Africa	within	 the	 law	of	nations	and	 for	European	and	American	
states	 to	 respect	 the	 law	 of	 nations	 as	 practiced	within	 Africa.	 	 Such	 gesture	was	
opposed	 following	 a	 fierce	 statement	 that	whatever	 custom	existed	 in	 the	African	
																																								 																				




















a	 new	 and	 expansionist	 phase	 in	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 modern	 market	 economy	
through	open	market	policies.108	Its	main	target	was	to	remove	the	constraints,	which	
hindered	 European	 exploitation	 of	 the	 export	 sector	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 In	












crops	 (cocoa,	 palm	 oil	 and	 groundnuts)	 were	 exported	 to	 Britain,	 while	 British	
manufactured	 products	 dominated	 the	 Nigerian	 market.109	 Tariffs	 were	 kept	 low,	
although	there	were	situations	when	higher	duties	were	imposed	to	restrict	the	entry	
of	 manufactured	 goods	 from	 rival	 industrial	 powers	 or	 the	 exportation	 of	 raw	
materials	 to	 rival	 colonial	 power.	 For	 instance,	 the	 British	 colonial	 government	
imposed	a	total	ban	on	the	exportation	of	palm	oil,	with	the	United	Kingdom	being	








international	 institutions.111	 In	 spite	 of	 the	 numerous	 assistance	 received	 in	 this	
region,	developmental	aspirations	have	remained	unfulfilled.	Such	failures	have	been	
blamed	on	the	failure	of	legal	institutions	within	the	Third	World.112	By	the	late	1990s,	
this	 understanding	 was	 embedded	 in	 international	 development	 policy.	 This	 was	
																																								 																				
109	 Olusegun	 Adeyeri	 and	 Kehinde	 David	 Adejuwon,	 ‘The	 Implications	 of	 British	 Colonial	 Economic	
Policies	 on	 Nigeria’s	 Development’	 (2012)	 INTERNATIONAL	 JOURNAL	 OF	 ADVANCED	 RESEARCH	 IN	
MANAGEMENT	AND	SOCIAL	SCIENCES,	Vol.	1,	No.	2,	pp.	1.	













ideology	 in	 respect	 of	 development	 globally.113	 Rather	 than	 creating	 expanded	
economic	 and	 political	 systems	 to	 accommodate	 the	 Third	 World,	 it	 became	 an	
instrument	 to	 further	 subject	 more	 lives	 within	 the	 Third	 World	 to	 international	





sustain	dominant	 ideas.	According	 to	Gramsci,	 civil	 society	 (as	 the	 sphere	 in	which	
ideas	 and	 beliefs	 are	 shaped)	 sees	 the	 reproduction	 of	 hegemony	 in	 cultural	 life	
through	the	media,	universities,	and	religious	institutions.	I	will	modify	these	slightly	






Ann	 Seidman,	 Robert	 Seidman	 and	 Thomas	 Walde	 (eds.),	Making	 Development	 Work:	 Legislative	
Reform	for	Institutional	Transformation	and	Good	Governance	(The	Hague:	Kluwer,	1999).	
114	 Sundhya	 Pahuja,	 Decolonising	 International	 Law:	 Development,	 Economic	 and	 the	 Politics	 of	
Universality	(2011)	see	note	112.	













human	 relationships	are	continually	 increasing,	both	nationally	and	 internationally.	





Furthermore,	 social	media	 is	 providing	 a	 wide	 environment	 dealing	 with	 different	
topics	among	divergent	group	of	people.	Such	forms	of	social	media	include	twitter,	
YouTube,	Facebook,	blog,	amongst	others.	There	is	a	wide	spread	believe	that	the	use	
of	 social	media	has	 an	 elective	 affinity	with	participatory	democracy.118	 This	 arose	
from	the	adoption	of	social	media	as	a	platform	by	politicians,	political	activists	and	
																																								 																				











is	 to	 be	 taken	with	 caution	 following	 the	 domination	 of	 particular	 ideologies	 over	
other	 competing	conceptions	of	democracy.119	Also,	 it	has	been	contended	 that	 in	
most	 pro-Western	 developing	 countries,	 the	 media	 system	 is	 directed	 towards	
maintaining	control	rather	than	educating	for	democracy.	120	
Although	the	media	have	been	playing	the	above	roles,	their	creation	of	complex	and	





ideologies	being	 superior	 to	 those	of	 non-Westerners.123	 Such	a	position	has	been	
















123	 Rod	 Chavis,	 ‘Africa	 in	 the	 Western	 Media’	 available	 at	
www.africa.upenn.edu/Workshop/chavis98.htm	[accessed	20	August,	2014].	





decide	 world	 opinion	 on	 many	 issues	 today.	 In	 this	 manner,	 many	 people	 from	
different	cultures	are	influenced	into	accepting	particular	views	in	their	everyday	lives.	
This	strategy	has	made	people	conscious	of	the	outside	rather	than	their	immediate	




law),126	 the	 presentation	 of	 Western	 ideologies	 in	 a	 manner	 superior	 to	 others	
arguably	 constitutes	 a	 form	 of	 sustenance	 of	 Western	 hegemony	 within	 the	
international	legal	system.		Different	generations	of	Western	media	have	reproduced	




or	media	 people	 are	 convinced	 that	 they	 are	 passing	 objective	 information	 to	 the	
public	based	on	professionalism.128	Ultimately,	the	focus	on	such	an	idea	forms	public	
opinion	 through	 which	 society	 is	 indoctrinated	 into	 believing	 to	 be	 natural	 and	
accepted	values.	Consequently,	those	with	media	power	and	skills	are	likely	to	dictate	
																																								 																				
125	James	Curran	and	Myung-Jin	Park,	 ‘Beyond	Globalization	Theory’	 in	 James	Curran	and	Myung-Jin	
Park	(eds.)	De-Westernizing	Media	Studies	(2000)	see	note	124.	










the	 form	 and	 content	 of	 what	 is	 or	 could	 become	 customary	 practices	 in	 the	
international	system.129	
b.) Education		
The	 understanding	 of	 hegemony	 and	 the	 sustenance	 of	 hegemonic	 ideologies	
expressed	 above	 could	 be	 greatly	 influenced	 by	 education	 according	 to	 Antonio	




international	 law	 rely	 on	 these	 resources,	 as	 well	 as	 being	 influenced	 by	 books,	
journals	 and	 other	 scholarly	 materials	 written	 by	 Northern	 authors,	 in	 order	 to	
understand	international	law.133			Most	of	these	Western	sources	fail	to	provide	the	
lived	experiences	or	practices	of	the	Third	World	in	the	study	of	international	law.	
There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 Western	 education	 and	 scholarship	 have	 made	 huge	
contributions	 towards	 making	 resources	 available	 for	 the	 study	 and	 practice	 of	
international	law.	However,	there	appear	to	be	some	limitations	to	these	resources,	
as	 they	 appear	 to	 neglect	 the	 lived	 experiences	 of	 the	 Third	World,	 for	 example,	
Nigeria	 and	 its	 citizens	 rely	 on	 the	 reproduction	 of	 a	 Western	 stereotype	 of	
																																								 																				
129	 John	 Street,	 Mass	 Media,	 Politics	 and	 Democracy	 (2nd	 edn.)	 (Hampshire-New	 York:	 Palgrave	
Macmillan,	2011).	
130	Antonio	Gramsci,	Selections	from	Prison	Notebooks	(1971)	see	note	11.	







information	 in	 international	 law-making.134	 	 Arguably,	 the	 imparting	 of	 Western	
ideology	to	Nigerians	and	other	members	of	the	Third	World	can	be	best	described	as	
‘instruction’	 rather	 than	 education.	 This	 inference	 is	 drawn	 from	 the	 colonial	
relationship	between	 the	 colonialists	 and	 the	 colonised	 in	Africa.	 For	 instance,	 the	
colonialists	described	many	practices	of	Africans	during	the	colonial	era	as	‘obnoxious	
and	unsuitable’	for	human	existence.135	Also,	the	negative	tagging	of	such	African	life	
styles	 has	 led	 to	 forceful	 relegation	 by	 the	 colonial	 powers.136	 In	 some	 instances,	
European	missionaries	and	Western	schools	have	instructed	Africans	to	neglect	their	
own	cultural	practices	and/or	replace	them	with	a	European	(Christian)	life-style.137	
This	 form	of	 transfer	 of	 knowledge	 (or	 ‘instruction’)	made	African	 students	 purely	
passive	and	mechanical	receivers	of	abstract	notions.138	In	this	regard,	the	students	
passively	received	whatever	the	Western	school/scholarship	presented	to	them	as	the	




teaching	 of	 international	 law.139	 Her	 analysis	 exposes	 the	 shortcomings	within	 the	















critical	 thinking.	Her	position	also	reflects	 the	Nigerian	situation	as	 its	students	are	
made	 merely	 consumers	 of	 the	 Western	 perspective	 of	 International	 law.	 Such	
Western	scholarship	and	ideologies	could	be	exemplified	by	Gower’s	articulation	of	
the	 British	 legacy	 in	 Nigeria.	 Gower	 presented	 statehood,	 membership	 of	 the	






for	 the	 benefit	 of	 Nigerians.	 His	 articulations	 and	 similar	 Western	 scholarship	
attempted	to	indoctrinate	Nigerian	and	other	Third	World	scholars	into	the	Western	
concept	of	customary	international	law.	The	training	of	these	scholars	emphasises	the	
role	 of	 the	 dominant	Western	 state	 practices	 and	opinio	 juris	 in	 the	 formation	 of	
custom	as	natural,	universal	and	inevitable.	These	scholars	are	expected	to	pass	on	
the	same	notion	of	Western	ideologies	and	practices	to	future	Third	World	students.	














This	 section	 samples	 the	United	Nations	 to	discuss	 the	 reproduction	of	hegemonic	
practices	through	the	International	Court	of	Justice,	the	judicial	organ	of	the	United	
Nations.	This	choice	is	based	on	the	fact	that	its	Article	38(1)	(b)	‘defines’	international	











of	 these	 state	 practices	 and	 opinio	 juris	 is	 greatly	 influenced	 by	 largely	 powerful	





















actual	 practice	 and	 opinio	 juris	 of	 states’.148	 	 International	 law	 practitioners	 and	
scholars	have	also	relied	on	these	case	laws	in	Western	education	and	scholarship.149	
Such	positions	by	scholars	appear	to	contribute	towards	the	reproduction	of	Western	






and	other	parts	of	 the	Third	World.	Usually,	 in	 some	cases,	 the	same	apparatus	of	
domination	 such	 as	 education,	 scholarship,	 and	 media	 can	 be	 used	 as	 agents	 of	
																																								 																				
146Michael	 Byers,	Custom,	 Power	 and	 the	 Power	 of	 Rules:	 International	 Relations	 and	 CUSTOMARY	
INTERNATIONAL	LAW	(1999)	see	note	57.	
















Counter-hegemony	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	more	 depth	 in	 Chapter	 five.	 Here,	 a	 brief	
introduction	to	its	relevance	to	the	thesis.	According	to	Gramsci,	counter-hegemony	
‘…is	 not	 a	 question	 of	 introducing	 from	 scratch	 a	 scientific	 form	 of	 thought	 into	
everyone's	individual	life,	but	of	renovating	and	making	“critical”	an	already	existing	
activity’.150	 His	 idea	 of	 counter-hegemony	 emphasises	 the	 introduction	 of	 new	
elements	 in	 order	 to	 critically	 interrogate	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 hegemonic	 projects	
succeed	 or	 fail.151	 Such	 a	 position	 supports	 the	 rising	 scholarship	 among	 critical	
analysts	 from	 the	 Third	 World	 in	 challenging	 the	 hegemonic	 nature	 of	 the	
international	legal	system.	Third	World	scholars	strive	to	rethink	the	models	through	
which	international	law	operates.	These	Third	World	scholars	place	emphasis	on	the	











of	 local	 struggles	 and	 oppression.153	 In	 a	 way,	 it	 compels	 a	 rethinking	 of	 the	
relationship	between	the	local	and	global.154		




goal,	 resistance	 is	 employed	 as	 a	 counter-hegemonic	 tool	 for	 restructuring	
international	 law.	 Such	 a	 medium	 seeks	 to	 rewrite	 the	 ‘Eurocentric’	 history	 of	
international	 law	 to	 include	 the	 Third	World	 in	 the	 international	 law	 processes.	 It	
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the	 ways	 in	 which	 Third	 World	 resistance	 could	 be	 employed	 is	 through	 ethical	
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In	 spite	of	 the	 risks	associated	with	 resistance,	 the	Third	World	continues	 to	 resist	
Western	 domination.	 This	 could	 be	 expressed	 in	 the	 politics	 of	 protest,	
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and	 territorial	 constructions	were	of	 legal	and	moral	nullity’.172	While	 the	Western	
states	shared	certain	features	such	as	‘named	human	population	sharing	a	historical	



























the	 inclusion	of	non-state	actors	 in	civic	and	political	 reconstruction.177	He	expects	
such	inclusiveness	to	provide	an	indigenous	political	solution	by	means	of	a	‘bottom	
up’	approach.178	
Following	 the	alleged	shortcomings	of	 the	post-colonial	African	 states	as	discussed	

































their	 common	 history	 of	 being	 subjected	 to	 colonialism,	 continuing	 under-
development	 and	 exploitation.183	 However,	 the	 term	 ‘Third	 World’	 has	 divergent	
meanings;	 it	 may	 portray	 the	 end	 of	 a	 period,	 new	 challenges,	 dreams	 or	
possibilities.184	In	some	cases,	it	is	believed	that	the	categorisation	of	the	‘Third	World’	
has	lost	its	relevance	in	the	present	international	system,	especially	after	the	end	of	
the	 Cold	 War.185	 This	 perception	 raises	 further	 questions	 because	 of	 the	 present	
reality	facing	the	people	from	the	region,	stated	above.	In	considering	the	purported	
end	of	the	anti-colonial	national	struggles,	Arturo	Escobar	raised	questions	concerning	























him,	 this	multiplicity	 is	 expected	 to	embrace	 the	downtrodden	and	 the	giants,	 the	
West	and	the	rest.		
Besides	the	above	perspective	on	the	term	‘Third	World’,	it	is	believed	that	the	Third	
World	 goes	 beyond	 a	 mere	 geographical	 location,	 as	 popularly	 conceived.	
Balakrishnan	 Rajagopal	 examined	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘Third	 World’	 from	 four	
perspectives.189	 Firstly,	 he	 viewed	 it	 as	 an	 ‘ideological	 category’.	 This	 portrays	 the	
Third	World	as	a	collection	of	states	that	practised	a	dominant	bipolar	bloc	politics	
through	non-alignment.	 Secondly,	 the	 Third	World	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 ‘geopolitical	
concept’	 that	 is	 differentiated	 from	 the	 First	 and	 Second	 Worlds	 in	 political	 and	
economic	terms.	Thirdly,	‘Third	World’	signifies	a	history	associated	with	the	suffering	
and	 experience	 of	 colonialism	 and	 imperialism.	 Fourthly,	 it	 is	 used	 as	 a	 ‘popular	
representational	model’.	In	this	sense,	‘Third	World’	has	been	used	to	express	certain	
negative	 images,	 such	 as	 ‘poverty,	 squalor,	 corruption,	 violence,	 calamities	 and	
disasters,	 irrational	 local	 fundamentalism,	 bad	 smells,	 garbage,	 filth,	 technological	
“backwardness”	or	simply	a	lack	of	modernity’.190		
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Globalization	Social	Movements’	(2004)	see	note	184.	




















The	 view	of	 ‘Third	World’	 as	 a	 signifier	 for	 resistance	 is	 emphasised	 and	 generally	
shared	by	Third	World	Approaches	to	International	Law	(TWAIL),	which	revives	Third	
World	opposition	during	 the	process	of	decolonisation	 (which	 took	place	 from	 the	
1950s	 through	 to	 the	 1970s)	 and	 enhances	 such	 opposition	 in	 this	 period	 of	
globalisation.194	In	a	bid	to	formalise	this	aspiration,	a	formal	structure	was	set	up	by	
																																								 																				
191Balakrishnan	 Rajagopal,	 ‘Counter-hegemonic	 International	 Law:	 Rethinking	 human	 Rights	 and	
development	as	a	Third	World	Strategy’,	(2006)	THIRD	WORLD	QUARTERLY,	Vol.	27,	No.	5,	pp.	767-783	
at	p.	767.	
192Balakrishnan	 Rajagopal,	 ‘Counter-hegemonic	 International	 Law:	 Rethinking	 human	 Rights	 and	
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193BS	Chimni,	‘Third	World	Approaches	to	International	Law:	A	Manifesto’	(2006)	see	note	5.		






TWAIL	 first	 emerged	 from	 New	 Approaches	 to	 International	 Law	 (NAIL),196	 and	
represents	a	move	from	the	dominant	Eurocentric	vision	and	practices	of	international	
law	to	the	idea	and	vision	of	international	interactions	from	a	non-Western	point	of	
view.197	 It	 reassesses	 the	 history	 of	 Eurocentric	 international	 law	 and	 exposes	 the	
arrogance,	violence	and	ruthlessness	of	European	rules	as	well	as	the	destruction	of	
other	 legal	 traditions.198	 Currently,	 this	 group	 has	 developed	 a	 theory	 and	
methodology	that	critically	analyses	different	aspects	of	 international	 law	from	the	
Third	World	point	of	view.199	It	is	aimed	at	understanding,	reconstructing	and	situating	




presented	 as	 a	 theory	 and	method	 during	 the	workshop	 held	 at	 the	University	 of	












Bardo	Fassbender	and	Anne	Peters	 (eds.)	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	 the	History	of	 International	 Law	
(2012)	see	note	134	at	p.2.	
199Obiora	 Chinedu	 Okafor,	 ‘Critical	 Third	 World	 Approaches	 to	 International	 Law	 (TWAIL):	 Theory,	
Methodology,	or	Both?	(2008)	INTERNATIONAL	COMMUNITY	LAW	REVIEW	10,	pp.	371-378.		
200	 Steven	 Ratner	 and	 Anne-Slaughter	 (eds.)	 The	 Method	 of	 International	 Law	 (Washington	 DC:	
American	Society	of	International	Law,	2014).	





based	on	whether	 it,	or	some	sections	of	 it,	 forms	 in	 itself	a	science	of	method;	or	
whether	 TWAIL	 is	 instrumental	 to	 scientific	 methods	 in	 international	 law.	 It	 was	






assumption	 that	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 isolate	modern	 forms	 of	 domination	 such	 as	
governmentality,	from	the	older	modes	of	domination’.204		It	questions	the	simplistic	
visions	 of	 an	 ‘innocent’	 Third	 World	 and	 the	 dominating	 First	 World.	 TWAIL’s	
methodology	aims	at	‘reconceptualising	and	restructuring’	international	law.205			
Arturo	Escobar	also	stated	that	TWAIL	is:	






























observation	 is	 on	 ‘how	 to	 advance	 tolerance/pluralism	 in	 the	 face	 of	 intolerant	
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210James	 Thuo	Gathii,	 ‘Neocolonialism,	 ‘Colonialism	 and	 International	 Governance:	 Decentering	 the	
International	Law	of	Governmental	Legitimacy’	(2000)	98	MICHIGAN	LR	2054;	David	P	Fidler,	 ‘Revolt	










Fidler	 identifies	 an	 element	 of	 consensus	 among	 TWAIL	 members	 that	 the	 post-






Also,	Michael	 Fakhri	made	 a	 similar	 observation	 concerning	 the	 diverse	 nature	 of	
TWAIL’s	agenda.213	While	acknowledging	that	TWAIL	collectively	explores	history	to	
pursue	 an	 emancipatory	 international	 law,	 he	 posited	 that	 there	 are	 points	 of	
departure.	 Fakhri	maintained	 this	 position	 by	 examining	 the	 perception	 of	 certain	
members	of	TWAIL	on	issues	concerning	‘capitalism	and	common	good’.	For	example,	





change	 from	 historical	 imperialism	 and	 the	 exploitation	 of	 post-colonial	 states	 to	










Furthermore,	 Fakhri	 explored	 Singh’s	 (another	 TWAIL	 advocate)	 view	 on	 the	
relationship	between	capitalism,	the	common	good	and	international	 law	by	asking	
whether	international	law	(as	a	language	of	hope)	can	provide	a	common	good	in	spite	
of	 capitalism.215	 Singh	argued	 that	 the	capacity	of	 international	 law	 to	bring	about	
common	good	is	dependent	on	traditional	writing	in	a	mode	of	critical	inquiry.	Despite	
the	 diversity	 of	 the	 TWAIL	 agenda,	 Fakhri	 concluded	 that	 TWAIL	 maintains	 a	
semblance	of	its	own	character	through	its	ever-growing	literature.216			
Elements	such	as	the	description	of	natural	or	social	phenomena,	a	predictive,	logical	
and	 testable	model/framework,	and	 self-consistency	were	used	 to	 test	TWAIL	as	a	
theory.217	In	the	course	of	such	assessment,	Okafor	argued	that	TWAIL	performs	all	of	
the	 functions	 enumerated	 above.	 He	 stated	 that	 TWAIL	 offers	 ‘windows	 into	
international	law’s	tomorrow’.	Its	scholarship	imagines	and	predicts	the	ways	in	which	
international	 law	 is	 likely	 to	 behave	 towards	 the	 Third	 World.	 The	 work	 on	
International	Law	and	the	Third	World:	Reshaping	Justice	was	cited	as	proof	of	this	
assertion.218	Okafor	also	argued	 that	TWAIL	offers	 ‘logical	 and	 testable	arguments,	
propositions	and	thesis’	through	incisive	critiques.	Makau	Mutua’s	incisive	critique	of	
international	human	rights	law’s	fixation	on	the	‘savages-victim-savior’	metaphor	was	
employed	 to	 support	 this	 position.219	 It	was	based	on	a	 ‘thorough,	 systematic	 and	
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216	Michael	Fakhri,	‘Questioning	TWAIL’s	Agenda‘(2012)	see	note	213	at	p.	8.	









testable	 analysis	 of	 relevant	 evidence	 and	 literature’.220	Another	 example	 is	 James	
Gathii’s	thorough	empirical	and	conceptual	appraisal	of	‘claims	of	the	emergence	of	a	
new	 doctrine	 of	 pre-emptive	 war	 under	 the	 doctrine	 of	 sources’.221	 Also,	 Okafor	
described	Gathii’s	appraisal	as	logically	systemic.	
Furthermore,	TWAIL	offers	various	models/frameworks	to	describe	the	behaviour	of	





without	 exception	 to	 TWAIL.	 TWAIL	 members	 are	 united	 in	 pursuing	 committed	
intellectual	and	practical	struggles	to	expose,	reform	and	place	the	Third	World	within	
the	 international	 legal	 system.224	 One	 such	 struggle	 lies	 in	 TWAIL’s	 persistent	
argument	on	the	hegemonic	nature	of	post-colonial	Third	World	states.	This	position	
contributes	 to	 the	 argument	 concerning	 the	 hegemonic	 nature	 of	 customary	
international	law	presented	in	this	thesis.	
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the	 colonial/post-colonial	 encounter	 between	 the	 West	 and	 the	 Third	 World,	
particularly	 the	 African	 continent.	 Such	 an	 encounter	 demonstrated	 a	 form	 of	
domination	that	is	motivated	by	Western	ideologies	to	privilege	the	West	against	the	
Third	World.	In	this	chapter,	the	idea	of	customary	international	law	was	viewed	as	




However,	 TWAIL	 and	 other	 Third	 World	 non-state	 actors	 are	 resisting	 Western	
hegemony	 and	 its	 institutions	 as	 the	 agents	 of	 counter-hegemony.	 The	 increasing	
activities	of	the	non-state	actors	in	the	international	sphere	question	the	monopoly	of	
states	over	international	law	making,	particularly	customary	international	law.	Since	













the	 two	 major	 indigenous	 political	 organisations	 in	 Africa	 namely	 centralised	 and	
decentralised	systems	and,	as	a	case	study,	Nigeria	gives	us	the	opportunity	to	explore	








ideologies	 and	 resistance	 by	 competing	 actors	 in	 Nigeria.	 Such	 struggles	 arose	
following	the	imposition	of	colonial	rule	and	subsequent	introduction	of	the	English	
legal	 system,	 which	 unsettled	 existing	 indigenous	 systems	 hugely	 dependent	 on	
customary	law.1	This	imposition	created	a	platform	for	foreign	domination	(portraying	













present	 international	 law.3	 Nigeria’s	 involvement	 in	 these	 international	 activities	
spans	 from	 its	 pre-colonial	 history	 to	 the	 present	 day.	 Within	 this	 period,	 its	
participation	 in	 the	 development	 of	 (customary)	 international	 law	 has	 varied	
depending	on	its	legal	personality	at	any	given	time.4	Nigeria	had	freely	participated	










other	 international	 law	 concepts	 from	 Westphalian/Western	 origin.	 Such	 position	 challenges	 the	
seeming	neglect	of	non-European	legal	traditions	in	the	development	of	(customary)	international	law.	
4	 Legal	personality	 (often	associated	with	subjectivity	 theory)	confers	 rights	and	duties	on	an	entity	
under	 international	 law.	 See	 Roland	 Portmann,	 Legal	 Personality	 in	 International	 Law	 (Cambridge:	








Gramsci’s	 notion	 of	 hegemony	 and	 counter-hegemony	 in	 relation	 to	 customary	
international	law	from	the	Nigerian	perspective.		
The	end	of	colonialism	(following	numerous	acts	of	resistance	from	Nigerians)	ushered	
in	 a	 new	 political	 system	 in	 the	 post-colonial	 Nigerian	 state	 which	 combine	 both	
indigenous	 and	 English	 legal	 systems.6	 Such	 combination	 results	 in	 conflict	 arising	
from	the	 loyalty	of	 the	Nigerian	people	to	their	 indigenous	customary	practices,	as	




Such	 a	 position	 pushes	 the	 Nigerian	 state	 to	 ‘consent’	 to	 hegemonic	 (customary)	
international	 law,	 which	 is	 often	 unfavourable	 to	 it	 and	 its	 people.8	 For	 example,	
African	states,	who	were	not	participants	in	the	formation	of	customary	rules	during	











9	 Michael	 Byers,	 Custom,	 Power	 and	 the	 power	 of	 Rules:	 International	 Relations	 and	 Customary	
International	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1999).	





interest	 of	 their	 former	 colonisers	 by	 adhering	 to	 these	 rules	 which	 are	 neither	
favourable	to	them	nor	their	people.	In	a	bid	to	circumvent	this	negative	impact	on	
the	 populace,	 non-state	 actors	 exert	 different	 forms	 of	 resistance	 to	 the	 Nigerian	
state.	 	 To	 successfully	 address	 these	 hegemonic	 tendencies,	 which	 flow	 from	 the	
international	 system	 and	 are	 sustained	 by	 the	 Nigerian	 state,	 an	 inclusive	 system	




experiences	 to	 Nigeria.	 African	 ‘indigenous’	 societies	 are	 made	 up	 of	 two	 major	
political	 systems;	 namely	 chieftainship	 or	 monarchist,	 and	 the	 ‘chiefless’	 or	
republican.11	 The	 chieftainship	political	 system	operates	 on	 a	 centralized	 authority	
with	 administrative	 and	 judicial	 machineries.	 In	 this	 hierarchical	 system,	 the	 ruler	
(often	referred	to	as	chief)	is	assisted	by	a	well-established	council-of-chiefs	that	are	




the	 elements	 of	 a	 political	 society,	 although	 they	 are	 sometimes	 perceived	 as	
																																								 																				






















Centralised	 systems	 of	 government	 as	 witnessed	 in	 Nigeria	 are	 often	 a	 result	 of	
















However,	 mindful	 of	 the	 potential	 for	 forms	 of	 oppression,	 tyranny	 or	 autocracy,	
certain	political	apparatus	have	been	put	in	place	to	act	as	checks	and	balances.18	Such	




chief	 (oba)	 in	 the	 Yoruba	 community	may	 be	 requested	 by	 his	 chiefs-in-council	 to	
‘open	the	calabash’.19	That	signifies	a	voluntary	commission	of	suicide	by	taking	poison	
or	voluntary	exile.	It	has	also	been	noted	that	in	some	Yoruba	communities,	like	the	
Oyo	 Empire,	 an	 official	 known	 as	 Baṣọrun	 pronounces	 the	 peoples’	 and	 council’s	
rejection	of	the	head	chief	(Alaafin)	by	proclaiming:	‘The	gods	reject	you,	the	people	










occupy	 the	monarch’s	 palace,	 but	 the	 harsh	 policies	 persist,	 parrot	 eggs	may	 be	 presented	 to	 the	
monarch	 to	 signifying	 that	 they	 should	 commit	 suicide.	 The	 first	 recorded	 rejection	 and	 suicide	 in	
history	was	that	of	Alaafin	Ayibi.	While	Ayibi	had	one	of	his	wives	bath	him,	he	took	offence	to	this	
particular	wife’s	joking	remark	that	‘this	is	all	of	the	man	so	much	dreaded	by	all’.	Ayibi	ordered	that	















community	 is	 guaranteed	 in	matters	 concerning	 internal	 relations.	 The	 checks	 and	
balances	in	most	Yoruba	societies	are	not	mere	institutional	affairs.	 In	practice,	the	
monarch	 does	 not	 rule	 single-handily	 as	 the	 ‘kingmakers’	 participate	 in	 decision-
making.22	The	monarch	and	other	members	of	the	ruling	class	act	as	varying	forms	of	
check	against	one	another	to	balance	the	governance	of	the	kingdom.	Also,	members	













deposition,	 the	spokesman	of	 the	community	 stated	 that	 the	above	dethronement	was	a	collective	






22	 Adedayo	 Emmanuel	 Afe	 &	 Ibitayo	 Oluwasola	 Adubuola,	 ‘The	 Travails	 of	 Kingship	 Institution	 in	







Beyond	 the	 internal	 relationships	 between	members	 of	 the	 community,	 the	 chiefs	
within	 the	centralised	 settings	were	major	actors	 in	economic	activities	with	other	
parts	 of	 Africa	 and	 Europe	 during	 pre-colonial	 times.	 Trade	was	 one	 of	 the	major	
international	 relations	 at	 that	 time,	 and	 the	 chiefs	 also	 strongly	 protected	 their	
political	positions	and	sovereignty.	The	chiefs	 took	special	 care	 to	protect	 the	 land	
within	strict	customary	law	which	positioned	them	as	trustees	of	the	land.	They	could	
not	relinquish	any	aspect	of	the	land	to	foreigners	without	the	consent	of	the	people.25	






Consensus	 is	 not	 just	 a	 political	 phenomenon;	 it	 also	 serves	 as	 a	means	 of	 social	






25	 Kenneth	 Onwuka	 Dike,	 Trade	 and	 Politics	 in	 the	 Niger	 Delta	 1830-1885:	 An	 Introduction	 to	 the	
Economic	and	Political	History	of	Nigeria	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1956).	














a	 resolution	 of	 the	 issues	 was	 negotiated;	 the	 point	 of	 it	 was	 seen	 in	 the	
attainment	 of	 reconciliation	 rather	 than	 the	mere	 abstention	 from	 further	
recriminations	or	collisions.28	




A	 decentralized	 system	 of	 governance	 diffuses	 power	 among	 certain	 groups.	 The	
Igbos,	located	in	the	south-eastern	part	of	Nigeria,	are	often	cited	as	an	example	of	
decentralized	 political	 organisation.	 Their	 socio-political	 set-up	 is	 derived	 from	 the	
family.	Families	are	organised	in	a	cluster	of	village	groups.	Each	village	is	independent	
of	 the	other	and	has	a	central	market.	Although	there	are	some	variations	 in	 their	
																																								 																				






be	 defined	 as	 a	 decentralised	 system.29	 Some	 Igbo	 communities	 share	 neighbours	
such	as	Ibibios,	Ijaws	and	Efiks,	who	adopted	similar	socio-political	structures.30	
Direct	democracy	was	practiced	 in	 the	pre-colonial	 Igbo	 region	of	Nigeria	 (to	post-






the	 family.	 The	 status	 of	 these	 groups	 of	 people	 is	 relevant	 in	 Igbo	 society	 as	 it	
recognises	 single	 individual	 accomplishment	 and	 accountability.34	 These	 attributes	
could	include	material	success,	wealth	resulting	from	industry	and	diligence,	integrity,	
and	a	high	level	of	morals.	The	presence	of	these	qualities	in	the	life	of	an	individual	
increases	 the	 chance	 to	 participate	 in	 governance	 and	 attainment	 of	 leadership	
positions.	Lack	of	these	qualities,	on	the	other	hand,	could	deprive	an	 individual	of	
such	 positions	 and	 responsibilities.	 	 In	 certain	 circumstances,	 the	 Igbo	 system	 of	
																																								 																				
29	Susan	Keech	McIntosh,	‘Pathways	to	Complexities:	an	African	perspective’	in	Susan	Keech	McIntosh	














governance	 has	 been	 described	 as	 a	 gerontocracy,	 however,	 not	 all	 elderly	 men	
participate	equally.35		
Age	grades	and	 secret	 societies	are	also	 important	political	 institutions	 in	 the	 Igbo	
society.36	These	are	groups	of	people	who	fall	within	a	close	range	of	age.	They	are	
usually	 dominated	 by	 young	 men	 and	 perform	 specific	 functions	 within	 the	
community.	For	instance,	the	age	grades	execute	decisions	in	the	community	made	





titled	men	 formed	 network	 systems	 to	 participate	 in	 cross	 border	 trade	 involving	
other	Africans	and	Europeans.	This	could	be	referred	to	as	 international	trade.	The	
intricacies	of	these	networks	have	demonstrated	the	complexity	of	Igbo	society.38	It	
has	been	argued	 that	 these	 trade	networks	expanded	across	 Igbo	 society.39	 It	was	

















Igbo	 communities)	operated	an	 ibini	 okpa	 oracle	whose	powers	 included	 resolving	
disputes	and	settling	warfare	among	others.	Arochukwu	people	were	also	known	to	
have	 travelled	 wide	 and	 established	 trade	 alliances	 in	 interested	 territories.	
Furthermore,	it	was	argued	that	the	trading	activities	of	the	Arochukwu	developed	‘a	




The	 decentralised	 system	 that	 was	 obtainable	 in	 Igbo	 society	 has	 remained	 in	
existence	 even	 after	 Nigerian	 independence,	 although	 it	 appears	 relegated	 to	 the	
background	in	terms	of	European	model	state	governance.	However,	this	indigenous	
system	 appears	 effective	 in	 Igbo	 society	 despite	 the	 criticisms	 of	 alleged	 lack	 of	
cohesion	and	inferiority	to	other	political	structures,	such	as	centralised	monarchies	
and	Western	 state	 systems.41	Modern	ethnographers	have	argued	 that	 there	 is	no	
basis	 on	 which	 to	 compare	 the	 centralised	 and	 decentralised	 socio-political	
organisations.42	 According	 to	 this	 view,	 there	 is	 no	 universal	 criterion	 on	which	 to	
make	 such	 comparisons,	 and	 scholars	 who	 make	 such	 comparisons	 are	 usually	
influenced	by	their	own	conditioning.	In	such	scenarios,	these	scholars	seem	to	favour	
their	 own	 customs,	 referring	 to	 them	as	 a	 standard	while	placing	 alien	 cultures	 as	












African	 writers,	 such	 as	 Onwuka	 Dike	 and	 Taslim	 Elias,	 posit	 that	 each	 structure	
effectively	serves	the	needs	and	aspirations	of	the	community	concerned.	Dike	stated	
that	there	are	deep,	fundamental	unities	in	religious	and	cultural	spheres,	as	well	as	
fraternity	 in	 matters	 of	 politics	 and	 economics	 beneath	 the	 fragmented	 authority	





decentralised,	maintained	 different	 degrees	 of	 interaction	with	 other	 parts	 of	 the	
world,	mostly	centred	on	trade,	prior	to	British	colonization.46	During	this	period,	the	
nature	 of	 these	 entities	 did	 not	matter	 in	 the	 international	 system.	Although	 they	










recognisable	 to	 anthropology	 rather	 than	 in	 international	 relations.	 See	 Robert	 H.	 Jackson,	Quasi-





rather	 than	 by	 administrative	 fiat.	 See	 Jeffrey	 Ira	 Herbst,	 States	 and	 Power	 in	 Africa:	 Comparative	











law	as	 European	practices	 attained	a	universal	 status.51	 These	pre-colonial	 entities	
were	 regarded	 as	 backward	 and	 primitive	 compared	 to	 the	 European	 states	 that	
formed	the	centre	of	the	international	community.	They	were	said	to	lack	the	capacity	
to	 employ	 serious	 diplomatic	 pressure	 or	 engage	 in	 international	 relations.	 Such	
negative	 perception,	 as	 argued	 in	 this	 thesis,	 contributed	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 pre-
colonial	Nigerian	entities	in	the	family	of	nations.52		
The	trade	relations	with	pre-colonial	Nigerian	entities	and	other	international	actors	
from	 Europe	 assumed	 a	 different	 dimension	 when	 their	 European	 counterparts	
sought	to	gain	greater	control.	Following	this	turn	of	events	and	news	from	around	
the	 world	 concerning	 the	 British	 conquest	 of	 other	 territories,	 many	 pre-colonial	
Nigerian	rulers	perceived	the	threats	of	colonialism	and	attempted	to	resist	it.53		
																																								 																				


























The	 arrival	 of	 George	 Taubman	 Goldie	 (a	 British	 administrator)	 in	 the	 Niger	 Delta	
region	 of	 Nigeria	 changed	 the	 mode	 of	 imperial	 trade	 and	 political	 activities	 in	
Nigeria.58	Goldie	sought	to	protect	Britain’s	imperial	interests	by	halting	competition	




















1884	 and	 1885,	 energised	 further	 colonial	 ambitions.	 Goldie	 sought	 to	 have	 full	
control	of	the	political	and	administrative	activities	of	the	entities	that	made	up	pre-
colonial	Nigeria.	In	this	effort,	Goldie	obtained	a	royal	charter	for	his	company	from	
the	 British	 government	 in	 1886.59	 The	 charter	 granted	 his	 company	 political	 and	
administrative	authority	over	areas	where	treaties	of	 ‘protection’	had	been	signed.	
The	charter	also	pursued	 further	British	 imperial	 interests	 through	the	conquest	of	
new	 territories.	 This	 led	 to	another	 change	 to	 the	 company’s	name	 to	Royal	Niger	



















the	 hands	 of	 the	 British.	 All	 these	 things	 which	 I	 have	 said	 the	 Fulani	 by	
conquest	took	the	right	to	do,	now	pass	to	the	British	…	the	Government	in	


























any	 agreements	with	G.	 Carter,	 a	 British	 colonial	 official	 in	 order	 not	 to	 lose	 their	
freedom	and	sovereignty	to	the	British	government.64	In	1902,	in	the	Umuahia	area	of	
south-eastern	Nigeria,	 the	people	 vacated	 their	 homes	 and	 sent	 a	message	 to	 the	
British	colonial	administrators	 that	 they	would	never	give	 in;	 that	 the	British	could	
destroy	their	homes	if	they	wanted	to.65	Also,	King	Koko	of	Nembe	in	the	Niger	Delta	
area	 of	 southern	 Nigeria,	 protested	 against	 trading	 policies	 of	 the	 Royal	 Niger	
Company	and	in	1894	began	to	plan	a	war	against	the	British	colonialists.66	In	early	
1895,	 King	 Koko	 and	 his	 forces	 destroyed	 the	 Royal	 Niger	 Company’s	 premises,	
warehouse	and	killed	a	number	of	indigenous	African	members	of	staff.	In	the	British	
counter	attack,	he	refused	to	negotiate	or	meet	with	the	representative	of	the	British	
company.	He	 later	went	 into	self-exile	and	died	(allegedly	by	suicide)	 in	1898.	King	
Koko’s	status	as	a	resolute	hero	admired	by	his	people	and	neighbours	earned	him	the	
nickname	 ‘restless	 shark’.	 King	Koko’s	 resistance	 created	 sufficient	 fear	 among	 the	
British	colonisers	 that	 they	stationed	 large	 forces	 in	 the	Niger	Delta	to	prevent	the	
occurrence	of	similar	resistance.67	Despite	these	and	other	numerous	resistances,	the	
people	 of	 Nigeria	 were	 overpowered	mostly	 through	 the	 use	 of	 military	 force	 by	



















a	 Gramscian	 sense	 of	 the	 word.	 Both	 slave	 trade	 and	 so-called	 ‘legitimate’	 trade	
(which	dealt	in	cash	crops	for	export	to	Britain)	incorporated	pre-colonial	and	colonial	







the	 people	 of	 Nigeria.73	 Such	 ‘progress’	 consisted	 of	 the	 promise	 to	 liberate	 the	
peasants	as	well	as	improve	Nigerians	by	raising	their	educational,	political	and	social	
status	to	the	standard	of	 the	modern	world.	For	example,	British	missionaries	sent	
negative	 reports	 describing	 human	 sacrifices	 and	 domestic	 slavery	 to	 their	 native	
country.74	These	 reports	were	often	exaggerated	and	 functioned	as	propaganda	 to	
justify	 their	 occupation	 of	Nigeria.75	 	 These	missionaries	 played	 significant	 roles	 in	
																																								 																				













backing	 colonialism	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 Africa	 by	 suppressing	 African	 culture	 and	





the	 creation	 of	 a	 space	 for	 the	 free	will	 and	 the	 incorporation	 of	 individuals	who	
consent	to	act	within	this	space	rather	than	solely	brutal	subjection.79	Such	position	
aligns	 with	 Gramsci’s	 notion	 of	 hegemony	 explored	 in	 chapter	 one	 of	 this	 thesis.	
Gramsci’s	 notion	 of	 hegemony	 emphasises	 the	 maintenance	 of	 control	 that	 is	
achieved	through	consent,	rather	than	via	violence	or	coercion	through	the	institution	














Princeton	 University	 Press,	 1999);	 Brian	 Larkin,	 Signal	 and	 Noise:	Media,	 Infrastructure	 and	 Urban	
Culture	in	Nigeria	(2008)	see	note	73.	


















impose	 their	 ideologies	 on	 Nigeria.84	 Such	 strategies	 especially	 in	 the	 area	 of	
institution	 of	 trade	 policies	 and	 political	 organisations	 by	 the	 British	 colonisers,	
deprived	 Nigeria	 its	 legal	 capacity.	 These	 activities	 impeded	 the	 participation	 of	




became	 a	 legitimising	 instrument	 for	 the	 acceptance	 of	 (hegemonic)	 customary	




their	 legal	 personality.	 It	 is	 asserted	 that	 such	 act	 was	 aimed	 to	 hinder	 Non-Europeans	 from	
participating	 in	 the	 making	 of	 international	 law.	 See	 Antony	 Anghie,	 ‘Finding	 the	 Peripheries:	











into	 the	 European	model	 state	 called	 Nigeria.	 	 During	 the	 colonial	 period,	 Britain	
introduced	a	system	of	indirect	rule	to	enforce	colonial	interests	in	Nigeria.87	Indirect	





friction	 between	 British	 rule	 and	 indigenous	 systems.90	 It	 was	 founded	 on	 the	
European	 stereotypical	 assumption	 that	 African	 societies	 possess	 some	 kind	 of	
rudimentary	kings.91	Indirect	rule	was	successful	in	the	northern	part	of	Nigeria	due	in	
																																								 																				
86	 E.	A.	Oji,	 ‘Application	of	Customary	 International	 Law	 in	Nigerian	Courts’	 (2011)	NAILS	 LAW	AND	
DEVELOPMENT	JOURNAL,	1	(1)	p.	151.	





89	 Robert	 L.	 Tignor,	 ‘Colonial	 Chiefs	 in	 Chiefless	 Societies’	 (1971)	 THE	 JOURNAL	 F	 ODERN	 AFRICAN	
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91	Terrence	Renger,	 ‘The	Invention	of	Tradition	in	Colonial	Africa’	 in	Roy	Richard	Grinker,	Stephen	C.	













region.	 The	 system	 of	 checks	 and	 balances,	 pursuit	 of	 consensus	 by	 protracted	
deliberations,	 the	use	of	 religious	sanctions,	as	well	as	small	 scale	units	of	political	
organization,	rendered	indirect	rule	impracticable.94		
Some	 southern	 collaborators	 were	 granted	 warrants	 to	 act	 as	 British	 local	
representatives	in	the	absence	of	a	centralised	structure	of	governance	as	obtained	in	
the	 north.	 Such	 appointments	 earned	 them	 the	 title	 ‘warrant	 chiefs’.95	 The	
appointment	of	only	men	as	warrant	chiefs	contributed	to	the	creation/reinforcement	
of	 a	 patriarchal	 society,	 as	well	 as	 a	 hierarchy	 in	 leadership.96	 	 The	 installation	 of	
warrant	 chiefs	 in	 Nigeria	 was	 made	 necessary	 for	 the	 effective	 administration	 of	
British	rule,	especially	in	south-eastern	Nigeria	(occupied	pre-dominantly	by	the	Igbo	
																																								 																				











people).	 Most	 often	 the	 warrant	 chiefs	 held	 magisterial	 powers	 and	 held	 court	
sessions	for	criminal	and	civil	hearing.97	











The	diversity	of	 the	 regions	of	Nigeria	 and	 its	 complexities	 created	 tensions	 in	 the	
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Kingdom	(2005)	see	note	94.	
98Elizabeth	Isichei,	A	History	of	the	Igbo	People	(1976),	see	note	27.		











these	 groups	 of	 people	 contested	 colonial	 decisions	 with	 an	 unending	 series	 of	
petitions.	 This	 southerners’	 attitude	 of	 resistance	 created	 resentment	 among	 the	
British	and	was	stereotyped	by	the	British	administrators	as	the	antithesis	of	what	the	
British	 wanted	 the	 northerners	 to	 become.103	 Based	 on	 this,	 the	 British	 aimed	 to	
preserve	native	powers	in	the	north,	forbade	missionary	activities	in	Muslim	areas	and	
restricted	 Western	 education.	 British	 officers	 were	 instructed	 to	 shun	 violent	
behaviours	in	the	north	and	their	wives	were	requested	to	veil	themselves	in	order	
not	to	offend	religious	sensibilities.104	In	the	1930s,	the	urge	to	preserve	indigenous	






















the	 imposition	 of	 hegemonic	 (customary)	 international	 law.	 For	 instance,	 Taslim	
Olawale	Elias,	 (who	had	his	 legal	 training	 in	England,	 including	 the	attainment	of	a	
PhD,	being	Barrister-at-law	of	 the	 Inner	Temple,	and	Simon	Research	 fellow	 in	 the	









Despite	 the	 diversity	 in	 application	 of	 indirect	 rule	 in	 different	 regions	 of	 colonial	
Nigeria,	 the	 installation	 of	 warrant	 chiefs	 in	 the	 south	 and	 other	 indigenous	
administrators	enabled	the	effective	exploitation	of	Nigerian	economic	resources	and	
indoctrination	 of	 Nigerians	 to	 British	 ideology,	 while	 neglecting	 indigenous	
institutions,	 culture	 and	 customary	 laws.108	 For	 instance,	 Nigerian	 native	 customs	












































inescapable	 conclusion	 that	 customary	 law…	 is	 subordinated	 to	 the	 English	
common	law	and	ensures	that	the	growth	of	customary	law	is	stunted.117		
As	observed	above,	the	application	of	the	repugnancy	test	and	the	above	decisions	







In	 every	 system	 of	 jurisprudence	 known	 to	 us	 one	 of	 the	 essential	
requirements	 for	 a	 valid	marriage	 is	 that	 it	must	 be	 the	 union	 of	man	 and	
woman	 thereby	 creating	 the	 status	 of	 husband	 and	 wife.	 Indeed	 the	 law	












The	 position	 in	 the	 above	 cases,	 based	 on	 Christianity,	 is	 contrary	 to	 the	 African	






procreation	by	marrying	another	woman.	 In	practice,	 the	 childless	woman	marries	
another	woman	in	order	to	continue	her	husband’s	family	tree.	
The	 above	 Nigerian	 case	 laws	 and	 analyses	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 definition	 of	
universality	and	the	standards	for	the	repugnancy	test	are	not	universal	at	all	but	that	
they	 are	 instead	 superimposed	 by	 a	Western	 liberal	 legal	 ideology,	 especially	 the	
British	 system.	 Consequently,	 the	 post-colonial	 Nigerian	 state,	 through	 its	 judicial	





hegemonic	 machinery	 of	 the	media	 and	 (colonial)	Western	 education,	 were	 tools	








and	 create	 ‘modern’	 Nigeria.121	 However,	 the	 meaning	 attached	 to	 media	
technologies,	their	technical	functions	and	social	uses	are	uncertain	following	changes	
in	the	political	order	and	responses	to	these	political	orders.122	For	instance,	the	British	
colonialists	 built	 radio	 networks	 and	mobile	 cinemas	 in	 Nigeria	with	 the	 intent	 to	
educate	 and	 develop	 Nigerians	 into	 ‘modern’	 colonial	 citizens.	 It	 operated	 at	 the	
imperial	level	through	the	use	of	the	British	Broadcasting	Corporation	(BBC)	and,	at	






rationalise	 their	 ideologies	 to	 the	 Nigerian	 populace.124	 Such	 usage	 brings	 to	
perspective	Gramsci’s	notion	of	hegemony	in	which	the	media	serves	as	a	source	of	
cultural	hegemony	by	helping	to	produce	and	sustain	the	production	of	consensus	and	
manufactured	 consent.125	 However,	 the	media	 has	 enjoyed	 diverse	 application	 by	




















matters	 that	 adversely	 affect	 them.	 For	 instance,	 the	 media	 was	 employed	 by	




The	 imposition	 of	 British	 colonial	 rule	 in	 Nigeria	 did	 not	 remain	 unchallenged,	 as	
observed	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 of	 this	 chapter.	 There	 were	 diverse	 forms	 of	
resistance	among	the	Nigerian	people.	The	First	World	War	has	been	described	as	one	
of	the	major	forces	that	propelled	these	groups	of	people	to	denounce	foreign	rule.129	
For	 instance,	 in	 the	south-eastern	region	of	Nigeria,	 rumours	arose	that	 the	British	
were	in	danger	of	German	defeat.	Such	assertions	were	bolstered	by	alleged	sightings	






















products.132	 Acknowledging	 this	 resistance,	 the	 Acting	 Lieutenant	 Governor	 of	 the	





of	 consultation	 with	 the	 Nigerian	 people	 prior	 to	 the	 imposition	 of	 colonial	
constitutions,	 immigration	 rules	 and	 educational	 systems,	 among	 others,	 were	
criticized	 by	 these	 elites.	 In	 the	 late	 1950s,	 a	 series	 of	 agitations	 for	 Nigerian	
independence	led	to	the	inevitable	outcome,	the	exit	of	British	officials.	On	1	October	
1960,	Nigeria	obtained	independence	from	Britain	and	in	1963,	became	a	Republic.	
Since	 then,	Nigeria	has	witnessed	diverse	 forms	of	political	administration,	 ranging	
from	 the	 British	model	 of	 a	 parliamentary	 system	 of	 government	 to	 an	 American	
																																								 																				
131	 Railways	were	 built	 in	many	 parts	 of	 Africa	 for	 economic	 reasons.	 It	 encouraged	 the	 European	
colonialists	into	African	farms	and	these	farms	were	turned	into	profitable	colonies.	See	‘Workhorses	












the	 domination	 of	 a	 particular	 group	 of	 people	 in	 the	 ruling	 class,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
demand	for	equal	representation	of	the	diverse	ethnic	groups	in	political	governance	
have	led	to	the	proliferation	of	‘states’	(sub-regions)	in	Nigeria.136	
Although,	 Nigeria	 became	 independent,	 the	 legacy	 of	 colonial	 state	 structure	 has	
endured.	British	colonial	officials	were	replaced	by	a	select	group	of	the	Nigerian	elite,	
which	 left	 the	people	unsatisfied.	 For	 example,	 a	 trade	union	document	 stated,	 in	
1963,	that:	
Independence	has	not	brought	democracy	to	Nigerian	workers	and	farmers.	
This	 is	 because	 the	 type	 of	 democracy	 preached	 and	 practiced	 by	Nigerian	






















these	sources	of	 law	are	being	used	 in	 the	administration	of	 justice	 in	Nigeria,	 the	
subjection	 of	 indigenous	 customary	 law	 to	 repugnancy	 tests	 as	 discussed	 above	
creates	tensions	and	sometimes	results	in	resistance.139		
The	state	has	retained	elements	of	 its	colonial	 legacy,	which	abide	to	this	day.	This	




then	British	ambassador	 in	 Lagos,	Nigeria,	 stated	 that:	 ‘It	 seems	 to	me	 that	British	
interests	would	 now	 be	 served	 by	 quick	 federal	 victory’.141	 He	 suggested	 that	 the	
maintenance	of	 the	 post-colonial	Nigerian	 state	 (with	 its	 intact	 boundaries)	 better	
















century.	 This	 unification	 has	 been	 described	 in	 the	 economic	 area	 and	
standardization	 has	 in	 the	 same	 way	 invaded	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 political	
systems.	It	may	be	true	that	these	states	are	self-governing,	but	they	no	longer	
control	the	functioning	of	their	society	and	of	production.142		
TWAIL	 scholarship	 also	 identifies	 the	 issues	 raised	 above	 (such	 as	 colonialism,	








organization	 of	 social	 relations	 and	 transactions-	assessed	 in	 terms	of	 their	
















avenue	 for	 the	 emancipatory	 evolution	 of	 non-state	 actors	 from	 rigid	 statist	
international	 law.147	According	 to	 this	position,	 the	activities	of	non-state	actors	 in	
globalisation	transcend	state	borders.	However,	it	has	been	argued	that	such	activities	
threaten	state	sovereignty.148	Based	on	the	latter	premise,	it	is	believed	that	non-state	




despite	good	aspects	of	globalization	which	may	be	beneficial	 to	 the	people	 in	 the	




Transformation	 Reader:	 An	 Introduction	 to	 the	Globalization	Debate	 (2nd	 edn.)	 (Cambridge-Malden:	
Polity	Press,	2000)	60	at	p.	68.	
146	 Christiana	 Ochoa,	 ‘The	 Individual	 and	 Customary	 International	 Law	 Formation’	 (2007)	 VIRGINIA	
JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW,	Vol.	48,	No.	1,	pp.	119-186.	














reliance	 on	 American	 military	 dominance	 and	 ideological	 leadership	 as	 the	 sole	
foundation	 for	 ensuring	 global	 security	 allegedly	 confirms	 Western	 dominance	 in	
globalisation.152	 These	 American	 strategies,	 as	 seen	 in	 ‘the	 war	 on	 terror,’	 raises	







persuasive	alternative	 to	American	organisation	and	 inspirational	 capabilities.	 Such	
liberalist	views	elevate	the	position	of	the	United	States	to	the	centre	of	global	issues.	
Other	 members	 of	 the	 international	 system	 (for	 instance,	 the	 Third	 World)	 are	
																																								 																				





World:	Reshaping	 Justice	 (2008)	see	note	151	at	p.	25;	Project	 for	new	the	New	American	Century:	
Rebuilding	America’s	Defenses,	Strategies,	Forces	and	Resources	for	a	New	Century,	2000	available	at	
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/pdf/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf	 [accessed	 on	 29	
September,	2014];	White	House,	 ‘National	 Security	 Strategy	of	 the	United	States	of	America,	2002’	











The	 neoliberal	 perception	 of	 globalisation	 in	 the	world	market	 also	 contributes	 to	
hegemonic	tendencies	in	the	international	legal	system.155	It	introduces	a	central	set	
of	guiding	principles	of	economic	thought	and	market	based	on	Western	ideologies	
and	 practices.156	 These	 principles	 are	 based	 on	 deregulation,	 privatization	 and	 the	
withdrawal	of	the	state	from	numerous	areas	of	social	provision.		These	ideas	were	
adopted	 by	 many	 states	 from	 the	 Global	 North	 to	 the	 South.	 Global	 Northern	
advocates	 occupy	 influential	 positions	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 education	 and	 corporate	
boardrooms,	as	well	as	such	international	institutions	as	the	International	Monetary	
Fund,	 World	 Bank	 and	 World	 Trade	 Organisation.	 Consequently,	 neoliberalism	
became	 a	 discourse	 that	 dictates	 how	 the	 world	 is	 interpreted,	 lived-in	 and	
understood.157	The	institutionalisation	of	these	ideas	has	enabled	their	sustenance	in	
Nigeria	following	her	assent	to	these	international	organisations.	
The	 Nigerian	 state	 consents	 to	 some	 of	 these	 worldviews	 through	 compliance	 to	
contractual	 obligations	 as	 a	 signatory	 to	 these	 international	 institutions.	 However,	



















statute.	 This	 statute	 allows	 US	 (federal)	 district	 courts	 to	 exercise	 subject-matter	
jurisdiction	over	civil	claims	brought	by	non-US	citizens	for	violations	of	international	
law	perpetrated	abroad.161		
Unfortunately,	 resistance	 to	 multinational	 corporations’	 imperialistic	 practices,	
human	rights	violations	and	other	problems	resulting	thereof	are	suppressed	by	other	
Western	tools	of	hegemony,	including	its	legal	systems	and	principles.	This	is	typified	
in	 the	 above	 case,	 following	 the	United	 States	 Supreme	Court’s	 affirmation	of	 the	
decision	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal.	 It	 held	 that	 there	 are	 no	 specific,	 universal	 or	
obligatory	 norms	 of	 customary	 international	 law	 that	 hold	 corporations	 liable	 for	
violations	 of	 the	 law	 of	 nations,	 including	 international	 human	 rights	 violations.	



















people	 in	 the	 Third	 World.164	 At	 decolonisation,	 many	 African	 states	 pursued	
development	plans,	as	 they	believed	that	 ‘modernisation’	brings	solutions	 to	many	
problems.	The	intention	was	to	use	such	tools	to	hasten	‘catching	up’	with	the	West	
in	order	to	abolish	the	colonial	idea	of	Third	World	backwardness.165	For	example,	the	






163	The	heavy	dependence	on	Western	 standards,	policies	and	 their	 aid	by	Third	World	 states	have	
raised	concerns	of	 re-colonization	of	 the	Third	World	by	Third	World	scholars.	 It	was	observed	that	
‘colonization	works	surreptitiously	because	colonized	institutions	either	do	not	realize	their	subservient	
status,	or	they	relish	the	thought	of	acceptance	by	the	dominating	off-shore	 institutions.	 Its	success	
also	 depends	 not	 just	 on	 a	 belief	 in	 its	 inevitability,	 but	 on	 the	 presumption	 of	 its	 necessity	 —	 a	




World	Resistance	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	University	 Press,	 2003);	Mohammed	Bedjaoui,	Towards	a	
New	International	Economic	Order	(New	York:	Holmes	and	Meier,	1979).	









It	 has	 also	 been	 argued	 that	 solutions	 to	 the	massive	 displacement	 of	 people	 and	
ecological	 destruction	 within	 Nigeria	 and	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 Third	 World	 are	 not	








The	 relocation	of	political	powers	 from	 indigenous	entities	 to	British	 colonisers	 for	




state	 was	 ‘manufactured’	 to	 inherit	 hegemonic	 customs	 derived	 from	 European	




























Custom	 usually	 involves	 repeated	 practices	 among	 a	 particular	 group	 of	 people.	
Although	 certain	 behaviour	 may	 become	 acceptable	 as	 a	 result	 of	 such	 frequent	
practices,	it	may	not	be	legally	binding.	However,	situations	in	which	such	practices	
involve	 the	 sense	 of	 an	 element	 of	 legal	 obligation	 to	 behave	 in	 a	 certain	way,	 a	
question	of	law	could	be	said	to	have	been	raised	and	in	particular,	the	question	of	a	
potential	 source	of	 law.1	Globally,	 custom	 is	a	 source	of	 law	that	 regulates	various	
activities	at	various	levels	in	different	legal	systems,	including	the	international	legal	
system.2	 Traditionally,	 the	 interpretation	 of	 customary	 international	 law	 by	 the	
International	Court	of	Justice	(ICJ),	as	seen,	for	example,	in	the	North	Sea	Continental	
Shelf	cases,	is	based	on	two	elements:	state	practice	and	opinio	juris	sive	necessitatis	













Concept	 of	 Custom	 in	 International	 Law	 (Ithaca	 N.Y.	 and	 London:	 Cornell	 University	 Press,	 1971)	 ;	








functions	 of	 the	 state,	 but	 also	 on	 its	 exclusivity	 in	 the	 making	 of	 customary	
international	 law.6	For	 instance,	non-state	actors	such	as	African	 indigenous	rulers,	
chiefs	 and	 community	 leaders	 exert	 great	 influence	 on	 local	 communities	 and	 the	
nation-state	at	 large	 in	terms	of	governance	and	resolution	of	conflict.	 7	 In	Nigeria,	
most	often,	indigenous	leaders,	family	heads	and	other	indigenous	community	bodies	
assist	 in	 the	 decongestion	 of	 the	 Nigerian	 state	 judicial	 system’s	 caseload.8	 For	
instance,	 disputes	 arising	 between	 individuals,	 as	 well	 as	 communities	 and	
multinational	corporations	which	could	have	come	to	the	state	courts	are	resolved	by	
these	non-state	actors,	whom	the	people	appear	to	accept	more	than	the	state	judicial	










crises	 regulatory.	 See	 Bridget	M.	 Hutter,	 ‘The	 Role	 of	 Non-state	 actors	 in	 Regulation.’	 Available	 at	
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/36118/1/Disspaper37.pdf	[accessed	on	5	August	2016].	
6	 Ben	 Chigara,	 Legitimacy	 Deficit	 in	 Custom:	 A	 Deconstructionist	 Critique	 (Aldershot-Burlington:	
Dartmouth	&	Burlington,	2001).	
7	Annette	 Iris	 Idler	and	James	 J.F.	Forest,	 ‘Behavioural	Patterns	among	 (violent)	Non-state	Actors:	A	
Study	 of	 Complementary	 Governance’	 available	 at	
http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.er/	[accessed	on	20	August	2016].	
8	Annette	 Iris	 Idler	and	James	 J.F.	Forest,	 ‘Behavioural	Patterns	among	 (violent)	Non-state	Actors:	A	
Study	of	Complementary	Governance’,	see	note	7.	










address	the	question	of	whether	customary	 international	 law	is	evolving	to	 include	





Overall,	 this	 chapter	 argues	 that	 the	 insistence	 on	 the	 traditional	 approach	 to	
customary	international	 law	serves	the	hegemonic	purposes	of	the	great	powers	in	
the	Global	North.	At	the	very	least,	the	traditional	approach	is	out	of	step	with	reality	
in	 that	 it	 fails	 to	 reflect	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 international	 system	 is	 characterised	and	
shaped	 by	 the	 activities	 of	 diverse	 non-state	 actors.	 These	 observations	 seek	 a	
reassessment	of	the	formation	of	custom	to	include	the	interests	of	diverse	actors	in	
the	making	 of	 customary	 international	 law.	 Based	 on	 the	 above,	 this	 chapter	 will	
explore	some	underlying	features	of	custom,	which	reveal	its	evolutionary	character.	
Such	 features	 serve	 to	 create	 a	 robust	 international	 law	 that	 encourages	 custom	
making	 by	 both	 states	 and	 non-state	 actors.	 The	 inclusion	 of	 non-state	 actors	 is	
expected	 to	 accommodate	 the	 participation	 of	 diverse	 legal	 cultures,	 especially	 in	
																																								 																				




























Groups	 in	 the	 Creation	 of	 International	 Humanitarian	 Law’	 (2012)	 THE	 YALE	 JOURNAL	 OF	
INTERNATIONAL	LAW,	vol.	31:1,	p.108.	












despite	 the	 current	 rules	of	 customary	 international	 law	having	been	modelled	on	
Western	traditions	and	norms.		The	inclusion	of	custom	as	a	source	of	international	
law	will	be	examined	 in	 its	 relation	 to	 treaties,	particularly	article	38	 (1)	 (b)	of	 the	





developments	 have	 necessitated	 the	 involvement	 of	 non-state	 actors	 in	 custom-
making	in	contemporary	times.	
2. HISTORICAL	DEVELOPMENT	OF	CUSTOMARY	INTERNATIONAL	LAW		
Records	abound	 in	examples	of	 the	presence	of	 custom	 in	many	societies.15	These	
customs	usually	result	from	social	interactions	and	relationships	among	people	within	
a	 given	 society,	 raising	 legal	 obligations.16	 A	 prominent	 feature	 in	 these	 societies,	
irrespective	of	their	geographical	locations	or	race,	is	that	custom	develops	through	












They	 are	 also	 developed	 collectively	 within	 a	 given	 community.	 In	 these	
circumstances,	 wide	 acceptance	 and	 application	 is	 expected	 based	 on	 the	
representation	of	collective	interests.		
Human	 relationships	 and	 interactions	 are	 known	 to	 transcend	 beyond	 one’s	
immediate	 borders	 into	 areas	 of	 different	 cultures,	 religions	 and	 historical	
experiences,	 especially	 in	 the	 field	 of	 trade.19	 In	 such	 situations,	 principles	 and	
applications	of	custom	assume	international	dimensions.	It	is	a	reasonable	assumption	




However,	 the	 present	 international	 system	 leads	 international	 law	 scholars	 and	





















De	 legisbus	 ac	 deo	 legislatore	 provided	 the	 first	 record	 on	 custom.23	 In	 Suarez’s	
account,	 there	are	 two	elements	 from	which	customary	 international	 law	could	be	




the	difference	 in	context,	 the	elements	 identified	by	Suarez	were	compared	to	the	
twentieth	century	ideas	of	state	practice	and	opinio	juris.27	
Following	 Suarez’s	 identification	of	 customary	 international	 law	was	Hugo	Grotius’	





















express	 consent	 is	 a	 requirement	 for	 being	 bound	 by	 international	 law.	 However,	
customary	 international	 law	 can	 be	 deduced	 from	 implied	 consent	 based	 on	
acquiescence.30		
Customary	 international	 law	has	evolved	from	its	elementary	stage,	as	reported	by	
scholars	 such	 as	 Suarez	 and	 Grotius,	 to	 become	 part	 of	 international	 treaties.31	
















attempt	 to	 circumvent	metaphorical	 and	 ambiguous	 issues	 that	 the	 use	 of	 ‘source’	may	 pose	 and	
therefore	create	confusion.	See	Ben	Chigara,	Legitimacy	Deficit	in	Custom:	A	Deconstructionist	Critique	








to	 customary	 international	 law.	 See,	 Ian	 Brownlie,	 Principles	 of	 Public	 International	 Law	 (5th	 edn.)	
(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1998).		In	most	cases,	its	use	is	intended	to	view	the	process	where	rules	of	
international	law	emerge.	See,	Malcolm	N	Shaw,	International	Law	(6th	edn.)	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	


















Although	 it	 is	widely	 accepted	 that	 article	 38	provides	guidance	 on	 the	 sources	of	
international	 law,38	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 it	 provides	 an	 authoritative	 and	
exhaustive	 list	 of	 sources	 of	 international	 law	 is	 contentious.39	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	






35	 Article	 38	 (1)	 (b)	 Statute	 of	 the	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice.	 Ben	 Chigara,	 Legitimacy	 Deficit	 in	
Custom:	A	Deconstructionist	Critique	(2001),	see	note	6.	

















international	 law	 deals	 with	 states	 alone	 has	 been	 described	 as	 erroneous.42	
Recognition	of	non-state	actors	as	subjects	of	international	law	challenges	the	idea	of	



























where	 there	 are	 possible	 practices	 leading	 to	 legal	 obligations	 among	 the	 various	
subjects	 (rather	 than	only	states)	under	 international	 law.	Since	the	article	has	not	
expressly	defined	custom	as	constituting	state	practice	and	opinio	 juris,	 it	could	be	
understood	 that	 the	 formation	 of	 custom	 emanating	 from	 other	 subjects	 of	
international	 law	 could	 be	 viewed	 through	 this	 article	 and	 applied	 in	 other	














see	 note	 76;	 Anthony	 Aust,	 Hand	 Book	 of	 International	 Law	 (2nd	 edn.)	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	
University	Press	2010);	North	Sea	Continental	Shelf	ICJ	Reports	(1969)	p.	3,	44	(para	77);	Asylum	case,	
ICJ	Reports	(1950)	pp.	226,	276-277.	











practice	 is	 not	 necessary;	 custom	 may	 result	 from	 quick	 practice.50	 There	 is	
considerable	 flexibility	 in	 many	 cases	 involving	 uniformity/consistency	 of	 practice.	
Although	 complete	 uniformity	 is	 not	 required,	 substantial	 uniformity	 is	 viewed	 as	
necessary.	
Opinio	 juris	 refers	 to	 the	 subjective	 (also	 referred	 to	 as	 psychological)	 element	 of	




The	above	 two	elements	have	evolved	 to	align	with	 the	 interest	of	 some	powerful	
states	in	the	Global	North,	as	will	be	demonstrated	below.	Such	a	position	highlights	
the	legal	fiction	of	free	and	equal	states,	as	powerful	states	insist	on	decisive	influence	
in	 determining	 the	 content	 and	 application	 of	 custom.	 In	 view	 of	 this	 situation,	
Mohammed	Bedjaoui,	 for	 example,	 argues	 that	 the	 freedom	of	 the	 high	 seas	was	





















commodities	 on	 an	 industrial	 scale	 –	 ‘international’	 issues	which	were	 of	 greatest	
concern	 to	 the	 so-called	developed	 states.	 These	 issues	enabled	 their	political	 and	
economic	dominance	in	the	international	sphere.	They	did	not,	for	example	concern	






Boz-Kourt	 ship	 drowned	 and	 Turkey	 alleged	 negligence	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 French	
officer	on	watch	duty.	The	French	officer	was	arrested	when	the	ship	reached	Istanbul	
and	was	 tried	 for	manslaughter.	 The	 issue	 of	 jurisdiction	was	 raised	 to	 determine	












The	 Permanent	 Court	 of	 International	 Justice	 rejected	 the	 above	 arguments	 and	
declared	that	the	existence	of	custom	would	still	have	been	established,	even	if	such	
a	practice	of	abstention	from	instituting	criminal	proceedings	could	in	fact	be	proved.	
The	court	held	 that	 ‘only	 if	 such	abstention	were	based	on	 their	 (the	states)	being	
conscious	 of	 a	 duty	 to	 abstain	 would	 it	 be	 possible	 to	 speak	 of	 an	 international	
custom’.57	Therefore,	the	crucial	component	of	obligation	was	lacking	and	the	practice	
remained	simply	 that	and	nothing	more.58	The	case	pointed	out	state	practice	and	
opinio	 juris	 that	 could	 create	 legal	 obligation	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 customary	
international	law.	
The	 Lotus	 case	 established	 the	 principle	 that	 jurisdiction	 is	 territorial.	 A	 state	
exercising	jurisdiction	outside	its	territory	requires	coverage	by	international	treaty	or	
customary	rule	to	do	so.	Another	principle	highlighted	in	this	case	is	that	a	state	has	





















ICJ,	 requesting	 a	 decision	 to	 recognise	 that	 Colombia	was	 competent	 to	 ascertain	
Torre’s	offences	 in	 regards	 to	whether	 they	were	 criminal	 (as	Peru	maintained)	or	
political,	in	which	case	asylum	and	safe	conduct	could	be	allowed.	The	court	held	that	






















there	 is	 silence.62	 Although	 universality	 is	 not	 a	 requirement	 in	 the	 formation	 of	
custom,	modern	international	law	seeks	an	inclusive	system	that	will	accommodate	






The	 above	 case	 was	 criticised	 as	 having	 created	 many	 uncertainties	 and	
contradictions,	fluctuations	and	discrepancies	in	the	exercise	of	diplomatic	asylum.65	
It	 was	 further	 criticised	 as	 having	 resulted	 in	 many	 inconsistencies	 in	 the	 rapid	
succession	 of	 conventions	 on	 asylum,	 as	 the	 practice	 had	 been	 influenced	 by	
















































such	 local	 custom.	The	 ICJ	declared	 satisfaction	 in	 the	existence	of	 a	 constant	and	
uniform	practice	 allowing	 free	 passage	between	 the	parties	 in	 the	 past.	 The	 court	
stated	that	the	practice	was	accepted	as	law	by	both	parties,	and	as	such	had	given	
rise	to	a	right	and	a	correlative	obligation.71		
This	 was	 a	 case	 between	 a	 European	 state	 (Portugal)	 and	 an	 Asian	 state	 (India).	
Portugal	was	of	course	a	key	player	in	the	areas	of	trade	and	colonisation	in	the	15th	
and	 16th	 centuries,	 often	 described	 as	 the	 first	 global	 sea	 power.72	 Nigeria’s	 first	
encounter	with	a	European	state	was	with	Portugal.73	Portugal	established	sea	routes	
to	 India	 and	 colonised	 some	 African	 states,	 including	 Angola	 and	 Mozambique.	
Portugal	also	had	colonial	influence	in	South	America	(Brazil)	and	Asia.		
The	 development	 of	 local	 custom	 in	 international	 law	 through	 this	 case	 has	 been	
based	on	the	protection	of	Portugal’s	practice	over	the	interest	of	India,	setting	out	




72	 Cyril	 Akobundu	 Ndoh,	 Imperialism	 and	 Economic	 Dependency	 in	 Nigeria	 (2nd	 edn.)	 (Owerri:	
Charismatic	 Forum	 Pub.,	 2000);	 J.D.	 Vincent-Smith,	 ‘The	 Anglo-German	 Negotiations	 over	 the	
Portuguese	Colonies	 in	Africa	1911-14’	(1974)	THE	HISTORICAL	JOURNAL	XVIII,	3,	pp.	620-629;	 ‘How	









expected	 to	 attribute	 decisive	 effect	 to	 such	 practice	 in	 Africa	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	




hegemonic	 pursuits	 in	 the	 development	 of	 customary	 international	 law	 in	 certain	
ways.	 Firstly,	 the	 development	 of	 such	 regional	 custom	 within	 Africa	 creates	 the	
opportunity	for	parties	(both	state	and	non-state	actors)	within	the	region	to	be	bound	
by	a	rule	of	custom	that	could	have	emanated	from	their	interactions	to	the	exclusion	





Sea.75	 These	 disputes	 involved	 Germany	 on	 one	 side	 and	 The	 Netherlands	 and	
Denmark	on	the	other.	Germany	could	not	agree	with	The	Netherlands	or	Denmark	
over	respective	boundary	lines	and	the	issue	was	brought	before	the	ICJ.	Here,	the	ICJ	













in	 the	 development	 of	 custom	affecting	 boundary	 rules	 for	 other	 states	 to	 follow.	
However,	while	setting	out	the	above	elements,	the	ICJ	held	that	it	was	necessary	for	
the	 practice	 in	 question	 to	 be	 completely	 rigorous	 in	 conformity	 with	 purported	
customary	 rule.78	 This	 position	 was	 established	 in	 the	Nicaragua	 v.	 United	 States	




















On	 the	 elements	 of	 state	 practice	 and	 opinio	 juris	 as	 constituting	 customary	
international	law,	the	ICJ	stated	that		





The	 ICJ	 also	 declared	 that	 for	 a	 new	 custom	 to	 emerge,	 not	 only	 must	 the	 acts	



















the	coasts	of	 the	United	States	as	appertaining	 to	 the	United	States,	 subject	 to	 its	
jurisdictions	and	control.’81	This	claim	was	inconsistent	with	pre-existing	international	
law;	no	state	had	previously	made	the	general	claim	to	control	the	seabed	resources	
of	 its	continental	 shelf	beyond	twelve	nautical	miles,	yet	many	states	 followed	the	
American	position	 and	 this	 position	 achieved	 the	 status	of	 customary	 rule,	 and	by	
1958,	its	customary	status	was	confirmed	by	its	inclusion	in	the	various	provisions	of	
the	Geneva	Convention	on	the	Continental	Shelf.82		
Although	 the	new	 custom	above	was	 believed	 to	 be	 beneficial	 to	many	 countries,	






violation	 of	 the	 above	 convention	 on	 consular	 relations	 in	 the	 ICJ.84	 Based	on	 this	
																																								 																				
81	499	UNTS	311.	
82	 Michael	 Byers,	 Custom,	 Power	 and	 the	 Power	 of	 Rules:	 International	 Relations	 and	 Customary	
International	Law	(1999),	see	note	3.	
83	Vienna	Convention	on	Consular	Relations,	Apr.	24	1963,	21	U.ST.	77,	596	U.N.T.S.	261;	John	Quigley,	
‘The	United	 States’	Withdrawal	 from	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice	 in	 Consular	 cases:	 Reasons	 and	
Consequences’,	 available	 at	
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1057&context=djcil	 [accessed	 on	 20	
August	2016].	










from	 the	 VCCR	 Optional	 Protocol	 demonstrates	 its	 unilateralist	 approach	 to	
international	 law.88	 	A	position	the	United	States	has	adopted	for	 its	benefit	 in	 the	
international	 sphere	 and	 in	 the	development	of	 custom	based	on	 its	 position	 as	 a	












named	LaGrand.	These	German	nationals	were	convicted	of	murder	and	 sentenced	 to	death	 in	 the	























due	 to	 their	 economic,	military	 and	 other	 strengths.	 These	 states	 also	 bear	 other	
similarities,	 such	 being	 colonial	 powers	 and	 having	 influenced	 the	 practice	 and	
behaviour	of	other	members	of	the	global	community	during	and	after	colonisation,	
as	explored	 in	 this	 thesis.	 These	 customary	 rules	have	universal	 application	except	










objector	 status	 in	 customary	 processes	 faces	 legitimacy	 problems	 following	 the	
																																								 																				













law	 applies	 to	 all	 members	 of	 the	 international	 community,	 including	 those	 who	
protested	against	their	creation	in	the	first	place.94	Here,	it	has	been	posited	that	a	
pre-condition	for	the	membership	of	the	United	Nations	requires	members	to	observe	
customary	 international	 law,	 even	 if	 they	 are	 emerging	 states	 and	 may	 not	 have	

































with	 international	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 United	 Nations	 in	 pursuit	 of	 self-
determination.97	This	medium	of	resistance	outside	international	courts	or	tribunals	












The	 above	 positions	 of	 the	West	 have	 been	 adduced	 to	 justify	 the	 universality	 of	
customary	 international	 law.	 For	 instance,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 states	 have	
universally	 accepted	 various	 ‘secondary’	 procedural	 rules	 of	 international	 law	 by	
consensus.98	Consensus,	in	regards	to	the	secondary	rule	of	customary	international	
law,	 is	 achieved	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 all	 states	 having	 relied	 on	 primary	 rules	 of	






















































World	 states	 to	 change	 customary	 rules,	 which	 are	 oppressive.	 However,	 the	
possibility	 presented	 in	 this	 assumption	 has	 suffered	 defeat	 in	 different	 ways.	
Therefore,	Third	World	states	have	continued	to	be	encumbered	by	certain	oppressive	
elements	of	customary	international	law.	For	instance,	Nigeria,	as	a	member	of	the	








Airlines,107	 	 the	 claimant	had	 contracted	with	 the	defendant	 for	 the	 latter	 to	have	
custody	 and	 take	 care	 of	 the	 former’s	 baggage	 containing	 an	 IBM	 typewriter.	 The	
baggage	was	brought	to	the	defendant	in	Lagos	for	delivery	to	Frankfurt,	Germany.	
The	defendant	failed	to	make	delivery	despite	repeated	demands.	Based	on	this,	there	
was	a	claim	of	negligence	on	the	part	of	 the	defendant	 for	 failure	 to	carry	out	 the	










However,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Eagles	 Super	 Park	 Ltd	 v.	 African	 Continental	 Bank,108	 the	
claimant	approached	the	defendant	for	the	issuance	of	a	letter	of	credit	in	favour	of	
Musahi	 Trading	 Company,	 based	 in	 Japan,	 for	 the	 supply	 of	 raw	materials	 to	 the	
claimant	in	Nigeria.	This	credit	was	to	enable	the	claimant	to	pay	the	cost	of	the	raw	
materials	to	the	Japanese	supplier.	The	defendant	assisted	the	claimant	in	sourcing	
the	money	required	for	 the	transaction,	and	the	claimant	paid	 for	 the	charges	and	
commission	to	the	defendant	for	the	transfer	to	be	effected.	However,	the	credit,	for	
unascertained	reasons,	did	not	reach	the	Japanese	supplier	despite	a	series	of	letters	
of	 complaint	dispatched	by	 the	claimant	 to	 the	defendant	 concerning	 such	 failure.	
Based	on	 this,	 the	matter	was	brought	before	 a	Nigerian	high	 court.	 	Here,	 it	was	
considered	whether	the	Uniform	Customs	and	Practice	(UCP)	for	documentary	credit	
was	applicable	in	Nigeria.	Although	the	UCP	was	made	by	the	International	Chambers	
of	 Commerce,	 with	 its	 headquarter	 in	 Paris,	 it	 was	 intended	 to	 be	 of	 universal	
application	in	terms	of	the	standardization	of	letters	of	credit	banking	and	commercial	
transactions.	 At	 the	 court	 of	 first	 instance,	 the	 application	 of	 UCP	 in	 Nigeria	 was	
denied.	 However,	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 of	 Nigeria	 held	 that	 the	 UCP	 constitutes	
customary	international	law	and	can	be	judicially	noticed	and	applied	in	Nigeria,	and	
this	Court	of	Appeal	decision	was	upheld	in	the	Supreme	Court	of	Nigeria.	
Besides	 the	above	positions,	 scholars	have	made	efforts	 to	 rationalise	 the	place	of	










(Nigeria).	 This	 is	by	virtue	of	 common	 law	being	part	of	 the	Nigerian	 legal	 system,	
provided	 such	 international	 custom	 is	 not	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 constitution	 of	
Nigeria.	 The	 Interpretative	 Act	 is	 an	 Act	 of	 the	 National	 Assembly	 validly	made	 in	





can	 be	 deduced	 through	 section	 12	 of	 the	 Constitution	 of	 the	 Federal	 Republic	 of	
Nigeria,	1999.110	This	section	seeks	to	make	international	law	enforceable	in	Nigeria.	
Although	 the	 section	 did	 not	 expressly	 mention	 customary	 international	 law,	 the	
application	of	customary	international	law	in	Nigeria	can	be	deduced	from	this	section	
as	a	source	of	international	law	applicable	in	Nigeria.	Based	on	this,	it	could	be	that	
post-colonial	 Nigeria	 became	 a	 legitimising	 instrument	 for	 the	 acceptance	 of	
(hegemonic)	 customary	 international	 law.	 The	 techniques	 through	 which	 such	
hegemony	has	 been	 reproduced	 and	 sustained	has	 been	demonstrated	 in	 chapter	
one.	
In	spite	of	the	above	divergent	views,	the	universality	of	customary	international	law	









TWAIL	 themes,	as	 it	 concerns	 the	people	 in	 the	Third	World	and	 the	unfavourable	
decisions	their	state	governments	make.111	For	instance,	the	customary	international	
law	principle	of	uti	possidetis	 juris,	which	preserves	 the	boundaries	of	Nigeria	 (and	
other	emerging	states),	has	not	been	totally	beneficial	to	the	populace	of	certain	parts	
of	Nigeria,	despite	the	principle’s	claim	to	maintain	stability	in	decolonized	areas.	In	
the	 Land	 and	 Maritime	 Boundary	 Between	 Cameroon	 and	 Nigeria	 (Cameroon	 v.	
Nigeria:	 Equatorial	 Guinea	 intervening),112	 there	was	 a	 boundary	 dispute	 between	
Nigeria	and	Cameroon	over	the	region	of	Bakassi.	This	disputed	area	is	a	peninsula	on	
the	Gulf	of	Guinea,	 lying	between	 the	Cross	River	estuary,	near	Calabar	city	 in	 the	
west,	and	the	Rio	del	estuary	on	the	east	of	Nigeria.	This	is	an	oil	rich	area	and	had	
aroused	economic	interest.	Historically,	Britain	had	political	control	over	this	area	and	
its	 surroundings,	 known	 as	 Old	 Calabar,	 due	 to	 the	 Treaty	 of	 protection	 signed	
between	Queen	 Victoria	 and	 the	 King	 and	 Chiefs	 of	 Akwa	 Akpa	 on	 10	 September	



















and	 sovereignty’	and	 ‘part	of	a	Western	ploy	 to	 foment	and	perpetuate	 trouble	 in	
Africa’.114	Bakassian	leaders	threatened	to	seek	secession	as	‘the	Democratic	Republic	









called	New	Bakassi	which	was	not	 suitable	 for	 fishing,	 therefore	 causing	economic	
hardship	for	this	group	of	people.117		
																																								 																				














to	 several	 criticisms,	 as	will	 be	 discussed	 in	 the	 next	 session.	 These	 challenge	 the	
insistence	on	those	elements	as	the	sole	determinants	of	custom-making.		
6. CRITIQUE	OF	THE	ELEMENTS	OF	CUSTOM	
Although	 classical	 international	 law	 views	 state	 practice	 and	 opinio	 juris	 as	
constituting	custom,	the	determination	of	the	two	elements	poses	some	difficulties.118		
Instances	can	be	drawn,	for	example,	from	Andrea	Pellet’s	statement	that	contrary	to	
what	 would	 seem	 logical,	 ‘determining	 the	 evidence	 of	 practice	 is	 far	 from	 self-
evident’.119	In	its	analysis,	the	court	simply	postulates	that	a	practice	sustaining	the	




Jörg	 Kammerhofer	 also	 emphasises	 the	 difficulty	 of	 ascertaining	 what	 constitutes	
state	practice	and	opinio	juris	in	the	determination	of	custom,	while	viewing	article	38	
of	 the	 ICJ	 as	 convenient	 but	 doubtful	 of	 its	 authoritativeness.121	 The	 particular	
uncertainties	of	customary	 international	 law	were	pointed	to	as	systematic	causes.	
																																								 																				




















practice,	 abstained	 from	 instituting	 criminal	proceedings,	 and	not	 that	 they	
recognized	themselves	as	being	obliged	to	do	so;	for	only	if	such	abstention	



















new	 rule	 of	 customary	 international	 law	 to	 develop,	 the	 relevant	 actors	 must	
erroneously	believe	 that	 they	are	already	bound	by	 that	 rule.126	However,	Michael	









However,	 the	 notion	 that	 only	 positive	 physical	 international	 acts	 of	 the	 state	
constitute	 the	 element	 of	 practice	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 formation	 of	 custom	 is	
																																								 																				




















that	of	 their	actual	practice.133	This	could	be	regarded	as	an	effort	 to	maintain	 the	




economically	 advanced	 nations	will	 have	 little	 voice	 in	 the	 development	 of	
custom.	If,	for	example,	the	only	way	to	participate	in	the	development	of	a	
new	custom	on	coastal	fishing	rights	is	to	have	the	technological	and	monetary	
capability	 to	 seize	 or	 destroy	 trespassing	 ships,	 only	 those	 nations	 with	
																																								 																				
130	Anthony	D’Amato,	The	Concept	of	Custom	in	International	Law,	(1971)	see	note	3.	For	criticism	of	















The	 difficulties	 adduced	 by	 scholars	 were	 captured	 by	 the	 president	 of	 the	
International	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 addressing	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 Court’s	 approach	 to	






It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 the	 inconsistency	 in	 the	 determination	 of	 customary	
international	law	by	international	tribunals	has	contributed	to	speculation	about	the	
justifications	 for	 accepting	 or	 rejecting	 certain	 principles	 as	 international	 norms	of	
customary	international	law.136	This	position	is	brought	to	bear	through	the	friction	
between	traditional	and	modern	custom;	while	the	former	develops	slowly	through	






























inclusion	 of	 non-state	 actors	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 customary	 international	 law.	
Secondly,	it	identifies	the	possible	custom-making	actors	in	the	Third	world,	for	the	





practice	 and	 opinion	 juris	 in	 cases	 that	 deal	 with	 important	 moral	 issues.	 Roberts	 argues	 that	
rearticulating	the	theoretical	foundation	of	custom	in	a	more	principled	and	flexible	fashion	will	provide	
international	 actors	 with	 a	 coherent	 theory	 to	 appreciate	 custom.	 It	 will	 also	 help	 to	 justify	 the	




146;	 John	 Tasioulas,	 ‘In	Defence	 of	 Relative	Normativity:	 Communitarian	 Values	 and	 the	Nicaragua	
Case’,	(1996)16	OXFORD	J.	LEGAL	STUD.	85. 	
138	Comment	of	Georges	Abi-Saab	in	the	discussion	on	the	sources	of	international	law	in	A.	Cassese	














































in	 international	 law,	 as	 well	 as	 tackle	 modern	 challenges.	 For	 example,	 Isabelle	
Gunning	proposes	a	more	expansive	approach	to	the	custom-creating-process,	which	
should	 be	modified	 to	 accept	 the	 contributions	 of	 transnational	 organizations	 and	
non-governmental	 organizations.145	 Such	 a	 proposal	 was	 geared	 towards	 the	
expansion	of	the	customary	definition	of	‘refugee’	to	include	forced	migrants	fleeing	
war	and	civil	strife.		
Christiana	 Ochoa	 presents	 some	 arguments	 to	 justify	 the	 inclusion	 of	 non-states	

























existence	 of	 custom,	 crystallise	 evolving	 rules	 and	 generate	 or	 constitute	 a	 rule	
whereby	 the	 court’s	 pronouncement	 becomes	 practice	 that	 forms	 into	 a	 rule	 of	
customary	 international	 law.150	These	tasks	help	to	address	ambiguities,	vagueness	
and	unforeseeable	contemporary	issues.151		
In	 view	 of	 the	 above,	 judicial	 decisions	 and	 the	 teachings	 of	 publicists	 of	 various	














to	ascertain	 the	existence	or	otherwise	of	 legal	principles	and	rules,	 some	scholars	
have	 argued	 that	 they	 also	 make	 custom.152	 In	 the	 Tadic	 case,	 the	 International	
Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	former	Yugoslavia	stated	that	the	outcomes	of	‘the	work	of	




custom	 is	 a	 deviation	 from	 the	domineering	nature	of	 the	 state	 in	 the	 creation	of	
custom.154	 Therefore,	 if	 judges	 could	make	 custom,	 and	 the	 practices	 of	 ICRC	 also	














154	 Noora	 Arajärva,	 ‘The	 Role	 of	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Judge	 in	 the	 Formation	 of	 Customary	
International	Law’	(2007)	see	note	28.			
155Andrea	Pellet,	‘Article	38’	in	Andreas	Zimmermann	et	al	(Eds.),	The	Statute	of	the	International	Court	











relied	 heavily	 ‘on	 resolutions	 of	 the	 United	 Nations,	 other	 intergovernmental	
organisations,	and	treaties	in	the	Nicaragua	case’.157		Therefore,	the	composition	of	




of	 international	 law.	 Such	 provisions	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 point	 to	 the	 role	 of	
jurisprudence	in	the	development	of	international	law.		For	instance,	the	teachings	of	
publicists	 have	 influenced	 the	 concept	 of	 custom	 as	 criticisms,	 such	 as	 lack	 of	
















and	 presented	 custom	 as	 positive	 law,	 which	 impacted	 on	 the	 formulation	 of	
interstate	 relations	 which	 was	 aimed	 at	 the	 equality	 of	 sovereign	 states.161	
Subsequent	 writings	 featured	 equality	 of	 sovereign	 states	 exclusively	 within	
Europe.162	Such	writings	affected	the	relationship	between	Europe	and	non-European	
nations	 that	 were	 regarded	 as	 ‘lacking	 sovereignty’.	 Therefore,	 the	 custom	 that	
mattered	was	 that	which	 evolved	 from	 European	 states.163	 However,	 Third	World	
writers	are	re-evaluating	the	Western	model	of	‘statehood’	in	the	international	system	
and	taking	into	consideration	their	own	realities.164		













163	 Antony	 Anghie,	 ‘Finding	 the	 Peripheries:	 Sovereignty	 and	 Colonialism	 in	 Nineteenth-Century	
International	Law’	(1999)	40	HARV.	INT’L	L.	J.	1	



















chapter	 one.	 All	 these	 circumstances	 are	 affecting	 and	 gradually	 shifting	 the	
traditional	position	of	state	monopoly	on	the	formation	of	customary	 international	
law	to	a	more	inclusive	system	that	incorporates	non-state	actors	and	diverse	legal	






customary	 international	 law	as	shown	in	the	recent	works	of	the	 International	Law	
Commission	(ILC).	According	to	Michael	Wood,	Special	Rapporteur	of	the	ILC,	the	term	
‘formation’	 expounds	 the	 process	 by	which	 customary	 international	 law	 develops,	
whereas,	 ‘evidence’	 illustrates	 the	 identification	 of	 such	 rules.169	 However,	 such	
																																								 																				
167	 Achilles	 Skordas,	 ‘Hegemonic	 Custom’	 in	Michael	 Byers	 (ed.),	United	 States	 Hegemony	 and	 the	
Foundations	 of	 International	 Law	 (Michael	 Byers	 and	 Georg	 Nolte	 (eds),	 (New	 York,	 Cambridge	
University	Press,	2008)	317.	
168	George	D	Kyriakopoulos,	‘Formation	of	international	Custom	and	the	Role	of	Non-state	Actors’	 in	
Photini	 Pazartzis	 et	 al	 (eds.)	 Reconceptualising	 The	 Rule	 Of	 Law in	 Global	 Governance,	 Resources,	
Investment	and	Trade	(Oxford	and	Portland,	Oregon:	Hart	Publishing,	2016),	p.	43.		






formation	of	customary	 international	 law	and	 its	consolidation	as	a	rule	of	positive	




propel	 the	 law-making	 process	 and	 the	 end	 result/rules	 that	 could	 lead	 to	 legally	
binding	 rules	 of	 regional	 and/or	 universal	 custom.	 According	 to	 the	 traditional	
approach,	 the	 understanding	 of	 custom-making	 actors	 (or	 any	 other	 form	 of	
international	 law-making)	 is	derived	 from	 legal	positivism	based	on	 the	voluntarist	
approach	 to	 international	 law.171	 This	 position	was	 also	 established	 by	 Permanent	
Court	of	International	Justice	in	the	Lotus	case	where	the	court	stated	that	‘the	rules	
of	law	binding	upon	states,	therefore,	emanate	from	their	own	free	will	as	expressed	
in	 conventions	 or	 by	 usages	 generally	 accepted	 as	 expressing	 principles	 of	 law’.172	
With	 regards	 to	 this	 position,	 states’	 participation	 in	 the	 making	 of	 customary	
international	law	is	certain	(in	public	international	law)	on	the	acquisition	of	statehood	
																																								 																				
170	P	M	Dupuy,	 ‘Formation	of	 customary	 International	 Law	and	General	Principles’	 in	D	Bodansky,	 J	
Brunee	and	E	Hey	 (eds.)	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	 International	 Environmental	 Law	 (Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2008),	p.	451.	
171	 Georg	 Jellinek,	 Die	 rechtliche	 Natur	 der	 Staatenverträge	 (1880),	 at	 2,	 48–49;	 Heinrich	 Triepel,	
Völkerrecht	und	Landesrecht	(Leipzig:	Verlag	von	C.L.	Hirschfield,	1899),	at	32,	81;	Ratner	and	Slaughter,	
‘Appraising	the	Methods	of	International	Law:	A	Prospectus	for	Readers’,	93	AJIL	(1999)	291.	However,	
legal	 positivism	 and	 voluntarist	 approach	 to	 international	 law	 have	 faced	 criticism,	 often	 on	 the	








and	 the	 law	creating	 role	attached	 to	 such	 status	based	on	 their	 consent.173	Here,	









to	 deviate	 from	 voluntarists	 approach	 following	 its	 emphasis	 on	 the	 expression	 of	
collective	unconsciousness	in	the	international	society.175	This	brings	to	perspective	












174	 Antony	D’Amato,	The	Concept	 of	 Custom	 in	 International	 Law	 (Ithaca	N.	 Y.	 and	 London:	 Cornell	
University	Press,	1971).		
175	 George	 D	 Kyriakopoulos,	 ‘Formation	 of	 international	 Custom	 and	 the	 Role	 of	 Non-state	 Actors’	
(2016),	see	note	1.	








of	 both	 Third	 World	 and	 non-Third	 World	 regions	 respectively	 in	 custom-making	
cannot	 be	 overlooked,	 despite	 contentions	 over	 the	 role	 of	 non-state	 actors	 in	
international	 law.177	 Although	 non-state	 actors	 are	 regarded	 as	 subjects	 of	




in	 this	 case.	 In	 this	 regard,	 international/regional	 courts/tribunals	 could	 in	 the	
identification	of	relevant	actors	that	could/participate	in	custom-making	as	observed	
in	 the	Tadic	 case	 discussed	above.	Despite	 these	 seemly	helpful	 guidelines,	 TWAIL	
strongly	advocates	for	a	more	inclusive	system	by	identifying	the	ordinary	people	in	
decision-making.179	 Pulling	 on	 these	 diverse	 positions,	 regional	 peculiarities	 are	
brought	into	focus	in	the	identification	of	non-state	actors	for	the	purpose	of	custom-
making.	Within	 the	 Third	World,	 relevant	 non-state	 actors	 that	 could	 possess	 the	
capacity	to	influence	the	development	of	customary	international	law	include	armed	
















said	 to	 be	 strictly	 tied	 to	 a	 particular	 actor	 (states,	 for	 example)	 as	 in	 traditional	
customary	international	law	portrayed	through	the	ICJ’s	interpretation	of	article	38	of	
its	 status	 in	 various	 case-laws.	 Rather,	 the	 possibilities	 of	 evidence	 of	 custom	
emanating	 from	 relationships	 among	 non-state	 actors,	 and	 those	 arising	 between	
states	and	non-state	actors,	suggest	a	reappraisal	of	the	interpretation	of	article	38	of	
the	ICJ.	Although	the	statute	appears	biased	according	to	diverse	scholars,	as	noted	in	
this	 thesis,180	 the	 identification	 of	 custom-makers	 beyond	 state	 purview	 gives	 a	
counter-hegemonic	perspective	of	article	38	of	 the	statute	of	 the	 ICJ.	This	position	
brings	to	perceptive,	at	 least,	a	 literary	 interpretation	of	article	38	as	practices	and	
opinio	 juris	 in	 favour	 of	 diverse	 participants	 in	 custom-making	 in	 the	 international	
sphere	(pending	any	future	amendment	to	the	statute	to	reflect	the	modern	realities	
characterised	by	diverse	subjects	and	legal	traditions).	This	would	give	credence	to	the	
long-time	 advocacy	 of	 such	 literary	 interpretation	 by	 scholars	 for	 effective	
participation	of	non-state	actors	in	custom-making.181	In	spite	of	such	possibilities,	it	
is	 believed	 that	 non-state	 actors	 may	 not	 necessarily	 be	 influencing	 all	 areas	 of	















as	 issued	 internal	 codes	 and	 drafted	 constitutions	 containing	 international	
humanitarian	 law	 provisions.	 For	 instance,	 there	 was	 the	 enactment	 of	 a	
Revolutionary	Women’s	law	by	the	Ejército	Zapatista	de	Liberación	Nacional	(EZLN)	of	





framework	 of	 the	 Darfur	 Peace	 Agreement	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 lasting	 impact	 its	
conclusion	 and	 implementation	 will	 have	 on	 the	 children	 of	 Darfur.	 Here,	 JEM	
reaffirmed	its	commitment	to	guarantee	the	protection	of	children	in	this	region	with	
																																								 																				
182	 Anthea	 Roberts	 and	 Sandesh	 Sivakumaran,	 ‘Law-making	 by	 Non-State	 Actors:	 Engaging	 Armed	
Groups	 in	 the	 Creation	 of	 International	 Humanitarian	 Law’	 (2011)	 THE	 YALE	 JOURNAL	 OF	
INTERNATIONAL	LAW,	Vol.	37:1,	p.	108.	







regards	 to	 the	 principles	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 international	 humanitarian	 law	 by	











non-state	 actors,	 some	 authors	 have	 approached	 such	 rules	 from	 a	 quasi-custom	
based	perspective	and	made	some	suggestions	to	mitigate	the	concerns	raised.187	For	
instance,	 Anthea	 Roberts	 and	 Sandesh	 Sivakumaran	 made	 the	 following	 three	
suggestions.	 Their	 first	 recommendation	 is	 that	armed	groups	 should	be	bound	by	






186	 Anthea	 Roberts	 and	 Sandesh	 Sivakumaran,	 ‘Law-making	 by	 Non-State	 Actors:	 Engaging	 Armed	
Groups	in	the	Creation	of	International	Humanitarian	Law’	(2011),	see	note	182.	










custom,	 through	 some	 form	of	 consensus	 between	 armed	 groups	 and	 states.	 This	
proposal	 appears	 progressive,	 as	 it	 tends	 to	 incorporate	 the	 interests	 of	 diverse	
parties;	both	states	and	non-state	actors	are	involved	in	a	particular	issue.	
The	last	proposal	by	Anthea	Roberts	and	Sandesh	Sivakumaran	is	that	owing	to	the	





hegemony	of	 a	 few	 states	within	 the	Global	North	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 the	Global	
South.	However,	the	above	authors	advocated	for	some	form	of	participatory	role	in	
the	creation	of	customary	norms	without	ceding	all	or	equal	power	to	armed	groups.	
Most	 often,	 the	 participatory	 roles	 of	 non-state	 actors	 include	 international	
humanitarian	law,	as	noted	above,	human	rights	law,	environmental	law,	international	
criminal	law,	trade	law,	and	peace	and	security	law.188	
The	 relevance	 accorded	 to	 the	 customary	 rules	 emanating	 from	 various	 non-state	
																																								 																				
188	Anne	Peters,	Lucy	Koechlin	and	Gretta	Fenner	Zinkernagel,	‘Non-State	Actors	as	Standard	Setters:	





actors	 is	 sometimes	 hinged	 on	 legitimacy,	 which	 has	 been	 viewed	 from	 two	
perspectives	 by	 some	 scholars;	 as	 an	 empirical	 or	 social	 fact.189	 Here,	 it	 could	 be	
viewed	that	the	non-state	actors	who	are	creating	norms	of	customary	international	
law	are	constituted	by	states	at	a	‘constitutional	moment’	and/or	that	the	non-state	
actors	 in	 question	 promote	 certain	 global	 political	 and	 justice	 ends,	 such	 as	 the	
protection	 of	 human	 rights,	 eradication	 of	 poverty,	 and	 protection	 of	 the	
environment,	among	others.190	The	position	of	the	state	in	allocating	such	powers	to	
non-state	actors,	such	as	international	organization	(for	instance,	the	United	Nations)	
appears	 to	 represent	 the	 traditionalist	 statist	 position	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 few	powerful	
states,	as	discussed	in	this	thesis.	However,	such	statist	positions	have	faced	resistance	
in	most	parts	of	the	Global	South	due	to	the	weakness	of	the	states	in	this	region	(for	
example,	 post-colonial	 African	 states).	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	
customary	practices	developed	by	non-state	actors	 arising	 from	 this	 region	do	not	
necessarily	need	the	express	or	implied	authority	of	the	post-colonial	states.	Rather,	
































no	 longer	represents	the	reality	of	contemporary	 international	 law,	nor	that	of	the	
Third	World.	Non-state	 actors	 are	 contributing	 to	 the	 international	 system	and,	 as	
such,	 their	participation	 in	 the	custom-making	process	has	become	 inevitable.	This	
chapter	explored	the	flexible	nature	of	custom	and	showed	that	 its	elements	make	
space	for	the	possible	participation	of	non-state	actors.	Such	accommodation	would	
encourage	 more	 effective	 participation	 of	 the	 Third	 World	 via	 side	 by	 side	
participation	of	states	and	non-state	actors	in	international	relations	for	the	purpose	
of	 the	 development	 of	 international	 law-making.	 In	 order	 to	 achieve	 this	 goal,	

















This	 chapter	 explores	 the	 legal	 capacity	 of	 non-state	 actors	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
international	 law	making.	 It	broadly	examines	non-state	actors	 in	 the	 international	
legal	system,	and	later	narrows	down	to	conceptualise	non-state	actors	in	the	Third	
World	 for	 the	purpose	of	 counter-hegemonic	pursuits	 in	 international	 law-making.	





state	 actors.	 However,	 contemporary	 issues,	 such	 as	 the	 need	 for	 equality,	 self-
determination,	and	human	rights,	amongst	others,	have	created	channels	for	the	re-











weak	 nature	 of	 post-colonial	 African	 states,	 the	 challenges	 of	 legitimacy	 and	 their	
inability	to	address	gaping	fiscal	deficits	(among	other	issues)	have	all	led	the	ordinary	
people	 to	 disregard	 the	 privileges	 of	 statehood	 attributed	 to	 African	 states.2	
Therefore,	the	activities	of	the	ordinary	people,	social	movements	and	other	non-state	








its	 greater	 part	 of	 the	 principles	 and	 rules	 of	 conduct	 which	 States	 feel	
themselves	 bound	 to	 observe,	 and	 therefore,	 do	 commonly	 observe	 in	
relations	with	each	other,	and	which	includes	also:		
																																								 																				
1	 Roland	 Portmann	 Legal	 Personality	 in	 International	 Law	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	
2010).	
2	 Michael	 Bratton,	 ‘Beyond	 the	 State:	 Civil	 Society	 and	 Associational	 Life	 in	 Africa’	 (1989)	WORLD	
POLITICS,	Vol.	41,	No.	3,	pp.	407-430.	
















neither	 conventional	 nor	 customary	 rules	 precluding	 non-state	 actors	 from	 law-























duties.9	 Legal	 personality,	 under	 international	 law,	 is	 used	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 in	
municipal	 law.10	 However,	 while	 both	 legal	 systems	 attribute	 rights	 and	 duties	 to	
denoting	 legal	personality,	 international	 law	goes	beyond	these	qualities	to	 include	
the	 competence	 to	 create	 law	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 decentralised	 nature	 of	 the	
international	system.11	This	is	of	importance	to	this	thesis	in	regards	to	who	has	the	
legal	capacity	to	create	international	custom.	In	response	to	the	question	of	who	can	
create	or	 contribute	 to	 the	 formation	of	 (customary)	 international	 law,	 there	have	
been	diverse	views	on	the	legal	capacity	to	do	so.	
One	 of	 the	 major	 views	 on	 international	 legal	 capacity	 is	 that	 such	 features	 are	
exclusively	reserved	for	states.12	The	attainment	of	 international	personality	 is	only	
based	on	statehood.	Such	a	position	denies	any	other	entity	in	the	international	legal	















(customary)	 international	 law.13	 Besides	 these	 colonial	 entities,	 any	 other	 entity	
outside	the	state	did	not	have	the	competence	to	make	law	in	the	international	legal	
system.	This	position	is	rarely	advocated	for	in	contemporary	times.14	


























There	 is	also	 the	view	that	 international	 legal	personality	 is	 individualistic.19	 In	 this	
regard,	only	individuals	are	the	‘real’	subjects	of	international	law,	whereas	the	state	





the	 state	 is	 regarded	 as	 mere	 fiction,	 and	 logically	 unable	 to	 form	 the	 subject	 of	
scientific	analysis.	However,	this	position	has	been	criticised	as	anarchic	individualism,	






The	 state	 is	 seen	 as	 nothing	 but	 a	 group	 of	 politically	 organised	 people	 exercising	
jurisdiction.	Consequently,	the	state	is	not	seen	as	a	person	but	an	entity	that	owes	its	





















where	 every	 entity	 is	 an	 international	 person	 and	 the	 addressee	 of	 the	 norms	 of	
international	law	according	to	the	general	principles	of	interpretation.	
The	 above	 four	 conceptions	 of	 international	 legal	 personality	 are	 based	 on	 the	
dichotomy	of	 subjectivity	and	objectivity.	Subjectivity,	 in	 international	 law,	 is	often	


















concerned	 reparations	 for	 injuries	 suffered	 in	 the	 service	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	
following	the	events	that	befell	agents	of	the	United	Nations.	Here,	the	UN	General	
Assembly	 referred	 the	 ICJ	 to	 its	 resolution	dated	December	 3rd	 1948,	while	 asking	
whether:		 	
I.	 	 In	the	event	of	an	agent	of	the	United	Nations	 in	the	performance	of	his	
duties	suffering	injury	in	circumstances	involving	the	responsibility	of	a	State,	







In	 giving	 its	 opinion,	 the	 ICJ	 highlighted	 the	 existence	of	 at	 least	 two	of	 the	 rights	
earlier	mentioned	(the	right	to	enter	into	treaties	and	the	right	to	bring	claims).	
Subjectivity	is	sometimes	regarded	as	a	status	conferred	by	the	academic	community,	
whereas	 legal	personality	 is	a	 status	conferred	by	 the	 legal	 system.27	Although	 the	









question	 has	 faced	 criticisms.29	 Such	 subjectivity/objectivity	 theory	 is	 believed	 to	
favour	 certain	 voices	 over	 others.30	 Contributing	 to	 these	 contestations,	 Klabbers	
described	subjectivity	as	a	status	conferred	by	the	academic	community,	and	one	that	
was	by	definition	 inaccurate	and	sketchy.31	 	Therefore,	the	role	of	non-state	actors	
under	 international	 law	 is	 deemed	 to	 be	 too	 complex	 to	 be	 compressed	 into	 a	
subjective/objective	classification.32		
In	view	of	the	forgoing,	it	has	been	advocated	that	the	‘participatory	theory’	should	
be	 employed	 as	 a	 lens	 through	 which	 to	 view	 the	 role	 of	 non-state	 actors	 under	
international	 law.33	 The	 proposal	 relies	 on	 the	 notion	 that	 international	 law	 is	 a	
decision-making	process.	This	process	 is	dynamic,	not	static.	Values	such	as	power,	
wealth,	 prestige	 and	 the	 notions	 of	 vindication	 and	 justice	 are	 promoted	 by	
participants	who	make	their	claims	through	a	variety	of	techniques,	ranging	from	force	
to	diplomacy	and	public	persuasion.34	Diverse	decision	makers,	such	as	Foreign	Office	




29	 Roland	 Portmann	 Legal	 Personality	 in	 International	 Law	 (2010),	 see	 note	 1;	 P.K.	 Menon,	 ‘The	
International	 Personality	 of	 Individuals	 in	 International	 Law:	 A	 Broading	 of	 the	 traditional	 Doctrine	







33	 Rosalyn	 Higgins,	 ‘Conceptual	 Thinking	 about	 individuals	 in	 International	 Law’	 (1978)	 BRITISH	








expected	 to	 pronounce	 authoritatively	 upon	 these	 claims.35	 Here,	 the	 participants	
include	 both	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 competing	 for	 various	 interests	 in	 the	
international	 plane.	 For	 example,	 while	 the	 state	may	 be	 interested	 in	 sea	 space,	
boundaries	 or	 treaties,	 individuals	 may	 be	 interested	 in	 the	 physical	 excesses	 of	
others,	 their	 treatment	 abroad,	 fairness	 in	 international	 business	 transactions,	 the	
protection	of	their	human	rights	and	the	environment.36	
Although	many	 scholars	 applaud	 the	participatory	 theory	 in	 international	 law,	 it	 is	
criticised	for	its	lack	of	an	objective	definition	of	a	participant.37	The	proposal	is	seen	
to	 grant	 the	 power	 to	 be	 a	 participant	 to	 every	 entity	 that	 has	 some	 form	 of	
international	 relations	without	 guidance.	 There	 are	 no	 suggestions	 for	who	 can	or	
cannot	be	a	participant.	Besides	this	criticism,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	participatory	
theory	fails	to	proffer	answers	to	questions	relating	to	the	subjects	of	international	
law.38	 Despite	 these	 criticisms,	 the	 participation	 theory	 has	 been	 described	 as	
compelling	and	practical,39	as	well	as	capable	of	evaluating	the	activities	of	entities	























heavy	 reliance	 of	 some	 views	 on	 the	 state	 having	 exclusive	 power	 to	 make	





so	 called	 ‘non-state	 actors’	 in	 the	 Third	World.42	 Trade	 and	 treaty	 formation	were	
carried	out	by	 indigenous	 chiefs,	 some	middle	men	and	other	 groups	of	non-state	
actors.	Colonising	states	relied	on	non-state	actors,	such	as	the	British	and	Dutch	East	
India	 companies,	 to	 achieve	 their	 economic	 exploitation	 and	 respective	 states’	
colonial	rule.43	These	trading	companies	asserted	sovereign	rights	over	non-European	























It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 although	 the	 above-mentioned	 trading	 companies	 are	
regarded	as	non-state	actors,	they	are	overall	hegemonic	in	nature	and	detrimental	
to	the	aspirations	of	the	Third	World,	largely	due	to	their	economic	exploitation	of	the	
region.47	 However,	 their	 participation	 in	 the	 international	 sphere	 questions	 the	
traditional	 notion	 that	 customary	 international	 law	 is	 derived	 solely	 from	 state	
practice	and	opinio	juris.			
Besides	 the	 subjectivity/objectivity	 dichotomy,	 the	 participatory	 theory	 appears	
flexible	and	robust	to	the	extent	of	accommodating	various	entities	with	international	

























neglects	 other	 legal	 traditions.	 In	 addition,	 such	 a	 Eurocentric	 narration	 is	 said	 to	
disregard	the	domination	and	colonisation	of	non-Europeans	as	an	irrelevant	event	in	
a	(continuing)	history	of	international	law.	It	has	been	suggested,	rather,	that	authors	
should	adopt	a	 starting	point	 in	order	 to	also	accommodate	non-Europeans	 in	 the	
history	of	international	law.50	Since	this	thesis	is	based	on	the	place	of	the	Third	World	















whether	 African	 non-state	 actors	 participated	 in	 international	 affairs	 before	 the	
colonial	encounter,	as	well	as	before	legal	positivism.	It	is	purported	that	the	exclusion	
of	 non-state	 actors	 constitutes	 a	 distortion	 through	 legal	 positivism.51	 The	 rise	 of	










to	 see	 how	 much	 gold	 had	 been	 placed	 by	 the	 unnamed	 tribes-folk.	 If	 the	
Carthaginians	were	satisfied	with	 the	amount	of	gold	offered,	 they	would	 take	 the	
gold	and	leave,	but	if	they	were	not	satisfied,	they	would	leave	the	gold	and	return	to	














apparent	 that	 there	has	been	a	 long	history	of	cross-border	activities	between	 the	
societies	of	Africa	involving	non-state	actors.		
Another	 example	 can	 be	 demonstrated	 through	 Nigeria’s	 early	 relationships	 with	
European	 traders,	which	mainly	 involved	 ‘indigenous’	 chiefs	 and	 other	middlemen	
who	controlled	trade	matters	and	practices	during	pre-colonial	times.54	These	groups	
of	 non-state	 actors	 formed	 network	 systems	 to	 participate	 in	 cross	 border	 trade	
involving	other	Africans	and	Europeans,	which	could	be	referred	to	as	international	
trade.	The	intricacies	of	these	networks	have	demonstrated	the	complexity	of	some	
decentralised	political	 systems,	as	exemplified	by	 the	 Igbo	society	of	south-eastern	
Nigeria.55	These	trade	networks	expanded	across	 Igbo	society.56	Expansion	was	not	
regulated	by	a	central	authority,	but	in	some	instances	through	religious	institutions.	
For	 instance,	 the	Arochukwu	area	 (one	of	 the	 Igbo	communities)	operated	an	 ibini	
okpa	 oracle	 whose	 powers	 included	 resolving	 disputes	 and	 settling	 warfare.	
Arochukwu	 people	 were	 also	 known	 to	 have	 travelled	 widely,	 establishing	 trade	
alliances	in	interested	territories,	and	to	have	developed	a	specialised	decision-making	
apparatus.57	This	presents	an	existing	 legacy	of	non-state	actors’	 legal	capacity	and	

















Therefore,	 the	 assertion	 of	 the	 state	 as	 being	 sovereign	 and	 all-powerful	 in	 the	
nineteenth	century	was	not	only	seen	as	a	distortion,59	but	it	has	also	been	viewed	as	
a	platform	from	which	non-Europeans	were	dispossessed.60	Such	dispossession	could	
be	 illustrated	 through	 Vitoria’s	 jurisprudence	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
Spaniards	 and	 Indians.61	 While	 he	 appeared	 to	 present	 the	 legal	 equality	 of	 all	
people,62	 arguably,	 he	 didn’t	 necessarily	 include	 non-Europeans	 following	 his	
assertion	that	Indians	needed	to	fulfil	certain	requirements	based	on	the	‘universally’	
applicable	 practices	 of	 the	 Spaniards.63	 Vitoria’s	 analysis	 highlighted	 cultural	
differences	 in	 international	 relationships	 and	 the	 hierarchical	 imposition	 of	 one	
culture	 over	 another,	 as	 seen	 in	 the	 colonial	 experience.	 This	 colonial	 encounter	
affected	many	non-European	entities,	and	appeared	to	shift	the	focus	onto	the	ability	
to	 participate	 in	 international	 activities	 in	 conformity	 with	 European	 state-like	
organisation.	 This	 chapter	 views	 this	 shift	 as	 a	 period	 of	 suppression	 of	 non-state	
actors	(both	in	the	Global	North	and	South)	in	the	evolution	of	international	law,	as	
the	 state	 took	 pre-eminence	 in	 both	 regions,	 particularly	 during	 the	 nineteenth	
century.	




















contracts	 between	 African	 chiefs	 and	 Europeans),	 statehood	 was	 held	 supreme.	
Following	 the	existence	of	 a	 valid	 legal	 relationship	 involving	non-state	 actors,	 the	
insistence	on	a	European	model	of	state	is	contestable.		
One	of	the	above	contestations	arises	from	the	effect	of	state	domination	on	other	





was	 further	 asserted	 that	 the	 positivist	 doctrine	 suppressed	 the	 idea	 of	 the	
emancipation	of	non-state	actors	such	as	individuals,	as	well	as	their	recognition	as	
subjects	 of	 international	 law.	 This	 suppression	 and	 state	 supremacy	 validated	 the	
abuses	perpetuated	in	the	name	of	the	state.	However,	by	the	mid-twentieth	century,	
the	 quest	 for	 self-determination,	 decolonisation	 movements	 by	 various	 colonies	
against	hegemonic	states,	as	well	as	the	inclusion	of	diverse	non-state	actors	over	time	














The	 traditional	 theory	 of	 personality	 in	 international	 law	 faces	 the	 need	 for	 the	
inclusion	 of	 non-European	 legal	 traditions,	 as	well	 as	 the	 recognition	 of	 increased	
activities	of	non-state	actors	in	response	to	various	challenges,	such	as	competence,	
responsibilities,	 legitimacy,	 existence,	 and	 sovereignty.68	 Non-state	 actors,	 such	 as	
international	 organisations,	 non-governmental	 organisations,	 private	 security	
contractors,	and	individuals	(e.g.	indigenous	community	leaders,	groups	of	women,)	
are	continuously	contributing	to	possible	solutions	to	the	named	challenges.69		
Also,	 the	 concerns	 of	 democracy	 and	 the	 desire	 to	 protect	 the	 masses	 against	
totalitarianism	via	international	law	have	further	fortified	the	position	and	personality	
of	non-state	actors	in	the	current	international	law.70	There	is	also	a	desire	to	protect	
and	promote	human	 rights,	which	 serves	 as	 a	 goal	 in	 itself,	 as	well	 as	 a	means	 to	
promote	 other	 goals,	 including	 poverty	 alleviation,	 anti-corruption,	 prevention	 of	
terrorism	and	resource	distribution.71	Contemporary	international	lawyers	view	this	
as	 a	 paradigm	 shift	 ‘from	 the	 law	 of	 nations	 to	 the	 law	 of	 the	 world’72	 or	 a	
‘humanization	of	international	law’.73		
																																								 																				
68	Matthias	 C	 Kettemann,	 The	 Future	 of	 Individual	 in	 International	 Law:	 Lessons	 from	 International	
Internet	 Law	 (The	Hague:	 Eleven	 International	 Publishing,	 2013);	 Ben	 Chigara,	 Legitimacy	Deficit	 in	
Custom:	A	Deconstructionist	Critique	(Hants	&	Burlington:	Dartmouth-	Ashgate,	2001).	












The	 (re)emergence	 of	 these	 non-state	 actors	 was	 given	 prominence	 by	 the	
International	 Court	 of	 Justice	 in	 the	 Advisory	 Opinion	 in	 Reparations	 for	 Injuries	




of	 international	 law,	and	 that	 this	 thereby	confers	 rights	and	duties	enforceable	 in	
international	law.75	The	proponents	of	this	position	contend	that	there	is	nothing	in	
the	structure	of	international	law	that	prevents	this	result	from	being	achieved.76	
It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 the	 above	 structural	 transitions	 result	 from	 ‘the	 need	 to	
manage	 and	 address	 practical	 problems	 rather	 than	 resulting	 from	 any	 deliberate	
attempt	 to	 effect	 a	 structural	 transformation’.77	 It	 has	 also	 been	 advanced	 that,	
although	there	is	no	smooth	shift	from	state-centric	to	more	inclusive	international	
law,	 the	 international	 legal	 system	 of	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 has	 undoubtedly	
become	less	state-centric	than	that	of	the	nineteenth	century.78		
In	view	of	such	wide	participation	of	non-state	actors	in	the	international	legal	system,	
























case	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 armed	 group	 activities	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 international	
humanitarian	 law.	They	argue	 that	any	normative	evaluation	of	whether	non-state	
entities	(for	example,	armed	groups)	could	participate	in	law-making	should	be	based	
on	 an	 analytical	 framework.	 This	 could	 be	 judged	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	
international	 community	 as	 a	 whole,	 rather	 than	 a	 position	 solely	 dependent	 on	
states.	Their	argument	is	based	on	the	Reparation	for	Injuries	Advisory	Opinion,	where	
the	ICJ	found	the	United	Nations	to	be	a	subject	of	 international	 law,	 it	stated	that	
‘[t]he	subjects	of	law	in	any	legal	system	are	not	necessarily	identical	in	their	nature	
or	in	the	extent	of	their	rights,	and	that	their	nature	depends	on	the	needs	of	their	
community.’81	 Based	 on	 that	 case,	 these	 authors	 argue	 that	 the	 traditional	 statist	
doctrine	is	both	‘descriptively	out-dated	and	normatively	questionable.’	In	view	of	the	
																																								 																				










above,	 they	 propose	 that	 armed	 groups	 should	 remain	 bound	 by	 existing	
responsibilities	but	be	given	certain	roles	in	the	norm	creation	process,	as	well	as	the	
capacity	 to	 recognise	existing	duties	 and	 to	undertake	new	ones.	 Such	 roles	 could	
include	 unilateral	 declarations,	 hybrid	 treaties	 (bilateral	 or	 trilateral	 treaties	 and	
multilateral	treaties)	and	quasi-customs.	The	proposals	of	Roberts	and	Sivakumaran	
are	built	on	existing	practices,	and	they	have	the	potential	to	enhance	armed	groups’	
knowledge	 of,	 and	 compliance	 with,	 international	 humanitarian	 law.	 More	
importantly,	they	argued	that	these	proposals	are	capable	of	providing	a	framework	
through	which	other	non-state	actors	may	engage	in	the	creation	of	international	law.	
The	 International	 Law	 Association	 Committee	 on	 the	 Formation	 of	 (General)	
Customary	International	Law	has	also	asserted	that	the	conducts	of	non-state	actors	
contribute	 to	 international	 law-making.82	 	 This	 position	 is	 viewed	 through	 the	
customary	 processes	 in	 its	 extended	 sense,	 although	 such	 law-creating	 power	 is	
limited	to	acts	carried	out	on	behalf	of	the	state,	or	adopted	or	ratified	by	it.	Another	
International	Law	Association	committee	report	on	non-state	actors	in	international	
law-making,	published	 in	2012,	also	explored	 the	extent	 to	which	non-state	actors	
have	engaged	 in	 international	 law-making.	The	committee	acknowledged	that	non-
governmental	organisations	have	initiated	intergovernmental	law-making	and	that	in	
many	 cases,	 these	 have	 resulted	 in	 treaties.83	 The	 committee	 also	 stated	 that	
sometimes	such	 initiatives	have	resulted	 in	the	crystallisation	of	binding	customary	
																																								 																				
82	 Final	 Report	 of	 ILA	 London	 Conference	 (2000)	 Committee	 on	 Formation	 of	 Customary	 (General)	
International	 law	 available	 at	 http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/A709CDEB-92D6-4CFA-
A61C4CA30217F376	accessed	on	18	April,	2014]	at	p.	16.	
83	 ILA	Second	Report	of	 the	Committee	on	 ‘Non-State	Actors	 in	 International	 Law:	 Law	making	and	









changing	 the	parameters	of	 the	 traditional	 state	outlook	on	 international	 law,	and	
thus	impacting	on	international	law-making.85	While	some	of	these	non-state	actors	






bodies;	 and	 from	 maritime	 operations	 in	 the	 Gulf	 of	 Aden	 to	 various	 land-based	
operations,	mostly	including	law	and	prison	reform’.87	
Mediators	 are	 also	 playing	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 substantive	 and	
procedural	 frameworks	 in	peace	and	 law-making	processes.	 In	order	to	set	out	the	
discourse,	it	has	been	asked	whether	mediators	are	mere	facilitators	of	a	dialogue	and	
negotiation	 process	 in	 a	 politically	 and	 legally	 set	 framework,	 or	 whether	 in	 their	
																																								 																				































88	Cindy	Daase,	 ‘The	Law	of	 the	Peacemaker:	The	Role	of	Mediators	 in	Peace	Negotiations	and	Law	
making’	(2012)	1	(3)	C.J.I.C.L.	pp.	107-135.	
89	Cindy	Daase,	 ‘The	Law	of	 the	Peacemaker:	The	Role	of	Mediators	 in	Peace	Negotiations	and	Law	
making’	(2012)	see	note	88	at	p.	134.	













law-creating	power	of	non-state	actors	 in	 international	 law.	The	expert	opinions	of	
individuals	 in	 certain	 international	matters	 through	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	World	
Health	 Organisation	 and	 Atomic	 Energy	 Agency	 also	 arguably	 contribute	 to	
international	law-making.94	





as	 well	 as	 cooperating	 with	 the	 ICRC	 during	 conflicts,96	 before	 any	 proposed	
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94	Ben	Chigara,	Legitimacy	Deficit	in	Custom:	A	Deconstructionist	Critique	(2001),	see	note	68;	Robert	
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of	 self-determination	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 platform	 for	 the	 participation	 of	 the	 Global	
North	and	South,	as	well	as	for	state	and	non-state	actors	in	the	international	legal	
system.	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 Global	 North,	 President	 Woodrow	Wilson	 linked	 the	








the	 statist	 purview,	 and	 states	 (unsurprisingly)	 resist	 the	 invocation	 of	 self-
determination	by	some	regions	within	their	jurisdiction.104	In	spite	of	the	diverse	views	
on	the	principle	of	self-determination,	the	principle	has	effectively	been	invoked	as	a	
tool	 of	 resistance	 against	 discrimination,	 cultural	 domination,	 suppression	 of	




102	 John	 Stalin,	Marxist	 and	 the	 National-Colonial	 Question	 (Proletarian	 Publishers,	 1975	 Reprint);	
Walker	 Connor,	 The	 National	 Question	 in	 Marxist-Leninist	 Theory	 and	 Strategy	 (Princeton	 N.	 J:	
Princeton	University	Press,	1984).	








of	 international	 law.	 For	 example,	 Judge	 Nagendra	 Singh	 in	 the	Western	 Sahara	
Opinion	stated	that:	
The	 consultation	 of	 the	 people	 of	 a	 territory	 waiting	 decolonisation	 is	 an	
inescapable	imperative…	Thus	even	if	integration	of	territory	was	demanded	
by	an	interested	state,	as	in	this	case,	it	could	not	be	had	without	ascertaining	









The	 idea	 of	 ‘peoples’	 in	 self-determination	 discourse	 has	 produced	 diverse	
interpretations.109	However,	it	has	been	advocated	that	each	interpretation	should	be	
able	to	incorporate	the	values	of	diverse	cultures,	or	local	authorities,	as	well	as	the	
need	 to	 support	 increasing	 linkages,	 commonalities	 and	 interdependencies	 among	
																																								 																				












people,	 economies	 and	 spheres	 of	 power,	 even	where	 secession	 and	 independent	









are	 encouraged	 to	 pursue	 their	 aspirations	 and	 participate	 in	 the	 making	 of	
international	laws	that	affect	them.111	Such	diverse	participation	reflects	the	present	
reality	in	the	international	system	made	up	of	both	state	and	non-state	actors.		
Having	 explored	 the	 legal	 capacity	 of	 non-state	 actors	 in	 a	 broad	 sense,	 the	 next	














opposition	 groups	 that	 act	 independently	 of	 any	 recognised	 government.113	 These	












interests.	 Examples	 of	 these	 groups	 and	 organisations	 could	 include	 trade	 unions,	
cultural	associations,	church	associations	and	universities,	among	others.	
Another	 definition	 of	 non-state	 actors	 captures	 ‘all	 those	 actors	 that	 are	 not	
(representatives	 of)	 states,	 yet	 that	 operate	 at	 the	 international	 level	 and	 are	




113Margaret	 Buse,	 ‘Non-state	 Actors	 and	 their	 Significance’	 available	 at	











tailors	 it	 to	 fit	 traditional	 patterns	of	 international	 relations	 scholarship.117	Here,	 a	



































groups	 from	 ‘states’,	 as	 known	 in	 the	 Eurocentric	 sense,	 is	 prominent.124	 This	
definition	 ignores	 the	understanding	of	 statehood	 from	a	Third	World	perspective.	
While	some	scholars	have	argued	that	states	existed	 in	 the	 ‘African	sense’	prior	 to	






and	 decentralised	 systems	 respectively.	 In	 each	 indigenous	 system,	 diverse	
participants,	such	as	age	grades,	community	leaders,	associations	of	men	and	women,	












systems	have	been	viewed	not	 to	be	 inferior	 to	 the	positivist	 idea	of	 statehood.127	
Sometimes,	 these	 Third	World	 non-state	 actors	 mentioned	 here	 act	 as	 checks	 to	
perceived	abuse	of	power	by	their	states.128	
Consequently,	 in	 order	 to	 conceptualise	 non-state	 actors	 from	 a	 Third	 World	
perspective,	the	traditions	and	their	diverse	experiences,	ranging	from	pre-colonial	to	






attribute	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 distinguishing	world	 view	 of	 Africans.	 Such	 attributes	 of	
solidarity	 enabled	 resistance	 to	 colonial	 domination	 and	 the	 eventual	 political	




















The	 colonial	 encounter	 and	 post-colonial	 experiences	 play	 significant	 roles	 in	
understanding	entities	that	are	non-state	actors	in	the	Third	World	and	their	roles	in	
the	region.	For	instance,	the	institution	of	Eurocentric	model	of	statehood	in	Africa	





post-colonial	 Africa	 sometimes	 share	 similarities	 with	 their	 Western	 counterparts	
following	their	institutionalisation	according	to	a	Western	ideology.	This	could	be	said	





















organisations)	 in	 the	 achievement	 of	 counter-hegemony	 in	 the	 international	




goal	 of	 the	 Third	World	due	 to	 the	belief	 that	 those	 institutions	 sometimes	 act	 as	
agents	 of	 ‘Western	 hegemony’,	 there	 are	 times	 that	 such	 institutions	 have	 played	
significant	roles.	The	Bandung	Conference,	for	instance,	pulled	together	Third	World	
states	 to	 address	 new	 and	 changing	 regional	 principles	 and	 practices	 that	 place	
obligations	on	 their	people.138	The	conference	articulated	 the	normative	basis	of	a	
regional	 and	 international	 order	 marked	 by	 ‘tolerance	 of	 diversity,	 mutual	
accommodation	and	the	softening	of	ideological	conflicts	and	rivalries’.139		
The	TWAIL	definition	(if	there	can	be	such	a	unified	position	at	all)	on	non-state	actors	






136	 S.	 Pahyja,	 ‘The	 Post-coloniality	 of	 International	 Law’	 (2005)	 HARVARD	 INTERNATIONAL	 LAW	
JOURNAL	46.	
137	Antony	Anghie,	Imperialism,	Sovereignty	and	the	Making	of	International	Law	(2005),	see	note	13.	
138	 Seng	 Tan	 and	 Aimtav	 Acharya	 (eds.)	 Bandung	 Revisited:	 The	 Legacy	 of	 the	 1955	 Asia-Africa	
Conference	for	International	Order	(Singapore:	NUS,	2008)	p.	1.	



















The	 contributions	 of	 non-state	 actors	 to	 the	 development	 of	 international	 law,	 as	
illustrated	above,	cannot	be	over-emphasised.	These	contributions	reflect	the	realities	
of	 contemporary	 international	 law.	 This	 chapter	 noted	 that	 non-state	 actors	 have	











of	 non-state	 actors,	 as	 their	 roles	 in	 the	 development	 of	 international	 law	 are	
continually	eroding	the	position	of	supremacy	enjoyed	by	states	therein	(sometimes	
for	better,	sometimes	for	worse).	Non-state	actors,	 in	the	course	of	their	activities,	
are	 de	 facto	 contributing	 to	 international	 law-making.141	 In	 this	 regard,	 non-state	
actors	in	the	Third	World	have	continued	to	share	in	the	responsibilities	of	their	states.	
Based	on	this,	the	insistence	on	law-making	by	states	exclusively	 is	challenged.	The	
























to	 Herman	 Von	Wissemen’s	 order	 asking	 the	 former	 to	 submit	 to	 colonial	 rule	 is	
illustrative.		Shaka	Zulu	of	South	Africa,	King	Jaja	of	Opobo-	Nigeria,	Chief	Dosumu	of	
Lagos-	Nigeria,	and	Mau	Mau	group	 resistance	 in	Kenya,	among	many	others,	also	
resisted	 foreign	 dominance.	 Unfortunately,	 many	 such	 Third	 World	 resistance	
narratives	 are	mostly	 suppressed	 in	 international	 law	 scholarship.2	 Arguably,	 such	
suppression	 of	 resistant	 narratives	 appears	 to	 suggest	 that	 Africans	 and	 other	
members	 of	 the	 Third	 World	 consented	 to	 Western	 hegemony	 and	 its	 resultant	














Resistance	 could	be	 said	 to	be	 the	action	 taken	 to	 challenge	dominant,	 traditional	




it	operates	 in	different	societies,	as	well	as	to	 identify	the	elements	that	enable	 its	
success.4	 For	 example,	 Antonio	 Gramsci	 identified	 the	 ‘spirit	 of	 solidarity’	 as	 an	
important	 counter-hegemonic	 force	 in	 effecting	 such	 shifts.5	 Gramsci’s	 notion	 of	
hegemony	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 understanding	 the	 nature	 of	 hegemony,	 its	
reproduction	 and	 sustenance	 in	 the	 making	 of	 customary	 international	 law,	 as	
explored	 in	 chapter	 one	 of	 this	 thesis.	 This	 chapter	 will	 also	 employ	 certain	 key	
elements	 from	 Gramsci’s	 perception	 of	 counter-hegemony,	 such	 as	 solidarity	 and	
education,	 among	 others,	 to	 explore	 various	 moments	 of	 resistance	 by	 non-state	
																																								 																				
3	 Balakrishnan	 Rajagopal,	 ‘International	 Law	 and	 Social	 Movements:	 Challenges	 of	 Theorizing	
Resistance’	 (2002-2003)	 41	COLUM.	 J.	 TRANSNAT’L	 L.	 397;	Antonio	Gramsci,	Selections	 from	Prison	
Notebooks	 of	 Antonio	 Gramsci	 (edited	 and	 selected	 by	 Quintin	 Hoare	 and	 Geoffrey	 Nowell	 Smith)	
(London:	Lawrence	and	Wishart,	1971).	
4	 Jocelyn	 A	 Hollander	 and	 Rachel	 L	 Einwohner,	 ‘Conceptualising	 Resistance	 (2004)	 SOCIOLOGICAL	
FORUM,	VOL.	19,	NO.	4	pp.	533-554.	Also,	see	the	section	dealing	with	the	term	‘resistance’	in	chapter	











Although	 Gramsci’s	 notion	 of	 resistance	 is	 arguably	 Eurocentric,	 his	 assertions	 on	
solidarity	 are	 vital	 in	order	 to	understand	 resistance	movements,	 including	African	
counter-hegemonic	efforts.6	 In	most	parts	of	Africa,	especially	among	 the	Western	
parts	of	the	continent	such	as	Nigeria	and	Ghana,	solidarity	is	an	integral	feature	of	




the	 Women’s	 war	 of	 1929.7	 This	 group	 of	 Nigerian	 women	 fought	 the	 colonial	
imposition	 of	 a	 tax	 on	women	 during	 that	 period.	 Importantly,	 one	 of	 the	 female	
leaders	 of	 this	 group	 strongly	 supported	 the	 community	 in	 their	 challenge	 to	 the	
taxation	 rather	 than	 aligning	with	 her	 husband,	who	was	working	 for	 the	 colonial	
authorities	at	 the	time.	 (A	detailed	analysis	of	 this	 resistance	will	be	discussed	 in	a	
																																								 																				
6	Although	Gramsci	had	 little	effect	on	 colonial	 struggle,	 it	 is	 believed	 that	he	had	 influenced	post-
colonial	theory.	He	made	no	direct	response	to	Italian	invasion	of	Libya	in	1911,	Albania	in	1915	and	
Turkey	from	1919	to	1923,	he	was	believed	to	have	offered	a	revolutionary	perspective	on	the	future	
of	 the	 revolt	 and	 emancipation	 of	 the	 colonies.	 In	 this	 regard,	 Gramsci	 pointed	 to	 the	 economic	




Robert	 J	 C	 Young,	 ‘II	Gramsci	Meridionale’	 in	Neelam	Srivastava	 and	Baidik	Bhaltacharya	 (Eds.)	The	
Postcolonial	 Gramsci	 (New	 York	 and	 London:	 Routledge,	 2012)	 p.	 17	 particularly	 p.	 19.	 Gramsci’s	























of	 traditional	 customary	 international	 law,	 the	 preceding	 chapters	 in	 this	 thesis	
demonstrate	the	hegemonic	nature	of	such	a	position.		Importantly,	the	employment	
of	non-state	actors	as	counter-hegemonic	in	the	Third	World,	particularly	in	Nigeria	
and	 its	surrounding	post-colonial	 states,	 is	made	 imperative,	as	 their	socio-political	
experiences	 and	 culture	 are	 quite	 unique	 and	 differ	 from	 that	 of	 their	 Western	
counterparts.	For	 instance,	 the	role	of	non-state	actors	such	as	nationalists,	 judges	










World	 non-state	 actors	 are	 effecting	 changes	 in	 their	 daily	 lives	 as	 well	 as	 their	
transnational	 relationships,	 and	 this	 could	 influence	 the	 formation	 of	 customary	
international	law	beyond	state	monopoly.	It	will	first	identify	some	tools	of	resistance	
used	by	the	Third	World,	such	as	solidarity,	education,	composition	of	post-colonial	













the	 right	 of	 self-determination.9	 In	most	 cases,	 at	 that	 formative	 stage,	 traditional	
international	 law	embraced	only	 the	 victor	 as	 a	 ‘legitimate	 representative	of	 state	
																																								 																				






Third	 World	 legal	 claims	 in	 anticolonial	 nationalist	 movements	 for	 independence	
under	international	law.11	For	instance,	in	Kenya,	the	Mau	Mau	resistance	to	British	
domination	 could	 not	 fit	 into	 the	 principles	 of	 classical	 international	 law.	 It	 was	




form	 of	 resistance	 by	 the	 Third	 World:	 international	 law	 that	 was	 mainly	
institutionalised	and	carried	out	by	the	Third	World	states	themselves.13	This	form	of	
resistance	canvassed	for	the	economic	development	of	developing	countries	through	
the	 New	 International	 Economic	 Order	 in	 the	 United	 Nations.14	 However,	 these	
subsequent	forms	of	resistances	have	been	criticised	for	their	heavy	reliance	on	some	
tools	 of	 traditional	 international	 law,	 such	 as	 sovereignty	 and	 the	 quest	 for	
development.15	These	tools	have	been	viewed	to	be	 in	 line	with	Western	capitalist	
																																								 																				
10	 Nathaniel	 Berman,	 ‘Sovereignty	 in	 Abeyance:	 Self-Determination	 and	 International	 Law’,	 (1988)	
WISCONSIN	 INTERNATIONAL	 LAW	 JOURNAL	 7,	 51;	 Balakrishnan	 Rajagopal,	 ‘The	 Case	 for	 the	






















in	modern	 international	 law.	 For	 example,	 Balakrishnan	Rajagopal	 argues	 that	 it	 is	
impossible	to	discuss	the	transformation	of	the	international	 legal	order	 in	modern	
times	without	 considering	 Third	World	movements.16	 He	 asserts	 that	 Third	World	
interactions	could	no	longer	be	evaluated	within	the	statist	or	liberal	rights	paradigms,	
and	 he	 acknowledges	 that	 many	 social	 movements	 within	 the	 Third	World	 reject	
Western	models	while	offering	emancipatory	promises	that	accommodate	farmers,	
women,	 environmentalists	 and	 other	 perceived	 oppressed	 people	within	 the	 local	
community.	 The	 struggles	 of	 social	movements	 as	 a	 counter-hegemonic	 discourse	
demonstrate	how	non-state	actors	can	attain	autonomy	and	self-realization	for	the	
Third	 World.	 Although	 there	 might	 have	 been	 individual	 resistance	 to	 oppressive	
foreign	 dominations,	 most	 often	 non-state	 actors	 present	 a	 united	 force	 to	
demonstrate	 their	 disapproval,	 leading	 us	 to	 the	 next	 discussion	 on	 solidarity.	 As	













of	 a	more	 individualistic	 approach.	 Sometimes,	 the	 notion	 of	 cooperation,	 shared	
responsibility	or	commitment	to	not	harm	each	other	as	a	description	of	solidarity	is	
considered	a	rather	flat	and	narrow	definition	that	could	diminish	the	political	value	





every	 citizen	 the	guarantee	 that	 they	would	 receive	 subsistence	 in	 case	of	need.21	
These	French	laws	were	earlier	associated	with	fraternité,	and	later	with	‘solidarity’,	
which	 introduced	 an	 entirely	 new	 concept	 dealing	 with	 political	 and	 economic	
inequalities.	 Within	 this	 sphere,	 solidarity	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 democratic	 and	 modern	
solution	 to	 the	 predicaments	 of	 mass	 poverty,	 especially	 in	 connection	 with	




18	Philipp	Dann,	 ‘Solidarity	and	 the	Law	of	Development	Cooperation’	 in	Rüdiger	Wolfrum	and	Chie	
Kojima	(eds.)	Solidarity:	A	Structural	Principle	of	International	Law	(Heidelberg:	Springer,	2009)	p.	61.	









been	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 bourgeois	 revolution,	 although	 this	 assertion	 has	 also	 faced	
some	contest.22	The	attribution	of	French	origin	might	be	as	a	result	of	another	form	
of	hegemony,	but	such	reference	is	challenged,	as	Africans	also	confront	political	and	











The	 introduction	 of	 solidarity	 into	 international	 law	 raises	 some	 challenges.	 As	
observed	in	the	Third	World	discourse	in	this	thesis,	terms	that	have	‘universal	appeal	

















matters	 of	 justice.	 Dann	 inquires	 whether	 it	 is	 possible	 ‘to	 reconcile	 the	 rather	
collectivist	idea	of	solidarity	with	sovereignty	–	i.e.	the	independence	based	structure	
of	international	law’.27	Pursuing	such	‘universalised’	solidarity	in	relation	to	classical	
customary	 international	 law	has	been	seen	to	hinder	 the	participation	of	 the	Third	
World	in	the	development	of	international	custom.	Rather	than	follow	such	a	route,	




was	 demonstrated	 at	 the	 Bandung	 conference	 of	 1955.	 Twenty-nine	 newly	
























arise	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 meeting	 did	 not	 end	 the	 Cold	 War,	 nor	 provide	 a	




regional	 and	 international	 order	 marked	 by	 ‘tolerance	 of	 diversity,	 mutual	
accommodation	 and	 the	 softening	 of	 ideological	 conflicts	 and	 rivalries’.34	 The	
solidarity	 that	 pulled	 together	 the	 states	 concerned	 in	 this	 conference	 provided	 a	
benchmark	 for	 judging	 the	 progress	 of	multilateral	 diplomacy	 among	 Third	World	
																																								 																				
30	Ang	Cheng	Guan,	‘The	Bandung	Conference	and	the	Cold	War	International	History	of	Southeast	Asia’	




Critical	 Pasts	 and	 Pending	 Futures	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 2015-	 Forthcoming);	
Adekeye	Adebajo:	 ‘From	Bandung	to	Durban:	Whither	the	Afro-Asian	Coalition’	 in	See	Seng	Tan	and	








34	 Amitar	 Achararya	 and	 See	 Seng	 Tan,	 ‘The	 Normative	 Relevance	 of	 the	 Bandung	 Conference	 for	























Latin	 American	 region	 was	 invited	 to	 join	 in	 the	 struggle	 against	 Western	













resulted	 in	 a	 Tricontinental	 conference.38	 Although	 the	 significance	 of	 the	
Tricontinental	conference	has	been	queried,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	conference	
increased	the	number	of	guerrilla	movements	in	Africa	and	Latin	America	leading	to	
the	 independence	 of	 countries	 such	 as	 Guinea	 Bissau,	 Angola,	 Mozambique,	 and	
Zimbabwe.39	 Today,	 regional	 organisations	 are	 arguably	 contributing	 to	 the	
emancipatory	 struggles	 of	 the	 Third	 World.	 The	 African	 Union,	 for	 instance,	
comprising	independent	African	states,	is	united	by	the	following	objectives:	
…	to	rid		the	continent	of	the	remaining	vestiges	of	colonization	and	apartheid;	
to	 	 promote	 unity	 and	 solidarity	 among	 African	 States;	 to	 coordinate	 and	
intensify	 	 cooperation	 for	 development;	 to	 safeguard	 the	 sovereignty	 and	
territorial	 	 integrity	 of	 Member	 States	 and	 to	 promote	 international	
cooperation	within	the		framework	of	the	United	Nations.40	
Although	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 African	Union,	 among	 others,	 have	 continued	 to	
show	their	desire	to	protect	the	Third	World,	there	are	reservations	over	the	mode	of	

























interests	 as	 evidenced	 in	 the	 matters	 of	 human	 rights	 discussed	 below.	 Such	
resistance	 allows	 the	 non-state	 actors	 concerned	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 shaping	 of	

















for	 example,	 designed	 a	 course	 titled	 ‘From	 Colonialism	 to	 Globalization:	 How	
International	 Law	Made	 a	 Third	World’	 at	 the	 Faculty	 of	 Law	 of	 the	 University	 of	
Auckland.43	 The	 course	 offers	 a	 narrative	 that	 details	 ‘a	 broad	 historical	 arc	 that	
included	the	naked	exploitation	of	the	earliest	European	invaders,’	while	abandoning	
the	 conventional	 image	 of	 international	 law.44	 It	 reveals	 the	 improvisation	 of	
international	 law	 as	 legitimizing	 the	 discourse	 for	 colonial	 invasion.45	 The	 course	
presents	 the	 intensifying	 globalized	 world	 order	 through	 the	 spread	 of	 neoliberal	
ideology	 to	 the	 realpolitik	 of	 empire	 manifesting	 itself	 in	 the	 manipulation	 of	
international	financial	institutions	and	the	foreign	aid	industry.46	
The	 process	 of	 imparting	 the	 above	 themes	 also	 defers	 from	 the	 stereotyped	














47	 Christine	 Schwobel-Patel,	 ‘Teaching	 International	 Law	Critically-	 Critical	 Pedagogy	 and	 Bildung	 as	






raise	 questions	 and	 debate	 among	 themselves.	 These	 encourage	 critical	 thinking	
rather	 than	mere	 conformity.	 The	 new	 approach	 also	 encourages	 solidarity	 in	 the	
rethinking	of	 the	understanding	of	 international	 legal	 theories.	 The	module,	 ‘From	
Colonialism	to	Globalization:	How	International	Law	Made	a	Third	World’	provides	a	
dialogic	and	democratic	approach	to	teaching	and	learning,	and	a	reflection	on	the	
place	 of	 justice	 in	 international	 law	 that	 were	 arguably	 unlikely	 within	 the	
conventional	model.48	
One	of	 the	 significant	 consequences	of	 the	 TWAIL	pedagogical	 counter-hegemonic	





















Therefore,	 he	 calls	 for	 resistance	 to	 the	mechanical	way	 of	 teaching	 students	 and	
requests	 a	 critical	 examination	 that	 allows	 students	 to	 question	 the	 structures	 of	
domination.	He	believes	that	the	effectiveness	of	this	new	approach	would	depend	on	




while	 attacking	 colonial	 authorities	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 especially	 during	 the	 period	
1890-1914.			
The	new	approach	 to	 critical	 thinking,	 teaching	and	understanding	of	 international	
law,	 and	 other	 subjects,	 dismantles	 the	 traditional	 notions	 of	 the	 principles	 and	
practices	of	international	law,	challenging	the	Eurocentric	foundation	of	international	
law.	Also,	it	seeks	and	situates	non-Europeans	in	international	relations.	Importantly,	
critical	approaches	 to	 international	 law	as	a	 theory	and	methodology	becomes	 the	
vehicle	 of	 action	 to	 resist	 the	 imposition	of	Western	notions	 of	 state	 practice	 and	
opinio	juris	as	the	only	determinant	for	the	formation	of	customary	international	law.	
Insistence	on	such	imposition	contradicts	the	reality	of	other	legal	traditions	as	well	
as	 modern	 international	 law	 that	 is	 characterised	 by	 different	 competing	 actors.	
Consequently,	the	making	of	international	customary	law	is,	arguably,	no	longer	the	







touches	on	how	 law,	particularly	 custom,	 is	made	 in	other	 societies	and	how	such	
custom	is	incorporated	into	international	relations.		
Indeed,	critical	pedagogy	 is	essential	 in	unsettling	colonialism	and	 its	effects	 in	 the	
reproduction	of	hierarchies	that	privilege	the	Global	North	over	the	Global	South.52		In	
this	 regard,	 revolutionary	 pedagogy	 that	 imparts	 on	 Nigerians,	 Africans	 and	 other	
diverse	actors	in	the	Third	World	their	participatory	roles	in	international	law-making	
is	crucial	and	urgent	if	they	are	to	have	a	significant	impact.	Such	a	regime	change	will	
not	 only	 critique,	 but	 also	 provide	 alternative	 patterns	 and	 ideologies	 in	 the	
educational	 process	 for	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 formation	 of	 customary	
international	law.	Decolonising	the	education	system	in	a	country	like	Nigeria	could	
raise	 numerous	 questions	 of	 how	 this	 could	 be	 achieved.	 Such	 questions	 could	
include:	

















‘perceived	 negative’	 colonial	 legacies	 and	 teach	 the	 present	 generation	 to	 assert	
themselves	 in	 the	 international	 legal	system	rather	 than	being	what	this	 thesis	has	
termed	 ‘perpetual-recipient-heirs’	 of	 hegemonic	 systems	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
contributing	 to	 what	 may	 constitute	 customary	 international	 law.	 In	 making	 this	
revolutionary	move,	 it	 is	possible	 that	each	option	may	 raise	 its	own	complexities.	
Such	complexities	are	 likely	 to	arise	due	to	the	diverse	socio-cultural	nature	of	 the	
Nigerian	 state,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 various	 stages	 of	 political	 development	 that	 it	 has	
witnessed.	
In	the	first	option,	the	teaching	of	international	law	in	Nigeria	from	indigenous	systems	
will	bring	 into	play	the	 learning	processes	how	the	various	ethnic	groups	 in	Nigeria	
disseminate	information.	Indigenous	Nigerian	(and	other	African)	educational	systems	
are	usually	an	information	base	for	the	community;	they	also	facilitate	communication	
and	 decision-making.53	 They	 rely	 heavily	 on	 oral	 transmission	 through	 beliefs,	
community	laws,	community	values,	dances,	folklore,	proverbs,	stories,	myths,	local	
languages,	 and	 taxonomy.54	 Education	 within	 Nigerian	 indigenous	 communities	 is	














be	prudent	 in	order	 to	be	 able	 to	 adapt	 to	 changing	 circumstances.	 Impliedly,	 the	
saying	 teaches	 flexibility,	 caution	 and	 adjustment	 to	 inevitable	 changes.	 In	 other	
words,	changes	in	circumstance	require	tactical	application	of	knowledge.		Learning	
does	not	end	in	one’s	present	life	time,	as	he	or	she	is	expected	to	acquire	knowledge	





raises	 concerns	 in	 modern	 times.	 The	 oral	 tradition	 may	 fade	 with	 time,	 thereby	
leaving	 later	 generations	 without	 concrete	 information	 or	 evidence	 to	 rely	 on.57	
Although	this	 is	a	 logical	criticism,	 it	has	been	variously	and	arguably	said	 that	 this	


















Diverse	cultures	 in	Nigeria	could	also	be	a	cause	 for	concern	while	considering	 the	
choice	of	a	particular	 indigenous	system	that	should	be	adopted	 in	the	teaching	of	
international	 law.	 Similarly,	 where	 these	 indigenous	 systems	 are	 successfully	
implemented	 in	 present	 post-colonial	 Nigeria,	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 pose	 peculiar	
challenges.	 This	 could	 be	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 colonial	 encounter,	which	 has	 left	 the	
country	with	the	burden	of	running	indigenous	and	Western	systems	concurrently.	
In	 spite	 of	 the	 above	 concerns,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 strong,	 unified,	 common	
characteristics	in	Nigerian	indigenous	(and	other	African)	educational	goals.	These	are	
centred	on	producing	students	who	are	 respectful,	 sensitive	and	 responsive	 to	 the	
needs	of	both	family	and	community,	as	well	as	being	able	to	 integrate	 into	‘wider	
society’.59	 Arguably,	 such	 common	 features	 raise	 the	 chances	 of	 minimising	
controversies	 in	 the	 development	 or	 adoption	 of	 Nigerian	 indigenous	 educational	
methods	 in	the	teaching	of	 international	 law.	This	 leaves	the	question	of	how	such	
methods	could	be	 revolutionised	 to	produce	a	counter-hegemonic	 legal	education,	
particularly	in	the	field	of	international	law	in	Nigeria.	Such	a	position	would	enable	
																																								 																				





















(i)	 To	 expose	 students	 to	 a	 clear	 understanding	 of	 the	 facts	 of	 inter-
dependence,	namely	that	in	the	contemporary	world	states	and	other	subjects	























objectives	 can	 fulfil	 the	 aspiration	 to	 assert	 a	 Nigerian	 voice	 in	 international	 law	
making	(particularly	customary	international	law).	Although	one	may	agree	with	the	














‘universal	 principles	 and	 rules’	 which	 have	 faced	 severe	 criticisms	 by	 Third	World	
scholars	 due	 to	 their	 perceived	 Western	 bias.64	 These	 criticisms	 arise	 from	 the	
application	of	 international	principles	of	Eurocentric	origins	as	universal,	which	this	
thesis	considers	to	be	a	form	of	manufactured	consent.	Such	global	application	of	a	
select	 few	 European	 states	 has	 been	 challenged	 and	 regarded	 as	 lacking	 wide	
representation	of	the	diverse	legal	traditions	of	the	international	system.65		
The	fourth	objective	leaves	an	individual	burden	on	every	international	law	teacher	
and	 student:	 the	 responsibility	 of	 being	 proactive	 in	 a	 counterhegemonic	 legal	
education	 in	 Nigeria,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 nations	 of	 the	 Third	 World.	 Such	 counter-







Third	 World	 scholarship	 has	 developed	 over	 time	 to	 counter	 Western	 negative	
perceptions	of	the	Third	World	that	led	to	their	exclusion	in	international	law-making	
																																								 																				











Over	 time,	 Third	 World	 resistance	 scholarship	 has	 challenged	 such	 negative	
perceptions	and	justified	the	participation	of	non-Westerners	in	the	international	legal	
system.	 These	 Third	World	 scholarships	 cut	 across	many	disciplines,	 including	 law,	
anthropology	and	fiction.	African	writers	have	tried	to	affirm	their	faith	in	their	native	
culture	 and	 defend	 it	 against	Western	 intrusion	 and	 prejudices.67	 In	 some	 African	
fiction,	this	 is	done	through	the	use	of	symbols	to	distinguish	African	cultures	from	
‘alien’	cultures.	 It	 is	 sometimes	believed	that	 there	are	exaggerations	 in	 the	use	of	
symbols	 to	portray	African	culture	as	positive	and	 that	of	 the	 ‘alien’	 as	negative.68	
However,	 it	 is	also	argued	that	such	styles	of	writing	are	 intended	to	avert	cultural	
annihilation.69	Those	writers	often	assert	African	cultural	practices	and	condemn	the	
disruptive	 nature	 of	Western	 intervention	 that	 justifies	 colonialism	 as	 a	means	 to	
change	 African	 culture	 for	 good.	 In	 this	 regard,	 these	 African	 writers	 insist	 that	





African	 societies,	 particularly	 the	 Igbo	 society	 of	 south-eastern	 Nigeria	 and	
																																								 																				















personal	 hard	 work	 to	 attain	 fame,	 wealth	 and	 respect,	 as	 well	 as	 obeying	 all	
communal	rules,	which	emanated	from	within.	Later	in	the	novel	it	is	shown	that	the	
changes	 due	 to	 Western	 encounters	 that	 were	 encroaching	 into	 Igbo	 society	 are	
unbearable	for	Okonkwo.	Particularly,	he	feels	betrayed	by	the	conversion	of	his	son	




to	 his	 resistance,	 Okonkwo	 hangs	 himself	 to	 avoid	 being	 tried	 by	 a	 colonial	





an	 influential	 man	 like	 Okonkwo,	 but	 they	 differ	 in	 terms	 of	 temperament	 and	
approach	to	issues.	While	Okonkwo	could	be	described	as	rash	and	rigid,	following	his	











is	 described.	 The	 killing	of	 a	 kinsman	was	 a	 crime,	 intended	or	 not.	 Consequently,	
Okonkwo	 and	 his	 family	 are	 sent	 into	 exile	 and	 his	 house	 is	 burnt.	 In	 order	 to	
demonstrate	the	African	capacity	of	self-reappraisal,	Obierika	questions	why	a	man	
should	 suffer	 so	much	 for	 an	 accidental	 killing.	 In	 the	 course	 of	 such	 assessment,	
Obierika	 also	mourns	 the	 deaths	 of	 his	 wife’s	 twins,	 whom	 he	 was	 forced	 to	 kill,	
wondering	 what	 crime	 they	 committed.	 Such	 critiques	 by	 Africans	 themselves	






play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 identifying	 and	 challenging	 the	 perceived	 distortions	
characterised	 in	classical	 international	 law.	 	Antony	Anghie,	 through	his	work	titled	
Imperialism,	Sovereignty	and	the	Making	of	International	law,	is	a	notable	example	in	
																																								 																				
71	 Tugume	 Lubowa	Hassan,	 ‘Attitudes	 of	 Christian	missionaries	 towards	African	 traditional	 religious	





this	 regard.72	 His	 work	 inquired	 into	 the	 relationship	 between	 colonialism	 and	
international	law,	and	how	international	law	legitimised	colonial	exploitation,	as	well	
as	 developed	 mechanisms	 to	 prevent	 claims	 for	 reparations.	 Anghie	 argues	 that	
colonialism	 was	 central	 to	 the	 constitution	 of	 international	 law,	 as	 many	 basic	










international	 law.	While	 challenging	 classical	 international	 law,	 many	 Third	World	
scholars	within	this	sphere	also	believe	in	the	emancipatory	promise	of	international	
law.74	 For	 instance,	 Antony	 Angie	 states	 that	 his	 continued	 hope	 for	 the	




73	 James	 Thuo	 Gathii,	 ‘Alternative	 and	 Critical:	 The	 Contribution	 of	 Research	 and	 Scholarship	 on	
Developing	Countries	to	International	Legal	Theory’	(2000)	SYMPOSIUM	ISSUE	FORWARD,	Vol.	41,	No.	
2,	p.	263	at	273.	









more	 interested	 in	 overcoming	 the	 inequalities	 in	 international	 law	 rather	 than	
absolute	replacement.76		
One	of	the	ways	that	Third	World	non-state	actors,	such	as	scholars,	have	sought	to	
overcome	 some	 of	 the	 inequalities	 mentioned	 above	 is	 through	 the	 notion	 of	
international	 human	 rights.	 The	 theme,	 widely	 portrayed	 in	 most	 Third	 World	
scholarship,	is	the	resistance	to	Western	notions	of	human	rights	law.77	The	attitude	
of	scholars	from	the	Global	South	is	that	human	rights	should	possess	the	features	of	
diverse	 legal	 cultures	 if	 it	 is	 to	 derive	 legitimacy	 within	 its	 area	 of	 operation.78	
Supporting	such	arguments	from	an	African	perspective,	Makua	Mutua	canvassed	for	
what	 he	 termed	 an	 ‘African	 cultural	 fingerprint’	 which	 would	 incorporate	 African	
experiences	and	values	by	focusing	on	social	cohesion,	duties	and	groups,	as	well	as	
communal	 solidarity.79	 It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 such	 scholarly	 resistance	 aids	 the	
identification	or	understanding	of	what	constitutes	the	practices	of	human	rights	from	
																																								 																				




Essays	 in	 Honour	 of	 Ivan	 Head	 (Toronto	 2003)	 p.112;	 Ibironke	 T.	 Odumosu,	 Locating	 Third	 World	
Resistance	in	the	International	Law	on	Foreign	Investment	(2007)	INTERNATIONAL	COMMUNITY	LAW	
REVIEW	Vol.	9	p.	427;	B	S	Chimni,	‘Permanent		Sovereignty		over		Natural		Resources:		Toward		a	Radical		
Interpretation’	 (1998)	 	 INDIAN	 	 JOURNAL	 	OF	 	 INTERNATIONAL	 	 LAW	Vol.	 38,	 	 p.	 208;	 B	 S	 Chimni,	
‘Globalization,	 	Humanitarianism	 	 and	 	 the	 	 Erosion	 	 of	 	 Refugee	 	 Protection’,	 (2000)	 JOURNAL	 	OF		
REFUGEE		STUDIES	13	(3)	p.	243.	




78	 Bonny	 Ibhawoh,	Between	Culture	 and	Constitution:	 Evaluating	 the	Cultural	 Legitimacy	of	Human	
Rights	 in	the	African	State	(2000)	HUMAN	RIGHTS	QUARTERLY,	Vol.	22,	No.	3,	pp.	838-860;	Akwasia	
Idoo,	‘Africa:	Democracy	Without	Human	Rights?’,	(1993)	15	HUM.	RTS.	Q.	703,	713.	





a	 non-Western	 perspective.	 If	 this	 were	 the	 case,	 then	 it	 could	 be	 said	 that	 such	
resistance	establishes	Third	World	participation	in	the	making	of	international	custom	
in	the	area	of	human	rights.80		
Furthermore,	 through	 the	 use	 of	 scholarship,	 there	 is	 resistance	 to	 classical	
personality	 theory	 in	 international	 law-making.	 State	 monopoly	 in	 international	
activities	has	been	refuted	by	scholars,	as	noted	in	chapter	four.	The	possibility	of	non-
state	 actors	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 custom	 has	 been	 engaged	with	 by	 such	 resistant	
discourse.81	 Equal	 representation	of	 the	polarised	nature	of	 the	 international	 legal	
system	that	should	protect	the	‘locals’,	including	women,	farmers	and	others	has	been	
advocated	for	by	TWAIL	scholarship.82	It	has	been	argued	that	most	legislations	usually	
have	 serious	 impacts	 on	 the	 locals	 and,	 therefore,	 it	 should	 be	 judged	 on	 this	
premise.83	These	groups	of	non-state	actors	are	constantly	seeking	their	rights	in	both	
domestic	 and	 transnational	 systems,	 particularly	 in	Africa,	where	 the	people	often	
ignore	 the	post-colonial	 state	 apparatus	 to	 attend	 to	 their	 daily	 socio-political	 and	
economic	needs.84	As	a	result,	TWAIL	scholars	argue	that	the	state	is	only	one	of	the	
																																								 																				
80	Although	Third	World	struggles	have	made	an	 impact	 in	 the	 international	system	as	seen	 in	anti-




Mutua	 are	 optimistic	 that	African	 resistance	would	 create	 a	 possible	 reform	 that	would	 encourage	
African	 participation.	 See	 generally	Obiora	 Chinedu	Okafor,	 ‘Poverty,	 Agency	 and	 Resistance	 in	 the	
Future	 of	 International	 Law:	 An	 African	 Perspective’	 in	 Richard	 Falk,	 Balakrishnan	 Rajagopal	 and	
Jacqueline	Stevens	(eds.)	International	Law	and	the	Third	World:	Reshaping	Justice	(2008)	see	note	77,	
p.	95	particularly	at	pp.	104-107.		





















As	 observed	 in	 chapter	 one,	 in	 present	 times	 there	 are	 widespread	 opinions	 and	
practices	through	the	use	of	diverse	forms	of	media.	The	role	of	the	media	in	forming	
public	 opinion	 cannot	 be	 over-emphasised.	 In	 contemporary	 legal	 arguments,	 the	
media	 is	 seen	 to	 influence,	 as	 well	 as	 contribute,	 to	 the	 making	 of	 customary	
international	law.86	Such	media	influences	often	have	impact	on	the	promotion	and	


















south-eastern	 Nigeria.	 	 	 Radio	 Biafra	 aims	 to	 propagate	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘freedom’,	
specifically	that	of	the	Igbos.90	The	view	arose	from	the	perception	of	Igbos	who	were	
marginalised	by	the	Nigerian	government	and	killed	en	masse	in	the	Northern	part	of	




Although	 the	 civil	 war	 has	 ended	 in	 Nigeria,	 the	 reason	 that	 led	 to	 the	war	may,	
arguably,	have	not	been	completely	resolved,	as	the	agitation	of	the	Igbos	in	south-
eastern	Nigeria	continues	to	mount	through	Radio	Biafra.	Mazi	Nnamdi	Kanu	currently	


















the	group	relies	on	 international	 law	to	seek	their	objectives.	This	 is	exemplified	 in	
their	current	petition	against	the	newly	elected	president	of	the	Federal	Republic	of	
Nigeria,	Muhammadu	 Buhari,	 who	 assumed	 office	 on	 29	May,	 2015.	 The	 petition	
states	that:	
The	 Indigenous	 People	 of	 Biafra	 (IPOB)	 are	 hounded,	 harassed,	
massacred,	and	incarcerated	in	violation	of	their	civil	and	United	Nations	


























which	 the	Nigerian	 government	 is	 dealing	with	 the	Boko	Harem	 crisis	 in	Nigeria.96	
While	 some	 are	making	 suggestions	 on	 how	 the	 Boko	Harem	 insurgency	 could	 be	
controlled,	others	are	demanding	for	a	breakup	of	the	Nigerian	state	to	allow	for	the	
independence	 of	 various	 regions	 of	 the	 state,	 as	 they	 could	 no	 longer	 endure	 the	
destruction	of	lives	and	properties	resulting	from	the	crisis.	These	social	media	are	not	
simply	 used	 in	 the	 same	manner	 as	 old	 technologies	 to	 coordinate	 and	document	
unfolding	events,	 rather	they	now	create	 ‘live	maps’.97	For	 instance,	 through	social	
media	 sources	 such	 as	 Twitter	 and	 YouTube,	 protest	 events	 were	 monitored	 and	
gathered	by	 the	public	 in	 Tunisia,	 Egypt,	 Syria	 and	Yemen.	 The	use	of	 these	 social	
media	are	seen	to	have	played	a	pivotal	role	in	the	success	of	the	Arab	Spring	protest	
movements.98	
	Group	 actions	 in	 the	 Third	 World	 have	 been	 an	 important	 tool	 to	 establish	
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Investigating	in	the	Social	Media’	(2013).	
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University	Press,	2012).	











The	 aftermath	 of	 the	 attacks	 on	 September	 11,	 2001	 and	 the	 succeeding	 ‘war	 on	
terror’	have	attracted	global	attention	to	social	movements.	Although	terrorism	is	not	
the	 concern	 of	 this	 section,	 such	 caution	 is	 crucial	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 attempts	 of	
negatively	 labelling	Third	World	movements.	Nevertheless,	 it	has	been	argued	that	








the	 ruling	 class	or	 customary	practices.	Most	 times,	 such	mass	protest	 results	 in	 a	
change	 of	 an	 ‘undesirable	 condition’.	 	 One	 of	 such	movement	 is	 the	 case	 of	Ogu	
																																								 																				







took	 place.	 The	 construction	 is	 derived	 from	 the	 Igbo	 language.	 Ogu	 umunwayi	
signifies	the	‘making	of	war’	by	women	against	a	person	or	persons;	or	a	disturbing	
situation.	War	 in	 this	 context	 does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 the	 definition	 of	 war	 as	
recognized	in	international	law.	It	is	a	sign	of	protest	that	is	peaceful	in	most	cases.	
Ogu	umunwayi	was	the	description	used	by	the	Igbos	to	explain	the	protest	by	women	




narrative.101	 Certainly,	 different	 names	 are	 given	 to	 conflicts	 depending	 on	whose	
point	of	view	and	agenda	is	portrayed.		
This	 thesis	will,	 rather,	 adopt	 the	description	of	ogu	umuwanyi	 in	 the	original	 and	
indigenous	meaning	used	by	the	language	of	the	women	who	carried	out	the	protest.	
Such	preference	contributes	to	the	counter-hegemonic	potential	of	non-state	actors	
in	 the	 Third	World.	 Furthermore,	 the	 employment	 of	 ogu	 umuwanyi	 is	 crucial	 to	
explaining	 the	 indigenous	 roles	of	women	 in	 the	decentralised	 indigenous	political	
structure	 of	 south-eastern	 Nigeria	 that	 has	 remained	 despite	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	
















Nigeria	and	beyond.	This	 resistance	has	been	 seen	 to	 recur	 in	 the	 struggle	against	










in	 the	 Bende	 division	 of	 the	 Owerri	 province	 decided	 to	 recount	 household	 and	





















who	 became	 convinced	 that	 they	 were	 to	 be	 taxed.	 Messages	 were	 sent	 to	
neighbouring	areas	and	the	women	marched	in	mass	protest	to	the	District	office	and	
made	 their	 demands.	 In	 response	 to	 the	 protest,	 a	written	 assurance	 stating	 that	
women	were	not	to	pay	tax	was	issued.	The	women	also	succeeded	in	getting	Okugo	
a	 two-year	 imprisonment	 for	physically	 assaulting	 the	women	and	 spreading	news	
likely	to	cause	panic.105	News	of	victory	spread	quickly	and	this	further	energised	the	
women	 to	 raise	 funds	 to	 send	 delegates	 throughout	 former	 eastern	 Nigeria	 to	
coordinate	 the	Women’s	War.106	 The	women’s	 network	 continued	 their	 resistance	














Churchill	 in	 August	 1941	 sparked	 off	 bold	 moves	 in	 the	 decolonisation	 of	 African	









immediate	 ‘Africanisation’	 of	 the	 colonial	 government;	 and	 the	 institution	 of	
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842–860.	





representative	 government	 in	 the	 colonies	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 ‘full	 responsible	
government’.110	
Unfortunately,	 the	 above	 encounter	 did	 not	 yield	 the	 expected	 result	 of	 self-
governance	 for	 the	 West	 African	 territories	 due	 to	 the	 unwillingness	 of	 Western	
countries	to	end	colonial	rule.111	However,	such	reluctance	by	the	colonialists	did	not	
deter	 anticolonial	movements.112	 Other	 bodies	 such	 as	 the	West	 African	 Students	
Union,	 Colonial	 Bureau	 of	 the	 Fabian	 Society	 and	 members	 of	 British	 Parliament	
interested	 in	 Africa	 continued	 the	 campaign	 for	 the	 emancipation	 of	 African	
peoples.113	 Over	 time,	 the	 Atlantic	 Charter	 became	 crucial	 to	 post-World	 War	 II	
international	anticolonial	politics.114		The	Charter	was	later	described	as	the	first	major	











1925–1958	 (Ibadan:	 Daystar	 Press,	 1982);	 Bonny	 Ibhawoh,	 ‘Testing	 the	 Atlantic	 Charter:	 linking	
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some	 of	 these	 women	were	 active	 in	 several	 women’s	 organisations,	 such	 as	 the	
Women’s	International	Democratic	Federation,	to	pursue	decolonisation	in	Africa.118	
The	involvement	of	these	diverse	groups	of	non-state	actors	no	doubt	has	expanded	








The	 presence,	 participation	 and	 resistance	 of	 many	 African	 indigenous	 systems	
comprising	 non-state	 actors,	 such	 as	 indigenous	 leaders,	 family	 heads,	 community	
																																								 																				















states	 has	 rendered	 these	 indigenous	 systems	 ‘old-fashioned,	 reactionary	 and	
anachronistic’,	there	are	people	who	are	not	willing	to	expunge	these	systems,	as	they	
are	 still	 relevant	 to	 their	 daily	 lives.121	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 instead	 of	 totally	
extinguishing	indigenous	African	systems,	such	institutions	should	be	purged	of	any	





Based	 on	 the	 above,	 there	 has	 been	 a	mandatory	 call	 for	 indigenous	 intervention	
within	 the	 Nigerian	 state	 since	 the	 colonial	 encounter.	 Arguably,	 such	 desires	 for	
indigenous	 intervention	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 ‘promises	 of	 the	 civilising	 mission’	
which	 led	 to	 the	 imposition	 of	 Western	 principles	 and	 practices	 (customary	
international	law,	for	example)	has	not	resulted	in	a	total	success	in	the	administration	
of	 African	 states.	 Consequently,	 ‘indigenous	 intervention’	 has	 continued	 to	 be	
relevant	for	the	effective	administration	of	the	Nigerian	state.	For	instance,	Kenneth	
Nweke	 recently	asserted	 that	although	 the	Niger	Delta	 communities	 in	Nigeria	are	
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amnesty	 era,	 indigenous	 institutions	 of	 governance	 in	 the	 Niger	 Delta	 should	 be	
strengthened	 to	 work	 in	 synergy	 with	 other	 stakeholders,	 such	 as	 Nigerian	 state	
institutions	and	transnational	corporate	actors,	in	evolving	processes	that	will	lead	to	
sustainable	peace	in	the	region.		
Pre-colonial	 times	 encouraged	 these	 systems	 through	 the	 active	 participation	 of	
certain	non-state	actors,	but	colonial	times	witnessed	their	suppression	by	the	use	of	
‘locals’	 for	 indirect	 rule.125	 However,	 the	 post-colonial	 period	 is	 witnessing	 a	 re-
emergence	 of	 indigenous	 systems	 through	 the	 leadership	 and	 group	 members	 of	
these	systems	in	the	post-colonial	state,	as	well	as	in	other	parts	of	the	Third	World.126		








chiefs	 to	 administer	 British	 rule	 in	 Nigeria.	 Although	 there	 were	 other	 arguments	 for	 the	 use	 of	
indigenous	rulers,	 such	as	 lack	of	 finance	and	manpower	on	the	part	of	British	government	 to	 fund	
colonial	rule	in	Nigeria,	it	is	obvious	that	the	use	of	these	types	of	non-state	actors	were	relevant	in	the	


















intervene	 whenever	 state	 policy	 makers	 are	 overwhelmed	 and	 there	 is	 a	 fear	 of	
failure.128	 For	 instance,	 in	 1993	 when	 the	 economic	 policy	 of	 the	 regime	 of	 the	
Nigerian	military	head	of	state,	Ibrahim	Babangida,	was	having	adverse	effects	on	the	
Nigerian	people,	 an	ad	hoc	 council	meeting	of	 indigenous	 chiefs	was	 called	by	 the	

















the	 Ogoni	 people.131	 The	 roles	 of	 these	 non-state	 actors	 appear	 to	 affect	 what	







they	 also	 oversee	 educational	 functions.	 In	 this	 regard,	 they	 are	 appointed	 as	
chancellors	of	federal	and	regional	universities.	For	instance,	the	Emir	of	Zaria,	Oba	of	
Benin,	Emir	of	Kano	and	Obi	of	Onitsha	serve	as	chancellors	of	various	universities.132	





the	 Western	 court	 system	 and	 other	 indigenous	 judicial	 systems	 that	 operate	 in	
different	communities.	For	example,	the	maintenance	of	peace	in	the	Igbo	community	











as	 well	 as	 judicial	 functions.136	 Such	 indigenous	 judicial	 systems	 afford	 non-state	
actors	 in	 this	 part	 of	Nigeria	 the	opportunity	 to	 administer	 customary	 rules	 in	 the	
settlement	of	disputes.	The	familiarity	of	such	laws	and	the	outcomes	they	provide	
claimants	and	defendants	are	often	satisfactory	to	the	parties	involved.137		
Studies	 carried	 out	 by	 scholars	 concerning	 the	 relationship	 between	 post-colonial	
state	 laws	and	 indigenous	systems	show	the	persistence	of	non-state	quasi-judicial	
modes	of	conflict	resolution.138	However,	this	is	often	dependent	on	the	nature	of	the	
matter	 at	 hand.	 For	 instance,	 in	 Igbo	 communities,	 owing	 to	 the	 importance	 and	






choose	 the	 judicial	 system	 that	 will	 determine	 their	 case,	 including	 customary	
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with	 the	 indigenous	 system	 of	 arbitration.	 There	 are	merits	 and	 demerits	 to	 each	
system,	 and	diverse	 complexities.144	 In	 spite	of	 this,	 the	preference	 for	 indigenous	
systems	 over	 post-colonial	 institutions	 in	 the	 resolution	 of	 certain	 matters	
demonstrates	 the	continuous	 relevance	of	 indigenous	 systems	 in	 the	affairs	of	 the	
people.		These	forms	of	indigenous	systems	of	dispute	resolution	appear	to	satisfy	the	
kind	of	‘justice’	desired	by	the	people.145	






















wide	opportunity	 has	 been	 received	with	 scepticism,	 and	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that,	
while	employing	indigenous	law	as	a	form	of	transitional	justice,	these	systems	should	
complement	 and	 not	 obstruct	 the	 processes	 of	 state	 and	 peace	 builders	 to	
accommodate	 these	 customs	 in	 national	 justice	 systems.148	 Although	 this	 position	
appears	logical	and	progressive,	it	seems	to	encourage	the	state	and	its	institutional	
dominance	 in	 the	 dispensation	 of	 justice.	 As	 argued	 in	 this	 thesis,	 such	 state	
dominance	often	results	in	hegemonic	tendencies	in	post-colonial	states	and	to	which	
there	is	continuous	resistance.		Resistance	through	indigenous	systems	and	customs	
arising	 therefrom	encourage	accommodation	 in	post-colonial	 states,	although	such	
customs	are	often	scrutinised	under	repugnancy	tests	based	on	English	standards	of	
justice.149	However,	such	tests	have	faced	resistance	through	Nigerian	courts,	which	






147	 Padraig	 McAuliffe,	 ‘Romanticization	 Versus	 Integration?:	 Indigenous	 Justice	 in	 Rule	 of	 Law	
Reconstruction	and	Transitional	Justice	Discourse’	(2014)	GOETTINGEN	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	
LAW	5,	1,	41-86.	
148	 Padraig	 McAuliffe,	 ‘Romanticization	 Versus	 Integration?:	 Indigenous	 Justice	 in	 Rule	 of	 Law	
Reconstruction	and	Transitional	Justice	Discourse’	(2014),	see	note	147.	
149Eshugbayi	Eleko	v.	Officer	Administering	the	Government	of	Nigeria	(1931)	A.C.	662;	Edet	v.	Essien	














lived	and	died)	under	 ‘Igiogbe’	Bini	 native	 custom.	However,	 his	 father,	 in	his	will,	
disinherited	him	of	this	entitlement.	The	Supreme	Court	of	Nigeria	held	the	will	invalid	




and	 long-standing	 custom,	 which	 had	 passed	 down	 from	 generation	 to	
generation	and	as	a	result,	had	been	accorded	statutory	recognition.	In	other	
words,	 the	practice	of	a	Bini	 customary	 law,	which	gives	 the	eldest	 son	 the	
prerogative	 to	 inherit	 the	 'Igiogbe'	has	not	changed	 from	time	 immemorial.	
Under	Benin	Native	Land	and	Custom,	Igiogbe	meant	a	principal	house	where	



























among	 the	 diverse	 geo-political	 zones	 in	 the	 area	 of	 Nigerian	 customary	
jurisprudence.	Therefore,	 it	 could	be	 inferred	 that	customary	practices	exist	within	
Nigeria	 that	 resist	Western	domination.	 In	addition	 to	 the	Nigerian	example,	many	









The	 Independence	 Constitution	 of	 Botswana	 in	 1966	 created	 a	House	 of	 Chiefs	 to	
serve	as	a	consultative	body	in	respect	of	indigenous	matters.157	The	Constitution	of	
Ghana	 also	 states	 that	 the	 institution	 of	 chieftaincy,	 together	 with	 its	 traditional	
councils	as	established	by	customary	law	and	usage,	 is	guaranteed.158	Although	the	




and	 the	ordinary	 people	 they	protect	 and	 represent.	 Such	 solidarity	 could	 provide	
them	with	a	platform	to	resist	hegemonic	customs	imposed	by	the	post-colonial	state	
and	the	international	system.	Arguably,	the	customary	practices	leading	to	obligations	
among	 the	 people,	 their	 state	 and	 international	 community	 are	 challenged.	 State	
practice	and	opinio	 juris	are	confronted	and,	 in	many	 instances	 in	the	post-colonial	
African	 states,	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 are	 forced	 to	 operate	 side	 by	 side	 as	
demonstrated	above.	The	assessment	of	this	resistance	by	non-state	actors	and	how	


















have	 been	made	 through	 resistance	 by	 non-state	 actors,	 especially	 through	 social	





enjoying	 in	 the	present	 international	 legal	 system.	This	position	generates	another	
optimistic	view	of	the	Third	World	struggle	for	emancipation	and	self-determination	
in	the	international	sphere.	














law	 forms	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 the	 legal	 system	of	Nigeria	 and	 some	 other	 parts	 of	
Africa.161		
The	 underlying	 elements	 of	 the	 above	 sources	 of	 the	 Nigerian	 legal	 system	
demonstrate	congruence	between	the	indigenous	system	(which	emanates	from	the	




between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 people	 led	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Zambia	 Law	
Development	 Commission.162	 The	 commission	 recognises	 that	 the	 daily	 life	 of	 the	
majority	of	its	people	is	lived	under	customary	law.	Following	this	knowledge,	one	of	
the	Commission’s	mandates	was	to	reconcile	indigenous	systems	with	present	post-












common	 law	 of	 South	 Africa	 by	 affording	 it	 constitutional	 recognition,	 but	 also	
subjecting	it	to	the	constitution	and	other	legislation.164	
The	co-existence	between	state	and	indigenous	systems	no	doubt	has	been	forced	by	
the	 resistance	 of	 various	 groups	 of	 non-state	 actors	 from	 colonial	 to	 post-colonial	








find	many	merits	 in	 the	 features	of	African	customary	 legal	systems;	




legal	 change	are	now	 recognised	 to	be	 far	 stronger	 than	 legislation-














68	 items	 contained	 in	 the	 exclusive	 list,	 Second	 Schedule,	 Part	 1,	 of	 the	 Nigerian	










resistance	 and	 compromise	 amongst	 the	 various	 actors	 (both	 state	 and	 non-state	
actors)	 come	 into	 play	 in	 the	 determination	 of	 what	 a	 particular	 practice	 and	





166Bonny	 Ibhawoh,	Between	Culture	 and	Constitution:	 Evaluating	 the	Cultural	 Legitimacy	of	Human	
Rights	in	the	African	State	(2000)	HUMAN	RIGHTS	QUARTERLY,	Vol.	22,	No.	3,	pp.	838-860.	
167	T.	W.	Bennett,	Human	Rights	and	African	Customary	Law	under	the	South	African	Constitution	28	








as	 discussed	 above,	 contemporary	 scholarship	 pursues	 congruence	 in	 order	 for	
African	states	and	their	people	 to	adjust	 to	 the	changing	circumstances	created	by	
colonisation	 and	 decolonisation,	 as	 well	 as	 globalisation.168	 Considering	 Africa’s	
circumstances,	such	arguments	will	privilege	both	state	and	non-state	actors	where	
their	 resources	are	pulled	 together	 for	 the	achievement	of	 international	 goals.	 For	
instance,	 in	 the	 incorporation	of	human	rights	 laws	 into	 the	constitution	by	states,	
contributions	by	non-state	actors	will	be	relevant	for	the	success	of	such	legislation,	





Female	 Genital	 Mutilation	 has	 been	 recorded,	 it	 is	 evidenced	 that	 families,	 the	
community	 and	 non-governmental	 organisations	 worked	 together	 to	 provide	
alternative	female	rituals	in	order	to	drop	the	old	tradition	of	genital	mutilation.170		
Where	 the	 participation	 of	 the	 post-colonial	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 (forced	










inconsistent	 to	 insist	 that	only	 state	practice	 and	opinio	 juris	 constitute	 customary	
international	law	from	this	region?	Insistence	on	a	solely	statist	approach	would	only	
continue	 to	 subjugate	Africans	 and	beget	 counter	movements.	 This,	 consequently,	
escalates	conflicts	within	the	African	region.	The	participation	of	non-state	actors	or	
indigenous	systems	in	creating	certain	norms	leads	to	legal	obligation	in	post-colonial	
African	 states	 and	 affords	 people	 the	 opportunity	 for	 true	 representation	 in	 the	





Delta	 area	 of	 Nigeria	 in	 matters	 of	 oil	 exploration	 and	 related	 multinational	
organisation	 activities	 have	 often	 resulted	 in	 crises.171	 Following	 this	 interplay	 of	
activities	 among	 competing	 actors	 in	 post-colonial	 African	 states,	 scholars	 tried	 to	
inquire	into	how	state,	non-state,	local	and	external	actors	interact	to	produce	order	










Four	 Years	 On:	 The	 Niger	 Delta	 Armed	 Conflict	 and	 the	 DDR	 Process	 of	 the	 Nigerian	 Amnesty	











made	 stakeholders	 in	 this	 regard.	 Such	 recognition	 is	 crucial	 for	 the	 actual	
participation	of	the	Third	World	in	the	making	of	international	custom	that	protects	
the	 interests	of	 the	Third	World.	 It	demonstrates	the	re-emergence	of	Third	World	






formed	 the	 foundations	 of	 the	 argument	 for	 the	 hegemonic	 nature	 of	 customary	
international	 law.	 In	 previous	 sub-headings,	 attempts	 were	made	 to	 demonstrate	
Third	 World	 resistance	 to	 such	 Western	 domination.	 Such	 counter-hegemonic	




Therefore,	 an	 inquiry	 into	 the	 African	 perspective	 in	 the	 making	 of	 customary	
international	 law	 further	 shows	 resistance	 to	 Western	 domination.	 This	 is	 also	
relevant	towards	understanding	the	polarised	nature	of	international	systems,	and	the	
need	 for	 international	 law	 to	 accommodate	 various	 cultures.	 In	 this	 section,	 the	
																																								 																				
173	E.	S.	Nwauche,	‘The	Constitutional	Challenge	of	the	Integration	and	Interaction	of	Customary	and	






































In	 spite	 of	 the	 above	 views,	 efforts	 have	 been	made	 to	 understand	 the	 nature	 of	




complexity	 of	 the	 term	 and	 the	 criticisms	 associated	 with	 it,	 he	 settled	 for	 a	
description	 of	 law	 that	 would	 serve	 both	 African	 and	 non-African	 societies.	 He	
suggested	that	‘the	law	of	a	given	community	is	the	body	of	rules	which	are	recognised	

















African	 legal	 systems	 are	 believed	 to	 have	 common	 features,	 leading	 to	 the	
description	 of	 African	 laws	 as	 ‘unity	 in	 diversity’,	 derived	 from	 their	 customary	
character.180	Such	notions	of	unity	in	diversity	could	be	traced	to	pre-colonial	Africa.	
Common	challenges,	ranging	from	social,	political	and	economic	changes,	appear	to	




post-colonial	 period,	 some	 aspects	 of	 African	 indigenous	 customary	 practice	 have	
been	retained	in	post-colonial	African	states.	Indigenous	political	systems	in	the	region	
still	 persist,	 as	 discussed	 earlier	 in	 this	 chapter.	 The	 retention	 of	 such	 indigenous	





















between	 these	 two	 types	 of	 situations,	 custom	 based	 on	 expressions	 of	 consent,	
special	interest	in	a	subject	matter	and	geography,	amongst	other	things.185	Classifying	
customs	based	on	these	factors	presents	a	fluid	outcome,	as	it	is	difficult	to	identify	
essential	 differences	 between	 these	 forms	 of	 custom.186	Most	 often,	 international	






debates	 on	 whether	 there	 is	 any	 basis	 for	 such	 distinctions	 in	 the	 application	 of	
custom.189	It	has	been	argued	that	there	is	no	basis	for	such	a	distinction	following	the	
																																								 																				






186	 Olufemi	 Elias,	 ‘The	 Relationship	 Between	 General	 and	 Particular	 Customary	 International	 Law’	
(1996),	see	note	184.	




















governing	 activities	 within	 the	 region.	 Arguably,	 such	 customary	 rules	 could	
contribute	to	the	resolution	of	international	conflicts,	especially	on	matters	affecting	
international	 bodies	 and	 members	 of	 African	 regions	 in	 issues	 within	 the	 African	
region.	 Furthermore,	 it	 could	 be	 posited	 that	 law-making	 originating	 from	 African	
regions	contributes	to	the	participation	of	non-state	actors	in	the	international	legal	
system,	 since	 it	 has	 been	 shown	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters	 that	 non-state	 actors	










Resistance	 by	 various	 non-state	 actors	 in	 the	 Third	 World	 has	 become	 a	 crucial	
discourse	in	the	pursuit	of	the	reconstruction	of	international	law.	In	particular,	this	
chapter	 demonstrated	 resistance	 to	 the	 insistence	 on	 the	 state	 as	 the	 sole	
determinant	of	the	making	of	(customary)	international	law.	Non-state	actors	are	at	
the	 centre	 of	 such	 resistance,	 and	 these	 include	 intellectuals,	 indigenous	 political	
leaders	and	women’s	groups,	among	others.	In	post-colonial	Africa,	non-state	actors	
are	shown	in	this	chapter	to	have	employed	certain	resistance	mechanisms	to	enforce	
their	 voices	 in	 law-making.	 Such	 resistance	 is	 shaping	 certain	 principles	 of	








Antony	 Allot,	 provide	 an	 understanding	 of	 customary	 international	 law	 from	 an	
African	perspective.	 Importantly,	 the	roles	of	 these	scholars	 (both	Third	World	and	
Western)	contribute	 to	 the	understanding	of	customary	 international	 law	and	how	
















law,	demonstrating	 that	 is	monopolised	by	a	 few	Western	states	who	advocate	 its	
universal	 application.	 This	 narrow	 understanding	 of	 one	 of	 the	 key	 sources	 of	
international	law	neglects	other	legal	traditions	as	well	as	the	diverse	participants	in	
the	international	legal	system.	Consequently,	the	legal	capacity	of	non-Western	non-
state	 actors	 to	 contribute	 to	 international	 law-making	 is	 adversely	 affected.	 The	
concerns	of	this	thesis	are	the	challenges	faced	by	the	Third	World	in	the	participation	
of	 the	 making	 of	 customary	 international	 law	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 colonial	
encounter,	 which	 ‘stripped’	 their	 legal	 personality.	 	 However,	 Third	 World	
confrontation	of	 this	 inequality	demonstrates	 their	counter-hegemonic	potential	 in	
custom-making.		



















Consequently,	 the	making	 of	 laws	 in	 this	 region	 is	 not	 an	 exclusive	 reserve	 of	 the	
European	model	of	states,	as	diverse	non-state	actors	are	contributing	as	well.	The	
participation	of	these	non-states	actors	in	custom-making	demonstrates	Third	World	
efforts	 to	 circumvent	 the	 status	 of	 being	 perpetual-recipient-heirs	 of	 hegemonic	
customary	rules	in	the	international	system.		
In	 setting	out	 the	above	study,	key	 terminologies,	 such	as	hegemony	and	counter-
hegemony,	 in	 relation	 to	 customary	 international	 law	 were	 examined	 from	 the	
perspective	of	Antonio	Gramsci’s	 ideas,	due	in	particular	to	their	relevance	in	post-
colonial	 theory.	 According	 to	Gramsci,	 power	 is	 distributed	 both	 through	 force	 (in	
political	 society)	 and	 through	manufactured	 consent	 (in	 civil	 society),	whereby	 his	
















states	 is	 enabled	 through	 international	 law.	 Customary	 international	 law	 is	 a	


























among	 the	 ‘civilised’	 countries.3	 Henry	 Wheaton,	 an	 influential	 American	 jurist,	
identified	 these	 civilised	 nations	 in	 his	 influential	 treatise	 on	 international	 law,	
Elements	of	International	Law,	as	‘the	Christian	people	of	Europe	or	those	of	European	
origin’.4			
Chapter	 Three	demonstrated	 in	 detail	 how	 traditional	 customary	 international	 law	
was	formulated	by	a	few	powerful	states	in	the	Global	North	to	protect	their	economic	
interests	 centred	 on	 raw	 materials	 in	 the	 Global	 South.	 Sustenance	 of	 colonial	





3Antony	 Anghie,	 ‘Finding	 the	 Peripheries:	 Sovereignty	 and	 Colonialism	 in	 Nineteenth-Century	
International	Law’,	(1999)	40	HARV.	INT’L	L.	J.	1.	







the	Third	World,	 some	distinctive	 indigenous	 features	have	not	been	extinguished.	
























anti-colonialists	 and	 other	 non-state	 actors	 through	 indigenous	 platforms,	 such	 as	












colonial	 times.	 Such	 legal	 capacity	 was	 generally	 suppressed	 during	 colonialism.	
However,	African	resistance	to	such	domination	has	led	to	continuous	resistance	in	
post-colonial	times,	demonstrating	the	re-emergence	of	Third	World	non-state	actors	
and	 their	 continuing	 participation	 in	 the	making	 of	 (customary)	 international	 law.	
Consequently,	 the	 customary	 practices	 arising	 from	 non-state	 actors	 in	 the	 Third	
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